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No current laboratory test can reliably identify patients with schizophrenia. Instead,
key symptoms are observed via language, including derailment, where patients cannot fol-
low a coherent storyline, and delusions, where false beliefs are repeated as fact. Brain
processes underlying these and other symptoms remain unclear, and characterizing them
would greatly enhance our understanding of schizophrenia. In this situation, computational
models can be valuable tools to formulate testable hypotheses and to complement clini-
cal research. This dissertation aims to capture the link between biology and schizophrenic
symptoms using DISCERN, a connectionist model of human story processing. Compet-
ing illness mechanisms proposed to underlie schizophrenia are simulated in DISCERN,
and are evaluated at the level of narrative language, the same level used to diagnose pa-
tients. The result is the first simulation of a speaker with schizophrenia. Of all illness
models, hyperlearning, a model of overly intense memory consolidation, produced the best
fit to patient data, as well as compelling models of delusions and derailments. If validated
experimentally, the hyperlearning hypothesis could advance the current understanding of
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Stories are a crucial part of who we are. They enable us to entertain others, to learn from
them, and to see the world through their eyes. Stories are deeply informative, and their
significance goes beyond communication and social exchange: We make sense of the world
and the people around us by fitting our experience into a coherent narrative structure. In
schizophrenia, this ongoing narrative breaks down. Disturbances in the perception and
expression of reality can be observed through the stories a patient tells. Indeed, narrative
language is the primary diagnostic tool, and clinicians use it every day to observe and assess
manifestations of schizophrenia. The purpose of cinical interviews, then, is to use narrative
language as a window into the schizophrenic mind. The motivation behind this disserta-
tion is the idea that computational models of narrative language can provide mechanistic
explanations of what is seen through that window. In other words, this dissertation aims to
understand the nature and pathophysiology of schizophrenia as disturbances in computa-
tions involved in story processing
1.1 The Biology of Schizophrenia
Over a century ago, Emil Kraepelin, one of the founders of modern psychiatry, asked his
assistants Frank Nissl and Alois Alzheimer to look for brain abnormalities in “dementia
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praecox,” the disorder now known as schizophrenia. The cortical and thalamic abnormal-
ities they reported were controversial, but the search for the biological underpinnings of
schizophrenia had begun (Bogerts et al. 2009). For much of the 20th century, Kraepelin’s
view that schizophrenia was likely caused by “a tangible morbid process in the brain” (Krae-
pelin 1896; c.f. Noll 2006) was overshadowed by the Freudian concept of schizophrenia
as a “psychogenic” disease. However, since the 1970s, Kraepelin’s theory of genetic and
biological defects as key contributors to psychiatric illness has returned to prominence, and
today it forms the foundation of biological psychiatry.
Schizophrenia research has come a long way since the days of Kraepelin. It is now
clear that schizophrenia is indeed a physical disease, and that structural brain abnormalities,
genetic vulnerabilities, and altered brain chemistry are all key components of the disorder.
Extensive biomedical research has implicated virtually every brain area and every major
neurotransmitter system in schizophrenia (Pearlson and Marsh 1999; Bogerts et al. 2009;
Glenthoj et al. 2009). This wealth of experimental findings has led to a large number of hy-
potheses regarding the causes and pathophysiology of schizophrenia, and recently, plausible
accounts of possible interactions between biology, genetics, and symptoms have begun to
emerge.
Despite these advances, the precise nature of schizophrenia is still largely a mys-
tery. No laboratory or neuroimaging test can reliably identify persons who suffer from it,
and the concept of schizophrenia itself remains a purely diagnostic construct. None of the
hypothetical links between biology and symptoms have gained wide-spread consensus, and
thus the century-old debate continues (Plum 1972; Ron and Harvey 1990; Kapur 2003).
At the same time, a better understanding of schizophrenia is badly needed, most im-
portantly because the lack of knowledge translates directly into a lack of adequate treatment
options. Dopamine-blocking antipsychotic drugs, which have been the mainstay of treat-
ment interventions since the 1950s, are reasonably effective, but address only a subset of
the symptoms, do not help all patients, and often cause dangerous side effects (Kane 1997;
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Kapur and Mamo 2003). A better understanding of the pathophysiology of schizophrenia
would likely lead to more effective drugs, and might suggest entirely new ways to treat or
even prevent schizophrenia (Brewer 2005; Pearlson 2000).
Given all the advances in experimental techniques in neuroscience, and given the
importance of developing a better understanding of schizophrenia, why has such an un-
derstanding has not yet emerged? One major problem is that schizophrenia is highly het-
erogeneous, i.e. both symptoms and observed biological abnormalities vary widely among
patients. This heterogeneity suggests that, rather than a single well-defined illness, schizo-
phrenia is likely to be a family of clinically related disorders that are, at least to some
degree, the result of different underlying biological mechanisms. What these pathological
mechanisms are, how they co-occur and interact, and how they lead to different patterns of
symptoms are all open questions. In short, heterogeneity complicates the question of cause
and effect, challenging researchers to infer complex combinations of causes from highly
variable patterns of symptoms.
The problem is further complicated by the fact that imaging, neuropathological, and
cognitive measures can associate schizophrenia with anatomical, neurochemical, and cog-
nitive changes, but they are in general not able to establish causality. For example, working
memory impairment is strongly associated with schizophrenia (Aleman et al. 1999), but it
is currently unclear if one is a result of the other, or if they are coincident effects of the same
cause. Similar uncertainty exists about many other brain abnormalities in schizophrenia.
In addition to these problems, however, I argue that an even more important ob-
stacle on the way to a better understanding of schizophrenia is the lack of an adequate
language in which to express hypotheses about the link between physiology and symptoms
in schizophrenia. In other words, new and advanced ways to investigate the schizophre-
nic brain experimentally should be complemented by new and equally powerful theoretical
tools. Contributing to the development of these tools is the principal motivation behind this
dissertation.
3
1.2 Modeling The Brain and Other Complex Systems
The need for new theoretical tools is not unique to schizophrenia research. The traditional
formal approach of obtaining analytical solutions to systems of mathematical equations is
inadequate for many complex adaptive systems like markets, ecosystems, or the human
brain. Until recently, researchers in these areas were limited to verbal theories, which often
lack precision and predictive power.
During the last few decades, computational models have emerged as an alternative
way to formulate theories, and have gained a prominent role in many scientific disciplines
that investigate complex systems, including climate science, economics, meteorology, as-
trophysics, and many others. Computational models are often based on purely mathematical
models, but are distinct from them in important ways. They do not demand a precise de-
scription of the system being modeled or its boundaries; they often incorporate other models
and span multiple levels of analysis; they are able to approximate the performance of sys-
tems that are not well-defined or too complex for analytical solutions; their predictions are
explicit rather than implicit and often include unexpected, emergent phenomena.
In cognitive science, computational models are often based on artificial neural net-
works, where mental processes and behavior are modeled as emergent phenomena in in-
terconnected networks of simple information-processing units. Most neural network-based
models are not intended to be physiologically accurate simulations of biological neurons
and their interactions in the human brain. Many details of biological neural networks, such
as separate neurotransmitter and receptor systems, the complex dynamics of single neurons,
and time-dependent information exchange via action potentials, are often either omitted or
abstracted into higher level approximations.
Nevertheless, connectionist models tend to exhibit many characteristics of informa-
tion processing in biological systems, including massively parallel computation, robustness
to noise and input errors, and the ability to learn and generalize from limited experience.
This property of brain-like information processing in systems that simulate biological mech-
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anisms on an abstract level makes connectionist cognitive models attractive: the simplicity
of the underlying framework makes it possible to build models of high-level cognition using
mechanisms that are plausible analogs of the real neural substrate.
During the last few decades, neural networks have been used extensively to create
models of human cognition in many different domains, including language, learning, vision,
and memory (McClelland et al. 1987; Elman 1990; Hinton 1991; Christiansen et al. 1999;
Miikkulainen et al. 2005; O’Reilly and Frank 2006). Neural network models such as these
have given detailed computational accounts of human behavior and its underlying informa-
tion processing mechanisms. Moreover, since such models are explicit, running systems,
many create unexpexted behavior that will lead to further experimental hypotheses.
1.3 Modeling Schizophrenia
The principal strength of neural network models lies in their intrinsic ability to connect our
understanding of biological systems at different levels of abstraction. They bridge the gap
between complex mental states and behavior on the one hand and underlying neural infor-
mation processing on the other. In schizophrenia research, where the central problem is
determining the ways in which biological abnormalities lead to altered behavior, this abil-
ity is precisely what is needed. A central working hypothesis is that neural networks can
be used meaningfully to model not only normal human cognition but also its impairment
in psychiatric illness. In other words, neural networks not only function in a brain-like
manner, but can also break down in the same way, creating an opportunity to advance our
understanding of both the healthy and the disordered brain. This dissertation is motivated
by this opportunity. Its goal is to give a computational account of schizophrenia that makes
explicit the link between biology and symptoms in terms of altered information process-
ing in a neural network model. Several previous computational studies had similar goals.
A number of neural network-based models have been used to simulate research findings
related to schizophrenia, including altered working memory (Braver et al. 1999; Cohen
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and Servan-Schreiber 1992; Monchi et al. 2000), hyperarousal states (Grossberg and Pepe
1970; Grossberg 1999), excessive semantic priming (Spitzer 1997), alterations of functional
connectivity between brain regions (Winder et al. 2007), attention (Wang and Fan 2007),
impairments of facial affect recognition (Carter and Neufeld 2007), and hallucinations and
delusions (Hoffman and McGlashan 1997; Ruppin et al. 1996; Loh et al. 2007).
The approach taken in this work, however, is new and different in several respects.
Most importantly, in contrast to previous studies, this research simulates manifestations of
schizophrenia using a model of narrative language. This is significant for two reasons. First,
conversational language is the primary diagnostic tool used to assess whether a patient has
schizophrenia or not. Key symptoms of schizophrenia such as delusions and disorganized
speech are observed directly through language, which means that a model of schizophrenic
language pathology can be evaluated on a clinically relevant level.
Second, clinical interviews are used to diagnose schizophrenia for good reason:
Narrative language and storytelling are among the richest human behaviors, and are con-
sidered critical for social intelligence (Bower and Morrow 1990), sense-making (Bruner
1991; Abolafia 2010), and cognition and consciousness (Rubin and Greenberg 2003). Fur-
thermore, narrative language cannot be reduced to the function of a specific brain region
or process. Its dysfunction in schizophrenia reveals the disturbance of deeper underlying
functions of memory and thought. The purpose of clinical interviews is to use narrative
language as a window to the schizophrenic mind, and computational models should be able
to do the same.
The modeling work reported here is based on DISCERN, a neural network-based
model of human story understanding and recall. The original DISCERN system was in-
troduced by Miikkulainen (1993), and has since been extended to handle complex stories
consisting of multiple events (Fidelman et al. 2005; Grasemann et al. 2007). Other exten-
sions in this dissertation include the ability to process emotional context of stories, and the
ability to filter distorted output language. DISCERN represents another way in which the
6
approach of this research differs from most previous work. DISCERN is a multi-modular
system that combines different network architectures and language-related functions into a
single, unified model of human story processing. The complexity of DISCERN translates
into a wealth of opportunities to simulate illness mechanisms underlying schizophrenia as
network disturbances in the model. This work takes full advantage of these opportunities:
A wide range of current research findings were simulated and compared using the model.
For instance, the candidate illness models included various disturbances of working mem-
ory (Potkin et al. 2009), loss of cortical connectivity (Feinberg 1982/1983), and semantic
memory dysfunction (Spitzer 1997), as well as simulations of overarousal and neuromodu-
latory dysfunction suggested by previous computational models (Grossberg and Pepe 1970;
Servan-Schreiber et al. 1990).
Moreover, hyperlearning, a model of aberrant memory consolidation (Grasemann
et al. 2009; Hoffman et al. 2010), turned out to be the most important illness model. The hy-
perlearning/DISCERN model is based on theories of psychosis advanced by Maher (1974)
and Kapur (2003), who propose that psychotic symptoms like delusions are due to abnor-
mally intense, or salient, experience, possibly driven by dopamine (DA) imbalance. Hy-
perlearning extends and formalizes this theory by implementing a possible mechanism by
which this could occur: Aberrant salience of experience leads to overly intense learning
during memory consolidation, which distorts and skews processing of narrative memory,
causing psychotic symptoms. This process is simulated in DISCERN using abnormally
high network learning rates in language processing modules, and it turns out to have signif-
icant predictive power.
The different illness models were applied to DISCERN, and their ability to recreate
language abnormalities in schizophrenia was evaluated both quantitatively and qualitatively.
The goal of these experiments, and of this dissertation, was to demonstrate that a neural
network-based model like DISCERN can be used meaningfully to compare separate illness
mechanisms, and to assess their viability as candidate causes of schizophrenia. Illness
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models can be distinguished by their distinctive language behavior, and can furthermore
generate predictions through unexpected, emergent behavior.
Beyond proving the concept, a further goal was to make a contribution to the cur-
rent understanding of schizophrenia. The need for testable, predictive hypotheses and the
attempt to find them are only partly academic. The illness models in DISCERN are detailed
computational hypotheses that produce complex behavioral changes at a clinically relevant
level. As such, their language behavior can explain and predict clinical data, and has the
potential to complement and guide future medical research.
If cognitive science can help advance schizophrenia research, no doubt the reverse is
true as well. Our understanding of cognition has greatly improved lately, but global, emer-
gent faculties of the mind like conciousness, intelligence, and personality are still largely a
mystery. A mental illness like schizophrenia, where these faculties change and break down
in complex ways, offers a unique window into the mind, and an opportunity to investigate
how it emerges from its neural substrate.
1.4 Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows. The next chapter reviews the literature on several
central topics of this dissertation. The current understanding of story processing in psychol-
ogy is discussed first, followed by a review of computational models of story processing.
The second part of the chapter is dedicated to schizophrenia, including its symptoms and
current research findings about its underlying causes. The final section reviews previous
computational models of schizophrenia related to this work.
Chapter 3 introduces the computational modeling tools that will be used later to
create simulations of schizophrenic language. DISCERN, a connectionist model of hu-
man story understanding and recall, is described in detail. Recent extensions of the model
are discussed, including the ability to process multi-script stories, a mechanism to attach
emotions to story segments, and a filter mechanism that reduces errors at the cost of lower
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overall language output. Based on the DISCERN model, eight simulations of candidate ill-
ness mechanisms that could underlie schizophrenia are then introduced. Each of the illness
models is motivated by a specific hypothesis about the pathophysiology of schizophrenia.
In each case, the relevant literature is reviewed and the implementation in DISCERN is
described.
Chapter 4 describes the steps necessary to develop a set of “healthy” DISCERN
systems as a basis for further experiments. An extensive corpus of input stories is designed,
semantic word representations are trained using the DISCERN model, and finally, network
training methods are optimized and used to produce concrete, running DISCERN systems.
In Chapter 5, the alternative illness models are evaluated experimentally. First, a
human subject study of story processing in schizophrenia is described, conducted at Yale
as part of a joint project with this dissertation research. The human subject data is used to
evaluate quantitatively how well the different illness models are able to match both healthy
humans and patients with schizophrenia.
Chapter 6 describes a second computational study that focuses on the more intense
symptoms that occur during active stages of schizophrenia. The different illness models
are again evaluated and compared, this time focusing on reproducing derailments and delu-
sions, two key symptoms of schziophrenic psychosis.
Chapter 7 discusses and interprets the findings presented in the previous chapters.
Strengths and limitations of the modeling approach are evaluated, as well as possible direc-




This chapter reviews the research literature on the three cornerstones of this dissertation:
stories, schizophrenia, and computational modeling. Current understanding of story pro-
cessing in psychology is discussed first, followed by a review of computational models of
story processing. The second part of the chapter is dedicated to schizophrenia. It provides
information on its symptoms, emphasizing those expressed through language, and reviews
current hypotheses about the link between symptoms and possible causes. The final section
of the chapter discusses previous computational models of schizophrenia.
2.1 Stories
Stories are the central theme that binds this dissertation together. The concept of stories, and
that of experience related through language, is a key part of our understanding of schizo-
phrenia, and it is also the core of the computational model that forms the basis of this
dissertation.
Stories viewed in a narrow sense, i.e. as narrative accounts of real or imaginary
events expressed through language, are an important social construct, because they enable
us to understand, learn from, and entertain each other. They are the principal tool by which
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we share experiences. However, they are even more interesting because they reflect and
reveal deeper processes through which we interpret, predict, and understand ourselves, our
world, and the people in it.
In a more general sense, then, the processes we use to encode ongoing experience
can be seen as a kind of narrative behavior, and the resulting memories that represent past
(or even fictional) events are stories, even if they are not exchanged with others. The con-
cept that we are living our own personal story is influential in philosophy of mind and
consciousness research (Bruner 1991; Rubin and Greenberg 2003). Dennett (1992), for
example, in defining the concept of “self”, says that
[...] it does seem that we are all virtuoso novelists, who find ourselves engaged
in all sorts of behavior, more or less unified, but sometimes disunified, and we
always put the best “faces” on it we can. We try to make all of our material
cohere into a single good story. And that story is our autobiography.
Along the same lines, Flanagan (1992) observes:
Evidence strongly suggests that humans in all cultures come to cast their own
identity in some sort of narrative form. We are inveterate storytellers.
Our personal narrative, then, is at least part of what defines us and unifies our iden-
tity. But just as importantly, processing stories involves every part of our mind. Memory,
attention, problem solving, and social cognition are all intrinsic and intricate parts of the
process of encoding, remembering, interpreting, applying, and exchanging stories.
In this sense, the stories we process are only partly linguistic: they are bundles of
sensory, interpersonal, emotive, and predictive information as well, and they play many
critical roles in our everyday lives. We use stories to give stucture to the events around
us. We repeat them to ourselves and to others — not just because they are entertaining
or intriguing, but because they are deeply informative. Stories are relentlessly formed,
molded and linked in memory because their representations provide the basis for predicting
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the world, and for understanding the actions and mental states of ourselves and the people
around us — a capacity of utmost importance in our complex social world.
Given that story processing is such a rich and complex behavior, it is not surpris-
ing that when it is impaired in psychiatric disorders, an equally rich range of symptoms
is observed. An important working hypothesis of this dissertation is that disturbances of
narrative language allow a deep look at how psychiatric disorders reshape and distort in-
formation processing in the brain. A model of altered story processing can then be used
meaningfully both to infer deep underlying processes and to test hypotheses about them.
2.2 Script Theory
In order to create a model of altered story processing, it is necessary to start with a model of
normal story processing. Such a model must in turn be based on the current understanding
of the human psychology involved. Script theory (Schank and Abelson 1977) provides such
a basis, and forms the fundamental framework underlying the model used in this work.
Script theory models the way humans process stereotypical sequences of events.
For example, every time we walk into a restaurant, approximately the same thing happens:
we wait to be seated, order a meal and eat it, pay, then leave. The specific restaurant and
the people with us may not be the same; the price and quality of the food may change. The
basic sequence of events, however, rarely does, and can therefore be learned and reused as
a script.
Scripts are best understood as templates for certain types of situations, including
open slots to be filled in (such as the kind of food), and constraints on what kinds of things
can fill the slots (e.g. you cannot order the decor). An instance of a script, then, is a tem-
plate representation whose slots have been filled to match a specific situation. In order to
understand a specific event, all we need to do is find out what kind of script it follows and
fill the slots with the appropriate concepts.
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Humans use scripts in may different ways to interact efficiently with each other,
grasp complex situations, and form expectations about a situation when faced with incom-
plete information. The restaurant script, for example, would tell us that we are not allowed
to pick a table ourselves, unless explicily told to do so. We do not have to ask anybody to
bring a menu, and we know without asking that the soup comes first and the dessert last.
If events and slot-fillers cannot be observed directly, they can instead be inferred based on
prior experience if a script for the current situation is available. Scipts are also used to struc-
ture memories efficiently — instead of remembering every detail about an event, the details
can be reconstructed later using just a stored script instance and whatever events violated
expectations. In fact, when recalling a past experience, humans can often not distinguish
observed events from those that were inferred from a script (Graesser et al. 1980).
Script theory was originally conceived as a technique in artificial intelligence, in-
tended as a way to encode procedural knowledge that would enable artificial systems to
form expectations and to understand their surroundings in terms of story-like constructs.
However, they were soon recognized for their capacity to model aspects of human cogni-
tion and language processing, and today scripts are central to the theory of human cognition
and memory. The hypothesis that humans use scripts is well supported by experimental ev-
idence. For example, the degree to which events in a story will be remembered can be
predicted by whether those events are part of a script (Graesser et al. 1980). Similarly, the
amount of time it takes humans to understand a sentence can be predicted by whether it fits
into a script (Den Uyl and van Oostendorp 1980). Script theory therefore forms a promising
framework for computational models of story processing.
It is important to note, however, that scripts should not be understood simply as a
way to process stories efficiently. Rather, script theory provides a general model for the way
humans think and learn about the structure of events in their world — narrative language is
only one prominent facet of the theory, much like its impairment in schizophrenia is only
one facet of deeper defects in the use of knowledge and the flow of information in the brain.
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2.3 Computational Models of Story Processing
Script theory was originally created in the context of contextual dependency theory (Schank
1972), a model of natural language processing that attempts to represent meaning as a set of
discrete tranformations of objects, times, mental states, etc., independently of grammatical
structure. Defined in this way, scripts are intrinsically a symbolic concept: Slots are filled
by unambiguous concepts; scripts are defined in terms of transitions between physical or
mental states, and each script is currently either occurring or it is not. Implementations
of script theory were therefore almost without exception symbolic systems. For example,
SAM (Cullingford 1978) was the original script-based story comprehension system. Schank
(1991) applied the theory to story telling and the idea of an intelligent tutor, and Schank and
Cleary (1995) applied the same idea to educational software.
In terms of language and story processing, which was its original goal, script theory
was at first not very influential. However, the theory was extended into a model of dynamic
memory Schank (1982, 1999). This work was the basis for case-based reasoning (Kolodner
1993), which is still influential in the area of knowledge representation and reasoning.
Recently, scripts have once again attracted interest, this time in the area of artificial
intelligence in games (Young et al. 2004; Riedl et al. 2011), intelligent teaching systems
(Rowe et al. 2010), and in automatic content generation and the design of interactive media
in general (Riedl and Young 2006; Jhala and van Velsen 2009; Riedl 2010). These emerging
applications are also motivating new basic research that attempts to understand creative
processes and narrative behavior in humans (e.g. Young 2007).
Neural network-based natural language processing has also been an active field in
the last three decades. However, in contrast to the abundance of symbolic work on the level
of stories and discourse, the focus of connectionist models has been on more traditional
problems in computational linguistics, i.e. sentence parsing and representation of semantic
knowledge (neural network-based AI in games is an active field, but is not generally based
on stories or language; e.g. Stanley et al. 2006).
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Many connectionist models of sentence parsing are built on a variation of simple re-
current networks (SRN; Elman 1990), and have modeled many aspects of human sentence
understanding successfully (Elman 1990; Miikkulainen 1990; Mayberry and Miikkulainen
2005; Farkas and Crocker 2008; Collobert and Weston 2008). Models of semantic knowl-
edge and lexical access are often based on self-organizing maps (Kohonen 1982), and have
been used to model the human bilingual lexicon (Li et al. 2004), large-scale vocabulary ac-
quisition (Sibley et al. 2008), and disorders like dyslexia (Miikkulainen 1997; Plaut 1997)
and aphasia (Miikkulainen and Kiran 2009; Grasemann et al. 2011).
In contrast to these sentence- and word-level models of human language processing,
the DISCERN model (Miikkulainen and Dyer 1991; Miikkulainen 1993) took a wider view
of natural language processing: It was the first integrated subsymbolic system that could
model the entire process of human story understanding and recall, from plain-text words
to episodic memories, and back to words. Stories in the original DISCERN model each
followed a single script, and the task of understanding, remembering, and reproducing them
was shared by a collection of cooperating simple recurrent networks and self-organizing
maps.
Before we take a closer look at the DISCERN model, the next section provides
background information on schizophrenia, including its symptoms and a review of current
hypotheses about its underlying pathology. The nature of these hypotheses, combined with
the key role of abnormal narrative language in schizophrenia, will illustrate why a subsym-
bolic model of story processing like DISCERN promises to be well suited to capture central
aspects of schizophrenia and its biological causes.
2.4 Schizophrenia
Schizophrenia is a disabling psychiatric disorder characterized by complex alterations in
the perception and expression of reality. Patients may suffer from a wide range of symp-
toms, including hallucinations, bizarre and unusual behavior, delusions, and the inability to
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communicate effectively via language. The onset of schizophrenia, which usually occurs in
adolescence or early adulthood, is often characterized by dramatic psychotic symptoms that
tend to wax and wane over time. In later stages of the disorder, these psychotic episodes of-
ten give way to other more enduring deficits, including blunted emotions, social withdrawal,
and reduced language output.
Schizophrenia is diagnosed by observing a patient’s behavior and self-reported ex-
periences. No laboratory test for schizophrenia exists, and in fact underlying brain mech-
nisms are unknown. Schizophrenia is therefore defined as a collection of symptoms, and
while the diagnosis is reliable, its validity can be questioned (Pearlson 2000). Specifically,
symptoms and outcome in schizophrenia are highly variable, suggesting that it may not be a
single illness but a family of clinically related disorders. This possibility is as real today as it
was almost a century ago, when Eugen Bleuler deliberately referred to “the schizophrenias”
in the plural when he coined that name (Bleuler 1911).
Despite the fact that its underlying causes are not known, partially effective treat-
ments for schizophrenia exist, mainly based on medication that can help manage psychotic
symptoms. Such antipsychotic medication is sometimes considered surprisingly effective
given that the neurobiological and neurocognitive basis of schizophrenia is so poorly un-
derstood (Kane 1997). However, antipsychotic drugs often have severe and dangerous side-
effects, they do not help all patients, and they do not address negative symptoms or cog-
nitive impairment, which can be equally disabling. These shortcomings make better and
more targeted treatment an important goal.
This section describes the symptoms of schizophrenia and discusses current hy-
potheses about the brain mechanisms underlying it, focusing on those most relevant to this
dissertation in more detail.
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2.4.1 Overview of the Symptoms of Schizophrenia
The manifestations of schizophrenia are complex and span a wide range of altered behavior,
perception, and emotion. The following descriptions cover the characteristic symptoms laid
out in the current American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM IV-TR, 2000). They are commonly divided into two groups,
positive and negative symptoms.
1. Positive Symptoms. These symptoms describe behavior or experiences that are not
usually present in healthy individuals, but can be present in schizophrenia. Positive
symptoms are often called psychotic symptoms, even though the term is less precise,
and other, less inclusive definitions exist. In this dissertation, positive and psychotic
symptoms are synonyms.
Delusions are pathological false beliefs that are held despite evidence to the
contrary. Not all false or unsupported beliefs are pathological. For example, beliefs
that are based on deception or normal religious beliefs do not qualify as delusions
(Andreasen 1984). Delusions often share one of several common themes, like the
belief that one is a famous person like Napoleon, or that one’s thoughts, feelings, or
behavior is controlled by outside forces.
Hallucinations are perceptions that appear real and occur without an outside
stimulus. Such perceptions are symptoms only if they occur in a concious and wake-
ful state. In schizophrenia, auditory hallucinations are very common, often in the
form of one or more voices conversing or commenting on the patient’s actions.
Grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior includes inappropriate or bizarre
behavior that interferes with regular daily activities. For example, patients may dress
inappropriately, or frequently have unprovoked confrontations. Catatonic behavior
may include peculiar or absent motor behavior, or lack of reactivity to outside stimuli.
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Disorganized speech is fluent spoken language that fails to communicate ef-
fectively or follow a coherent discourse plan. It is a manifestation of positive for-
mal thought disorder, i.e. it is believed to reflect an underlying impairment of verbal
thought. The most prominent signs of disorganized speech are difficulties in main-
taining a coherent story line (e.g. derailment refers to speech that switches topics
without apparent cause), but patients may also show other signs like blocking (inter-
ruption of speech before it is complete), or (rarely) produce completely incoherent
language (word salad).
2. Negative symptoms, or deficit symptoms, describe the absence of a normal type of
behavior or emotional response.
Blunted affect describes the absence of normal emotional response, both posi-
tive and negative. Anhedonia, a similar symptom that describes a decrease or absence
of feelings of pleasure, is also often mentioned in schizophrenia.
Alogia, or poverty of speech, is a lack of volume and content of voluntary speech.
Patients with alogia tend to give only short answers to direct questions, and some-
times do not say anything without prompting. Alogia is commonly thought to be a
sign of negative formal thought disorder, i.e. it is assumed to reflect an underlying
poverty of thought.
Avolition is the general absence of drive, motivation and normal goal-directed
behavior.
In addition to these symptoms, cognitive impairments in schizophrenia are common
but not ubiquitous, including reduced working memory capacity, impaired verbal learning,
and disturbed lexical access. These deficits are not used for diagnosis, but they are relatively
consistent across the different clinical subtypes, and some researchers believe that cogni-
tive impairment (especially working memory impairment) should be regarded as a central
pathology in schizophrenia (Lewis and Gonzales-Burgos 2006). The true significance of
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cognitive impairment is currently unclear, but it is by no means specific to schizophrenia
(Crockett et al. 1988), and could also be the result of the stress involved in such a severe
psychiatric illness (Arnsten and Goldman-Rakic 1998).
Based on commonly co-occurring patterns of symptoms, five clinical subtypes of
schizophrenia have been identified, including the paranoid type, where symptoms include
delusions and hallucinations but not prominent thought disorder, and the disorganized type,
where symptoms are dominated by prominent thought disorder, disorganized behavior, and
emotional blunting. The other three types are catatonic, undifferentiated, and residual type
schizophrenia.
2.4.2 Diagnosis
Patients with schizophrenia rarely have all of the above symptoms, and patterns of symp-
toms vary widely from patient to patient. In addition, most symptoms are shared with other
illnesses. Psychosis, for example, occurs in a variety of other disorders, including bipolar
disorder, drug abuse, clinical depression, and other psychiatric or medical conditions. Delu-
sions also occur in delusional disorder. Negative symptoms overlap with the symptoms of
depression; social withdrawal can be a sign of anxiety disorder. These and other similarities
make the differential diagnosis of schizophrenia difficult.
Several standardized diagnostic criteria exist for schizophrenia that are intended to
make consistent and reliabe diagnosis possible. For example, the criteria that are currently
used in the United States, as well as for most research studies, are those described in the
DSM IV-TR. In order to be diagnosed with schizophrenia according to these criteria, a
patient must only display two of the seven symptoms, at least one of them positive. If
hallucinated voices are present that comment on the patient’s life, or if delusions are judged
to be bizarre, only that symptom is required. However, in all cases, the patient must suffer
from social or occupational dysfunction, and signs of the disorder must persist for at least
six months.
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The diagnosis of schizophrenia relies almost entirely on language: A clinical inter-
view is conducted with the patient, and diagnosis is made based on the observed behavior.
Information comes from two primary sources: The symptoms reported by the patient, and
the signs observed through his or her language. Hallucinations, for example, would be diag-
nosed because the patient says something like “I hear voices,” not because the interviewer
is able to hear them. In contrast, disorganized speech is observed directly in the discourse
structure and in abnormal speech patterns. Similarly, delusions can be observed directly, for
example when a patient offers bizarre opinions or states patently false things as fact. Alogia
can also be directly observed when patients talk very little and volunteers no information in
a conversation.
The focus of this research is on symptoms that can be observed directly in the
language of schizophrenic patients, most importantly disorganized language and delusions.
The following sections discuss these symptoms in more detail.
2.4.3 Disorganized Speech
Language disorganization can take a variety of different forms. Patients with schizophrenia
often have problems maintaining a consistent storyline. For example, circumstantiality
describes extreme long-windedness or speech that is delayed by unnecessary or irrelevant
detail. Distractable speech means the patient changes subjects easily, but in response to a
real stimulus (i.e. not without apparent cause). The following example was taken from the
Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS; Andreasen 1984):
Then I left San Francisco and moved to ... where did you get that tie? It looks
like it’s left over from the 50’s [...]
Derailment is a speech pattern where a patient switches from one topic to another
that may be only vaguely related or completely unrelated to the current one, leaving the
listener in a bewildered state. Even if no single derailment is particularly severe, steady
20
slippage can lead to answers that have nothing in common with the original question. De-
railed language in schizophrenia often seems disjointed and fragmented, giving the impres-
sion of an arbitrary juxtaposition of “discourse shards.” The following example is part of
an interview with a thought-disordered patient (Andreasen 1984):
Interviewer: Did you enjoy college?
Subject: Um-hum. Oh hey well, I really enjoyed some communities I tried
it, and the, and the next day when I’d be going out, you know, um, I took
control like uh, I put, um, bleach on my hair in, in California. My roommate
was from Chicago, and she was going to the junior college. And we lived in
the Y.M.C.A., so she wanted to put it, um, peroxide on my hair, and she did,
and I got up and looked at the mirror and tears came to my eyes. Now do you
understand it, I was fully aware of what was going on but why couldn’t I, I...
why, why the tears? I can’t understand that, can you?
In extreme cases, disorganized language can be entirely incomprehensibe at times.
The main difference between such “word salad” and severe derailments is that the break-
down occurs within the sentence structure, which is not the case for derailments. This
type of behavior is rare in schizophrenia – in general, the sentence structure of thought-
disordered schizophrenic patients is intact.
Apart from these difficulties in following a coherent discourse plan, thought-disordered
patients sometimes repeat words or phrases (perseveration), make word choices based on
rhymes and puns rather than meaning (clanging), or stop speaking before a thought is com-
pleted (blocking). Primarily, however, disorganized language in schizophrenia is character-




Delusions can take many different forms, but in almost all cases, they follow one of a
surprisingly small number of themes, for example:
• Grandiose delusions include the belief that one is a famous person, for example a
rock star or Jesus Christ, or believing that one has special powers or abilities.
• Persecutory delusions are beliefs that one is being conspired against or persecuted.
Examples include secret agents being after the patient, coworkers or neighbors ha-
rassing the patient, the phone being bugged and the mail opened, etc. Persecutory
delusions can be extremely complex and self-consistent.
• Delusions of reference are delusions where the patient thinks that insignificant events
refer to him or have special significance. Items on the news, for example, may be seen
as messages intended specifically for the patient.
• Delusions of thought insertion, thought control, thought broadcasting. These are
delusions where the patient thinks his thought are controlled or inserted by an outside
force, or that his thoughts are being broadcast so that he or others can hear them.
• Delusions of control are the experience of one’s actions and feelings being controlled
by an outside force. For example, the patient may feel that aliens are controlling his
brain with radio waves.
Apart from the content, delusions are generally classified as bizarre (e.g. aliens
removing the patient’s brain) or non-bizarre (being followed by the CIA). The severity of a
delusion is also judged by its complexity and self-consistency, and by the patient’s ability
to question his beliefs.
Delusions in schizophrenia are often bizarre and frequently have paranoid content.
Patients with persecutory delusions tend to confuse the actors and agents in their personal
stories with those of the shared stories of their culture. Often, patients inserts themselves
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into stories that are imaginary or unrelated to the patient. Such “agency shifts” are thought
to be the cause of the spurious plots and imaginary conspiracies that characterize persecu-
tory delusions.
The common themes of delusional beliefs change to some extent over time, and
adapt to cultural context. For example, unsurprisingly, delusions today include witches
much less frequently than a century ago. On the other hand, delusions of being controlled
seem to have occured in a stable fraction of schizophrenia patients between 1886 and 1946
(Kranz 1967). Such shared patterns in delusional beliefs suggest that they have a common
underlying cause, and that the same essential stories are adapted to the individual and his
cultural context in each case. The DSM-IV defines a delusion as
A false personal belief based on incorrect inference about external reality and
firmly sustained in spite of what almost everyone else believes and in spite of
what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary
[...]
Maher (2002) pointed out several ways in which this definition is problematic. For exam-
ple, many delusions, like being followed by secret agents, are actually possible, and many
others can only be refuted with extreme difficulty. More importantly, the definition contains
the assumption that delusions are caused by incorrect inference. In fact, experimental data
suggest that formal, syllogistic reasoning in delusional patients is not impaired compared to
healthy individuals (Kemp et al. 1997). Furthermore, healthy persons frequently acquire be-
liefs by incorrect inference, and indeed often hold irrational beliefs like having seen UFOs
(Gallup and Newport 1991). Note that in this case as well, proving incontrovertibly that no
UFO has ever visited the Earth would be impossible.
If the abnormality underlying delusions is not incorrect inference, then, what other
cause could there be? Maher (1974, 2002) proposed that some delusional ideas are based on
anomalous experience. Simply stated, a failure to predict events leads to a feeling of undi-
rected significance, which causes the need for an explanation. Finding such an explanation,
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even a delusional one, brings relief, and evidence to the contrary is ignored to protect the
explanation. Maher also pointed out that not all delusions need to be formed in the same
way, just like non-delusional beliefs may be acquired in many different ways.
2.5 Possible Causes of Schizophrenia
After many decades of research into the causes of schizophrenia, not much is known with
any certainty. Advances in neuroimaging, pharmacological, and post-mortem techniques
have at least demonstrated one fact: Schizophrenia is a physical illness, involving genetic,
developmental, anatomical, and neurochemical abnormalities (Weinberger 1995). The ex-
act nature of these abnormalities, which ones are central, and how they cause symptoms,
are still open questions, and the debate continues (Plum 1972; Ron and Harvey 1990; Kapur
2003).
This section discusses some current attempts to answer these questions. In order to
manage the vast research literature on the subject, I will focus on hypotheses about schizo-
phrenia that establish a link between biological processes on the one hand and abnormal
experience and behavior on the other. Work that deals with only one of the two is only
included if it provides converging evidence.
When discussing specific hypotheses about schizophrenia, it is important to keep
in mind that schizophrenia is heterogeneus, which makes the search for underlying illness
mechanisms much more complicated, and opens up a number of additional questions: How
many different illnesses are there? Do they correspond to known clinical subtypes? Which
symptoms arise from which underlying mechanisms, and why do they tend to occur to-
gether? The problem has become one of inferring many different causes from many effects,
and, as Maher and Deldin (2002) put it,
Arguing backwards from effect to cause is notoriously unreliable, but it is a
constant problem for the research pathologist who takes heterogeneity seri-
ously.
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Despite these difficulties, a number of plausible partial explanations have begun to emerge.
The remainder of this section reviews some of them, emphasizing the ones that are relevant
to this dissertation.
2.5.1 Abnormal Brain Connectivity
In schizophrenia, both local cortical connections (microcircuitry) and connectivity between
different regions of the cortex (macrocircuitry) were found to be altered (Bogerts et al.
2009). These alterations are especially interesting because schizophrenia has long been
considered a developmental disorder (Weinberger 1987; Feinberg 1982/1983), and humans
ordinarily lose about 40% of their synapses through a developmental process called cortical
pruning (Huttenlocher 1979; Chechik et al. 1998; Abitz et al. 2007) — a process that ends
during the same developmental period in which schizophrenia usually begins, namely late
adolescence to early adulthood. This suspicious timing is the original motivation behind
the pruning hypothesis of schizophrenia, which suggests that overeager or prolonged de-
velopmental pruning contributes to the emergence of schizophrenia (Feinberg 1982/1983;
Saugstad 1994).
The pruning hypothesis has received further support from several studies indicating
that neuropil (the tangle of axons and dendrites surrounding cortical neurons) is reduced in
schizophrenia. Imaging studies have shown less gray matter in patients with schizophrenia
than in normals (Buchanan et al. 1998), especially in the prefrontal cortex (PFC), a brain
area implicated in many symptoms of schizophrenia, and also one where developmental
pruning is especially pronounced (Huttenlocher 1997). Furthermore, neurons are more
dense than normal in several prefrontal areas in schizophrenia (Selemon et al. 1995, 1998),
while the actual number of cortical neurons is not changed (Pakkenberg 1993). Taken
together, these findings suggest that neuropil is reduced and that the cortex is less well
connected in schizophrenia.
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Recently, advances in functional brain imaging and EEG analysis have revealed an-
other kind of abnormal connectivity in schizophrenia. Several researchers reported patterns
of changed functional connectivity between brain regions in schizophrenia. For example,
Kim et al. (2003) observed functional disconnection between prefrontal and parietal cor-
tices during working memory processing in schizophrenia in a PET study. More recently,
Karlsgodt (2008) reported anatomical changes in frontal-parietal white matter connections
and linked such changes to performance on working memory tasks. Another imaging study
(Meyer-Lindenberg et al. 2001) found similar disruptions of interactions between brain re-
gions, and Sakkalis et al. (2006) observed disconnections using EEG data. These findings
support the view that schizophrenia may be a disorder of brain connectivity and involve
white-matter pathology.
Interestingly, both local PFC connectivity and frontal-parietal networks are thought
to play key roles in working memory function (Smith and Jonides 1997; D’Esposito et al.
2000; Postle et al. 2003). In schizophrenia, working memory, along with other execu-
tive functions associated with the frontal cortex, is definitely impaired (Nuechterlein and
Dawson 1984; Bilder et al. 2000; Gur et al. 2007), and PFC function in general is often
considered central to the pathophysiology of schizophrenia (Bogerts et al. 2009).
2.5.2 Dopamine
In its original form, the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia suggests that some symptoms
of schizophrenia are caused by abnormal dopaminergic transmission in the brain, probably
involving overactivity of midbrain dopamine (DA) neurons that project to limbic and corti-
cal regions. It originated with the observation that antipsychotic drugs are effective because
they block the D2 dopamine receptor (Kapur and Seeman 2001), while DA agonists on the
other hand can provoke psychotic symptoms even in healthy individuals (Egan and Wein-
berger 1997; Curran et al. 2004), and are much more likely to do so in psychotic patients
(Lieberman et al. 1987). Imaging studies have provided further evidence for excessive DA
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release in schizophrenia, especially when patients are having active symptoms (Guo et al.
2003; Laruelle 2000).
On balance, the evidence that abnormal DA activity is involved in schizophrenia
in some form is strong. However, there is some uncertainty whether or not it is a direct
cause of symptoms. First, active schizophrenia is a very stressful condition (Dazzi et al.
2004), and stress is known to elevate midbrain DA release. Second, a number of studies
have suggested reduced cortical DA release in patients with schizophrenia (Lidow et al.
1997; Goldman-Rakic et al. 2004). Third, blocking DA completely through drugs does not
universally or immediately remove active symptoms.
Until recently, detailed accounts of how DA imbalance could lead to manifesta-
tions of schizophrenia were rare. The complex functions of DA in the brain, including in
reward and reinforcement, synaptic plasticity, and working memory were not sufficiently
understood. However, advances in the understanding of DA function have led to several
plausible theories, and today the DA hypothesis subsumes a number of different accounts
of links between DA and schizophrenia.
One widely endorsed emerging theory is due to Kapur (Kapur 2003; Kapur et al.
2005). Based on the view that DA activity mediates motivational salience (Berridge and
Robinson 1998), and extending Maher’s model of delusion formation (Maher 1974, 2002),
Kapur proposes that in schizophrenia, increased midbrain DA release leads to abnormally
enhanced motivational salience. The salience in turn is thought to cause psychotic symp-
toms through normal mechanisms of memory, learning and inference, but based on abnor-
mal and overly intense experience. Delusions, for example, are explained as secondary
reactions to an altered experience of the world — i.e. trying to make sense of the aber-
rant significance assigned to insignificant events or facts. Hallucinations are simply seen as
normal percepts and memories that are pathologically enhanced by abnormal salience.
A different take on the DA hypothesis was prompted by computational models of
the role of DA in working memory (WM; Servan-Schreiber et al. 1990; Trantham-Davidson
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et al. 2004). In particular, Braver et al. (1999) offered a possible explanation of how ab-
normal DA transmission in the midbrain and frontal cortex might lead to cognitive deficits
observed in schizophrenia. According to this theory, tonic DA activity (possibly mediated
by the D1 receptor) serves to stabilize activation patterns stored in working memory, while
phasic (D2) dopamine activity temporarily destabilizes those patterns to facilitate updates.
Thus, DA imbalance could make working memory either unstable or too stable, possibly
explaining cognitive impairment and negative symptoms in schizophrenia. Additionally,
overactivity of midbrain D2 dopamine could lead to faulty information gating and spurious
working memory updates without meaningful input, providing a possible model for psy-
chotic symptoms. Recent reports of excessive cortical noise, reduced signal-to-noise ratio,
reduced control, and reduced efficiency in frontal cortical systems linked to WM in persons
with schizophrenia Potkin et al. (2009); Tan et al. (2007); Winterer and Weinberger (2004)
support the view that WM dysfunction plays a role in schizophrenia.
The two versions of the dopamine hypothesis described above — abnormal working
memory function and aberrant motivational salience — largely concern different complexes
of symptoms and are formulated at different conceptual levels. Nevertheless, a classic the-
ory first proposed by Weinberger (1987) suggests a possibility to unify the two. Weinberger
postulates a “paradoxical state” of DA function in schizophrenia, where low cortical DA
levels and high midbrain DA levels coexist. Combining the three hypotheses, low pre-
frontal DA activity could account for cognitive deficits and negative symptoms, while high
midbrain DA would produce heightened phasic D2 activity, a possible neural substrate of
aberrant salience. According to Weinberger, such a paradoxical state could be caused by a
primary impairment of prefrontal DA function wich could cause a chain reaction involving
cortical, midbrain, and limbic systems that induces excessive D2 midbrain activity. How-
ever, the opposite direction of causality is also possible: A recent animal study by Kellen-
donk et al. (2006) suggests that even temporarily increased midbrain DA transmission can
cause persistent abnormalities of prefrontal DA function and WM impairment.
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In more recent version of the DA hypothesis, Assadi et al. (2009) proposed that
dopaminergic dysregulation of a network involving dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC),
striatum, and thalamus could contribute to the pathophysiology of schizophrenia. The
dACC and its related subcortical structures are involved in decision making (Kennerley
et al. 2006; Hampton and O’Doherty 2007), and the midbrain DA system regulates this net-
work (Salamone et al. 2007). According to this hypothesis, failure of the decision-making
process leads to negative symptoms and disorganization in schizophrenia. The faulty deci-
sion network fnord does not cause delusions and hallucinations, but delusions and hallucia-
nations cause social dysfunction because of impaired decision-making.
In summary, there is strong evidence that DA is involved in schizophrenia, but there
is no consensus yet as to how DA dysregulation could cause symptoms. Given the wide
range of DA functions in the brain, DA imbalance could contribute to the manifestations
of schizophrenia in many different ways. Emerging hypotheses are often not mutually
exclusive, and include working memory impairment, aberrant motivational salience, and
dysregulated decision-making networks.
2.5.3 Impaired Semantic Memory
Converging evidence from imaging, psycholinguistic, computational, and lesion studies
suggests that map-like cortical structures encode semantic knowledge in the human brain
(Farah and Wallace 1992; Caramazza et al. 1994; Spitzer et al. 1995). Semantic concepts
in such topographic maps are localized, and the map structure is organized according to
similarities in the use and meaning of concepts.
Given this development in the understanding of associative semantic memory, Spitzer
(1997) argued that early characterizations of schizophrenic pathology in terms of associa-
tion psychology become significant again. Specifically, the classic observations that free
word associations produced by schizophrenic patients tend to “proceed along new lines” and
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that “indirect associations receive unusual significance” (Bleuler, 1911, c.f. Spitzer, 1997)
suggest that semantic maps, or access to semantic maps, are disturbed in schizophrenia.
Disturbed lexical access in schizophrenia has been investigated recently using lex-
ical decision tasks, where subjects decide whether a given string of characters is a word
or not. A robust phenomenon demonstrated in both healthy and schizophrenic subjects is
semantic priming: a target word is recognized faster if it is preceded by a closely related
word called a prime (e.g. black → white). This effect has been attributed to activation in
the semantic map that spreads from the prime to related words and pre-activates the target
word (Neely 1977, 1991). Several studies demonstrated that this effect is more pronounced
in thought-disordered (TD) schizophrenic patients (Manschreck et al. 1988; Kwapil et al.
1990; Spitzer et al. 1993a), although those findings have not been universally replicated
(Chapin et al. 1989; Ober et al. 1995; but see Moritz et al. 2003). Even greater increases
in priming for TD schizophrenic patients were observed when the relation between prime
and target word was indirect, as in black → (white) → snow, or lion → (tiger) → stripes
(Spitzer et al. 1993a).
The increased priming effect, combined with the map-based model of semantic
memory, has led to the hyper-priming hypothesis, which states that excessive spreading
activation in semantic maps is a major contributor to the symptoms of thought disorder in
schizophrenia (Maher et al. 1987; Spitzer et al. 1993b; Aloia et al. 1998; Moritz et al. 2003).
The indirect priming effect suggests furthermore that the activation spreads not only faster,
but also farther in TD patients with schizophrenia (Spitzer et al. 1993a; Spitzer 1997).
Spitzer also argued that a combined dysfunction of semantic and working memory
can account for other clinically relevant symptoms as well, including the pervasive lack of
sensitivity to context found in schizophrenia patients. He also pointed out that the observed
differences in lexical access could be due to deeper structural or functional cortical deficits.
Indeed, studies of verbal fluency and object comparisons suggest that semantic memory
itself, not just access to it, may be disorganized in TD schizoprenic patients (Goldberg
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et al. 1998; Tallent et al. 2001). This hypothesis is also supported by the fact that semantic
priming abnormalities are independent of medication, and seem to persist over the entire
course of schizophrenia (Moritz et al. 2003). To complicate things further, imaging stud-
ies have shown cortical overactivation during semantic association tasks (Kuperberg et al.
2007; Assaf et al. 2006), suggesting that overpriming effects may be due to general semantic
overactivation.
In summary, abnormal lexical access in TD schizophrenic patients has prompted the
hypothesis that excessive spreading of activation in map-like semantic networks is a major
contributor to thought disorder in schizophrenia. Disturbances of semantic memory in TD
schizophrenic patients are well established, but their exact nature, and whether or not they
cause thought disorder, is currently unclear.
2.5.4 Other Possible Causes
In addition to the hypotheses about the causes of schizophrenia discussed so far, numerous
others have been proposed. Structural abnormalities in many different parts of the brain
have been linked to schizophrenia, including in the hippocampus, basal ganglia, PFC, cin-
gulate cortex, and others (see Bogerts et al. 2009 for a review).
Apart from dopamine transmission, many other biochemical alterations have been
reported, implicating almost every major neurotransmitter system, including serotonin,
GABA, glutamate, norepinephrine, and others (see Glenthoj et al. 2009 for a review).
Historically the immune hypothesis of schizophrenia has received much attention,
which states that neuroinflammatory (possibly autoimmune) processes are significant in
schizophrenia (Bogerts et al. 2009). Another influential hypothesis is due to Crow and col-
leagues, who state that abnormal brain development (possibly including connection prun-
ing) could lead to a failure to achieve left or right dominance, which could ultimately cause
schizophrenia. (Crow 1990). Postmortem and imaging studies have confirmed that schizo-
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phrenic brains are sometimes less lateralized, and schizophrenic patients are more likely to
be left-handed or mixed-handed than the general population (see Maher 2002 for a review).
More recently, a mechanism that has been implicated in schizophrenia is apoptosis,
i.e. programmed cell death that is regulated by a complex mechanism of cell signals. Re-
cent postmortem studies suggest that apoptotic mechanisms in several cortical regions are
dysregulated (Glantz et al. 2006). Furthermore, certain pro-apoptotic triggers can lead to a
“sub-lethal” form of apoptosis that eliminates synapses without neuronal loss, a mechanism
that could account for the reduced neuropil (LF et al. 2005; Glantz and Lewis 2000).
In summary, there is evidencethat many different neurochemical, cognitive, and
anatomical abnormalities are involved schizophrenia. Competing hypotheses, which are
not always mutually exclusive, often involve dopamine imbalance, developmental abnor-
malities, or disturbed semantic memory. The heterogeneity of schizophrenia makes the
search for underlying causes more difficult, and it is unlikely that any one theory will be
able to explain the complex cognitive, emotional, and behavioral changes in schizophrenia.
Given the daunting nature of this task, new tools to formalize and test hypotheses and to
complement and guide clinical research are needed.
2.6 Computational Models of Schizophrenia
During the last two decades, neural network-based models have increasingly been used in
research that attempts to capture and express central aspects of psychiatric and neurological
disorders in a computational process. Models of many known disorders have been proposed,
including conditions as varied as Alzheimer’s disease (Finkel 2000; Adeli et al. 2005),
epilepsy (Wendling 2008), depression (Huys 2007), dyslexia (Harm and Seidenberg 1999;
Miikkulainen 1997) and schizophrenia (Grossberg and Pepe 1970; Hoffman et al. 1986;
Cohen et al. 1996; Reggia et al. 1999; Spitzer 1997).
These models are useful because they can potentially link underlying causes of brain
disorders to their behavioral manifestations, and because they can express hypotheses about
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such links in a formal yet flexible and predictive way. This ability makes them attractive the-
oretical tools to complement experimental research. Schizophrenia has been an important
focus for computational models of psychiatric disorders, both because of its complexity
and because experimental research has so far failed to identify its causes. Schizophrenia
thus presents an opportunity to demonstrate the value of computational models as well as a
challenge to create testable computational hypotheses of such a complex and heterogeneous
disorder.
As early as 1970, based on the theory that schizophrenic patients are in a constant
state of overarousal, Grossberg and Pepe (1970) described a neural network model where
pathological reductions of spiking thresholds caused an increased span of learned associ-
ations, suggesting a model for attention deficits and loose associations in schizophrenia.
Later, Grossberg (1999) developed a model of hallucinations based on Adaptive Resonance
Theory (ART) where hyperactive modulatory signals intensify top-down predictions such
that perceptions occur without external input. Again based on ART, Grossberg (2000) ad-
vanced a model that attempts to explain negative symptoms in schizophrenia as imbalanced
opponent processes between emotional centers and the cortex.
PARRY, another early simulation of schizophrenia, was introduced by Colby (1973).
PARRY was a symbolic system rather than a neural network-based model, but it is espe-
cially relevant to this dissertation because it attempted to simulate the language of a para-
noid schizophrenic. The system included a behavioral model based on conceptualizations
and beliefs, i.e. judgments about specific conceptualizations. Paranoid schizophrenia was
modeled as a dysfunction of the belief system, leading to abnormal judgments to accept or
reject propositions.
In another early study of psychopathology, Hoffman (1987) investigated perturba-
tions in attractor networks (Hopfield 1982) to model dysfunctional associative memory in
schizophrenia. In response to information overload in such networks, instabilities and “par-
asitic” stable states emerged, suggesting disorganization and delusions in schizophrenia.
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Several other models have also focused on the positive symptoms of schizophrenia.
Ruppin et al. (1996) studied a computational model of Stevens’s (1992) theory of the patho-
genesis of schizophrenia. This theory suggests that in schizophrenia, projections from the
medial temporal cortex to the frontal cortex are lost, and symptoms then emerge because
synapses regrow at the projection sites to compensate for the lost connectivity. Ruppin and
colleagues simulated these hypothesized synaptic changes in a model of the frontal cortex
based on an attractor network. They observed spontaneous, stimulus-independent retrieval
of stored memories that focused on just a few of the stored patterns, suggesting hallucina-
tions and delusions that occur in schizophrenia without apparent external cause.
In a more recent study, Loh et al. (2007) used similar but more biologically detailed
networks to model symptoms of schizophrenia through changes in network dynamics. Re-
ducing the depth of basins of attraction in spiking attractor networks reduced the stability of
memory states, suggesting a cause for cognitive and working memory deficits. Lower firing
rates were observed that could account for negative symptoms, and spontaneous jumps into
attractor states could explain positive symptoms.
In a study closely related to this dissertation, Hoffman and McGlashan (1997) used
simple recurrent networks (of Elman 1990) to model aspects of human speech perception.
In order to understand the mechanisms underlying hallucinated speech in schizophrenia,
the impact of several simulated pathologies on speech perception was investigated. When
recurrent connections were pruned excessively, the networks generated spontaneous speech
percepts, thus emulating hallucinated speech. A further study (Hoffman and McGlashan
2006) compared the performance of “hallucinating” networks to that of actual hallucinat-
ing patients. Overpruned networks with additional simulated downregulation of dopamine
activity matched human data best, suggesting that schizophrenia may arise from curtailed
connectivity and involve secondary downregulation of dopaminergic activity.
In contrast to these simulations of psychotic symptoms, Cohen and colleagues
(Servan-Schreiber et al. 1990; Cohen and Servan-Schreiber 1992; Braver et al. 1999) fo-
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cused on modeling behavioral deficits and cognitive impairment in schizophrenia. They
argued that these manifestations of schizophrenia can be explained by a failure of cognitive
control and processing of context due to faulty information gating in working memory. The
gating failure in turn was thought to be caused by abnormal neuromodulatory influence,
especially through DA. The theory was implemented in a series of connectionist models
of cognitive control tasks like the Stroop test. The influences of simulated abnormal DA
activity were measured, and shown to account for cognitive deficits in schizophrenia.
Based on the hypothesis that schizophrenic thought disorder is caused by dys-
functional map-like semantic networks (Section 2.5.3), Spitzer (1997) proposed a neural
network-based model of disturbed lexical access in schizophrenia based on self-organizing
maps (SOMs, Kohonen 1982). In this model, access to semantic memory is impaired
through excessive spreading activation, and it is argued that activations in SOMs that spread
faster and farther than normal can account for increased indirect priming effects, decreased
accuracy of lexical access, and other correlates of thought disorder in schizophrenia.
In a related study,Silberman et al. (2007) used a SOM-based model of semantic
memory to simulate how semantic and episodic factors interact to form word associations.
In this model, activations that spread faster and farther than normal were simulated in order
to gain insight into the causes of schizophrenic thought disorder. The results of this study
suggested that impaired spreading activation may indeed be able to account for impaired
associative thinking in thought-disordered schizophrenia patients.
Carter and Neufeld (2007) investigated impairments of facial affect recognition in
schizophrenia using a partially recursive network trained with backpropagation through
time. Several competing impairment models, including connection pruning and altered
network gain, were evaluated using human subject data. The hypothesis that additional net-
work processing load interferes with the judgment of facial affect provided the best match
for the impairment seen in schizophrenia.
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The computational studies discussed above span three decades, and simulate a wide
range of symptoms and underlying illness mechanisms using a variety of different ap-
proaches and network architectures. They all represent progress towards a true “compu-
tational patient.” One problem shared by most of them, however, is that manifestations
of schizophrenia are represented by network behavior that is either very abstract, as is the
case of attractor networks, or does not correspond directly to core symptoms, as in the sim-
ulations of cognitive defects or facial affect recognition. In both cases, the link between
network behavior and schizophrenia is subject to interpretation. The model presented in
this dissertation attempts to avoid this problem by simulating symptoms on the level of
narrative language, the same level used to define and diagnose schizophrenia.
2.7 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to provide the background on three overarching themes
of this dissertation: stories, schizophrenia, and computational modeling. One important
goal of this research is to combine these three themes, and to demonstrate that a compu-
tational model of human narrative language can also simulate how language breaks down
in schizophrenia. An accurate simulation of impaired story processing could be expected
to reveal deeper distortions of information processing in the brain, and could then be used
meaningfully to infer underlying illness mechanisms. The next chapter introduces a set of




The goal of this dissertation is similar to the goals of the computational studies discussed in
the previous chapter: To develop a computational understanding of schizophrenia, specifi-
cally of the ways in which abnormal brain processes can cause symptoms to emerge. How-
ever, the approach taken in this work is new and different in several respects.
Most importantly, this research attempts to simulate manifestations of schizophrenia
at the level of narrative language — the same level at which real patients are diagnosed. The
symptoms of schizophrenia span a wide range of altered behavior and perception, including
bizarre behavior and social dysfunction. However, since schizophrenia is diagnosed mainly
through clinical interviews, the most relevant human behavior is conversational language.
For example, disorganized speech and delusions, two hallmark symptoms of schizophre-
nia, are observed directly in the patient’s conversational language (rather than the patient
reporting symptoms via language). Moreover, as I argued in the previous chapter, narrative
language is one of the richest human behaviors. It cannot be reduced to the function of a
specific part of the brain, and its dysfunction in schizophrenia has the potential to reveal the
disturbance of deeper functions of memory and thought on which human language is built.
The purpose of clinical interviews, then, is to use narrative language as a window
to the schizophrenic mind. The motivation behind this dissertation is the idea that compu-
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tational models should be able to do so as well. Consequently, this research represents an
attempt to simulate a speaker with schizophrenia. A computational model of human narra-
tive language is used to compare and distinguish a range of simulated illness mechanisms
with respect to their ability to recreate the language-related symptoms of schizorphenia.
This chapter introduces the computational tools used to achieve this goal. First,
DISCERN, a neural network-based model of human narrative language, is described. Based
on the research literature, simulations of eight candidate illness mechanisms that could
underlie schizophrenia are then discussed, and their implementation using the DISCERN
model is described in detail. In the following chapters, the resulting candidate simulations
of schizophrenia language are then evaluated experimentally.
3.1 The DISCERN Model
The original DISCERN model (Miikkulainen and Dyer 1991; Miikkulainen 1993) was the
first integrated, neural network-based simulation of human story understanding and recall.
It simulated human language behavior at several levels, from lexical access to overall dis-
course planning. DISCERN was able to understand, remember, and reproduce script-based
stories and answer questions about them.
The original DISCERN was shown to exhibit important characteristics of human
story processing, such as robustness to noise and realistic recall errors. However, it could
only process stories that consisted of single script instances. In order to be useful as a model
of schizophrenic language, it needed to understand and recall more realistic and complex
stories. The model was therefore extended to process stories consisting of multiple scripts,
using a new architecture to encode and retrieve episodic memories (Fidelman et al. 2005;
Grasemann et al. 2007). Further extensions implemented in this dissertation include the
ability to process emotional content of stories, and a filter for overly distorted language out-
put. On the other hand, since the focus is on story recall, the question-answering modules

















Figure 3.1: DISCERN is a neural network model of human story understanding and recall.
The task of understanding and reproducing a story is achieved by a chain of modules, each
building on the results of the previous module and providing input for the next. The figure
shows the extended version of DISCERN used in this dissertation. It is able to understand
and recall stories consisting of multiple scripts using the memory encoder module and a
content-adressable episodic memory.
This section provides an overview of the current extended version of DISCERN,
with special emphasis on the new memory architecture that enables the model to process
multi-script stories. For simplicity, the extended model will be referred to as “DISCERN”
in the remainder of this dissertation.
3.1.1 Architecture Overview
DISCERN reads and outputs natural language. Stories follow sequences of scripts, but
are presented to the model as plain text, one word at a time. The task of understanding,
remembering, and reproducing a story is achieved using a chain of neural network modules,
each building on the results of the previous module in the series and providing input for
the next (Figure 3.1). The modules communicate using patterns of neuron activations that
encode word meanings. They are stored in a central lexicon, and are learned from input
stories such that words that are used in similar ways have similar activation patterns. The
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other DISCERN modules are then trained in their tasks and learn to understand, remember,
and paraphrase the stories.
For each story (such as the one in Figure 3.2) the word representations are presented
to the sentence parser one at a time as a sequence of activation patterns. The sentence
parser builds a representation of each sentence by concatenating the word representations
that correspond to agent, predicate, indirect object, modifier, and direct object. At the
end of each sentence, the sentence representation is passed on to the story parser. The story
parser transforms sequences of sentences into script representations. A script representation
consists of the name of the script and the words and emotion filling its slots. The sequence
of script representations that constitute the story is stored in the episodic memory module in
a compressed form, which is created by the memory encoding module using the Recursive
Auto-Associative Memory (RAAM;Pollack 1990) architecture. To generate an output story,
the story generator module translates the episodic memory representation into a sequence
of sentences. Based on evidence of an editor function during human speech production
(Fox Tree 2000), an output sentence filter evaluates and prunes this sequence. Finally the
sentence generator module, last in the chain, reproduces the original word sequence for
each sentence.
In this way, while DISCERN understands, remembers, and recalls the story, the
content is tranformed from words to sentences, scripts, episodic memory traces, and even-
tually back to words. The remainder of this section describes each part of this process in
detail, starting with the way in which the word representations in the lexicon are formed.
3.1.2 FGREP and the Lexicon
In the original DISCERN model (Miikkulainen 1993), the lexicon was an interconnected
system of two self-organizing maps that translated between semantic and orthographic rep-
resentations of the words used in the input stories. Since this part of the model is not a major
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Emotion: Negative
[$job Vito Mafia head liked New-York famous gangster]
Vito was a gangster. [Vito was _ _ gangster]
Vito was the head of the Mafia. [Vito was Mafia _ head]
Vito worked in New-York. [Vito worked New-York _ _]
Vito liked his job. [Vito liked _ his job]
Vito was a famous gangster. [Vito was _ famous gangster]
[$driving Vito _ scared airport LA recklessly _]
Vito wanted to go to LA. [Vito wanted LA go _]
Vito entered his car. [Vito entered _ his car]
Vito drove to the airport. [Vito drove airport _ _]
Vito was scared. [Vito was _ _ scared]
Vito drove recklessly. [Vito drove _ _ recklessly]
[$pulled-over Vito cop arrest(ed) _ murder _ _]
Vito was pulled-over by a cop. [Vito was cop _ pulled-over]
The cop asked Vito for his license. [cop asked license his Vito]
Vito gave his license to The cop. [Vito gave cop his license]
The cop checked the license. [cop checked _ _ license]
The cop arrested Vito for murder. [cop arrested murder _ Vito]
[$trial Vito _ walked cleared free murder good]
Vito was accused of murder. [Vito was murder _ accused]
Vito was brought before the court. [Vito was court _ brought]
Vito had a good lawyer. [Vito had _ good lawyer]
The court cleared Vito of murder. [court cleared murder _ Vito]
Vito walked free. [Vito walked _ free _]
Figure 3.2: An example input story for DISCERN about a gangster getting arrested for a
crime committed in another story. The story consists of four scripts. The slot-filler repre-
sentation of each script is on top, followed by the sentences of the script. Each sentence
(left) is paired with its static case-role representation (right). During story understanding,
DISCERN transforms such input stories from individual words to sentences, scripts, and
finally episodic memory traces. Story recall later reverses this process to reproduce the
individual words.
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focus of the present work, a simplified version of the lexicon was used in order to reduce
the overall complexity of the model. Instead of developing both orthographic and semantic
representations of words, the current lexicon focuses on associating plain-text words with
semantic word meanings, encoded as patterns of neuron activation. These patterns, called
word representations, are fixed-length vectors of real numbers between 0 an 1. Similar
words tend to have similar representations (in terms of Euclidian distance).
Apart from the words that encode semantic concepts, the lexicon also contains a
special symbol “ . ” (period), which is used as an end-of-sentence marker, and is represented
by a vector of zeroes. Additionally, it contains one pattern of random values for each script
DISCERN learns to reproduce. The random patterns are used as script labels during story
parsing and recall.
DISCERN’s lexicon is accessed at three points during story recall. First, when DIS-
CERN parses a story, the lexicon translates plain-text words into input activation patterns
for the sentence parser. This translation is done by simple look-up: for each word, the
associated representation is used as input to the sentence parser.
Second, when recalling a story, the ouput activation patterns produced by the sen-
tence generator module are translated back into plain-text words by the lexicon. Since
the sentence generator will generally not produce activations that precisely match a word
representation in the lexicon, output word are selected by finding the nearest neighbor in
Euclidean distance.
The third way in which DISCERN uses the lexicon occurs when the output filter
is applied to the sentence representation produced by the story generator. The output filter
(described in detail in Section 3.1.5) determines how well the words produced by the story
generator match actual words in the lexicon, and prunes out the sentence from the output
story if if the average similarity is below a threshold.
Note that in all cases, the way in which the lexicon is accessed is an abtraction of the
original DISCERN lexicon implemented with a self-organizing map with plain-text labels:
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When translating a word into an activation pattern, the weight vector of a neuron would be
output based on its label. When looking up a plain-text word based on an activation pattern,
the winner neuron would be decided based on Euclidean distance, and the corresponding
label would be produced. The fundamental difference between the current lexicon and a
self-organizing map lies in the way both are trained.
Words with similar semantics are represented by similar activation patterns in the
lexicon. This property is achieved using the FGREP algorithm (Forming Global Represen-
tations with Extended backPropagation; Miikkulainen 1993), which develops word repre-
sentations automatically based on the way words are used in the input text.
FGREP is most easily defined as a simple extension of standard backpropagation,
where each input pattern is seen as an additional layer of weights that is adapted to the
task at hand. Word representations are kept in the lexicon, and are used as input and target
patterns in a traditional language processing network trained with backpropagation. The
FGREP algorithm modifies the input patterns, which are then returned to the lexicon.
The major difference between FGREP and regular backpropagation is that the error





where δli is the error signal of unit i in layer l; wlij is the connection weight of unit i in
layer l to unit j in the following layer. Note that this is a simple case of the normal back-
propagation rule for error signal propagation where the activation function is the identity
function. Using the error signal for the input layer, the input representations can then be
modified:
pci = pci + ηδ1i,
where pci is the ith component of a word representation pc, δ1i is the error signal for input
unit i, and η is the learning rate.
A convenient way to implement the FGREP algorithm is to add an additional input
layer (layer 0) to the network, with one binary unit for each word in the lexicon. The new
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layer is fully connected to the original input layer. When a word is used as input, the corre-
sponding binary unit’s activation is set to 1, and all others to 0. The word representation pc
is then encoded by the connection weights: pci = w0ci for all i.
If the network is extended in this way, no modification of the backpropagation al-
gorithm is necessary; the error signal need not be propagated further back than usual, and
the rule for modifying the word representation becomes a special case of the normal rule
wlij = wlij + ηδ(l+1)joli,
where oli is the output of unit j in layer l, which in this case would be 1 for the unit
corresponding to the input word, and 0 for all others.
Intuitively, FGREP answers the question, “what input activation would have made
the correct output more predictable?” The actual input of the network (the word repre-
sentations) are then changed slightly in order to make the same sequence of words easier
to predict in the future. If words are used in a consistent manner in the input sentences,
changes to the word representations add up over time to reflect the way in which they are
used. The resulting word representations reflect both grammatical role and semantic mean-
ing of words, since co-occurrence of words is determined by both – e.g. nouns are often
preceded by articles and followed by verbs; at the same time, the word “murder” is more
likely to occur in a sentence that also contains the name of a gangster (as in the exam-
ple story above). Both kinds of correlation will influence the representations developed by
FGREP, since both enable the networks to predict their outputs more efficiently.
The only difference between word representations and connection weights in this
algorithm is that word representations need to be used as output neuron activation patterns,
and must therefore be constrained to the interval [0, 1]. This constraint is implemented in
FRGEP by setting each component of the pattern to zero if it is negative, and to one if it is
larger than one, after every FGREP iteration.
Importantly, in the resulting word representations, word meaning is distributed over
the entire length of the pattern, not localized in specific neurons, as in the case of feature-
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based representations. This property of global rather than local semantic representations
makes DISCERN more robust and allows it to generalize better: small activation errors
lead to small (or non-existent) errors in word selection, and damage to part of an output
pattern can be compensated by the remaining undamaged part.
3.1.3 Story Parsing
The task of parsing a story in DISCERN transforms an input story from a sequence of word
representations to a (much more compact) sequence of script instances represented by their
slot-filler representations. This transformation is achieved using the sentence parser and
story parser modules (Figure 3.1), two simple recurrent networks (Elman 1990) that are
trained to produce fixed-size representations of variable-length input sequences.
During story parsing, the sentence parser module receives a separate input pattern
for each word in a story, plus the “period” pattern of all zeroes to mark the end of each
sentence. While receiving the input words one at a time, the sentence parser builds a static
output representation of the entire sentence. Sentences are represented by a list of five
words, each corresponding to an input word that fills a specific case role in the input sen-
tence. The case role structure used is generally [agent, predicate, indirect object, modifier,
direct object]. For example, the sentence
Vince entered the LA airport
would be turned into the static case-role representation
[Vince entered _ LA airport],
where each plain-text word represents a pattern of neural activations, and the underscore ( )
represents the blank pattern consisting of all zeroes. In this example, “Vince” is the subject,
“entered” is the predicate, and “LA” modifies the direct object “aiport”. There is no indirect
object, so that slot is filled by the blank pattern.
In order to keep the representations compact while at the same time making a range
of interesting sentences and constructions available to DISCERN, the individual case-role
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slots are overloaded slightly with related constructs. For example, the indirect object slot
often contains prepositional objects, in which case the preposition used is implicit:
Vito drove to the airport. --> [Vito drove airport _ _]
Note also how articles are never part of the case role structure. The role of the modifier slot
in particular is ambiguous and can contain adjectives or nouns that modify either the direct
or the indirect object. It can also contain a possessive pronoun, as in
The cop asked Vito for his license.
--> [cop asked license his Vito].
In some cases, the modifier slot is also abused to introduce an infinitival phrase:
Vito wanted to go to LA. --> [Vito wanted LA go _]
As would be expected of a neural network architecture, DISCERN deals well with such un-
derdefined sentence encodings. Prepositions and articles are inserted correctly, and creative
and even inconsistent uses of case-roles is tolerated well, as long as they are the exception
rather than the rule.
At the end of each sentence, the case-role representation produced by the sentence
parser is passed on to the story parser module. Similar to the sentence parser, the story
parser is a simple recurrent network that builds static representations of scripts from a
variable-length sequence of sentences, much in the way the sentence parser builds sentence
representations from a sequence of words. Scripts are represented as slot-filler representa-
tions: Each script is represented by a sequence of 8 words that encode the script’s name and
seven concepts filling its slots. For example, consider the third script in Figure 3.2:
Vito was pulled-over by a cop. [Vito was cop _ pulled-over]
The cop asked Vito for his license. [cop asked license his Vito]
Vito gave his license to The cop. [Vito gave cop his license]
The cop checked the license. [cop checked _ _ license]
The cop arrested Vito for murder. [cop arrested murder _ Vito]
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The sentence parser produces the sequence of case-role representations shown on the right;
the story parser then encodes this sequence as an instance of the $pulled-over script:
[$pulled-over Vito cop arrested _ murder _ _]
The $pulled-over script has only four slots, so the other three contain the blank sym-
bol. Note that in practice, slot-filler representations are concatenated activation patterns that
each represent a word or script name in the lexicon. In this way, DISCERN’s modules com-
municate using concepts and symbols encoded in the lexicon, but still retain the advantages
of subsymbolic information processing.
In addition to the slot-filler representations, the story parser also builds a represen-
tation of the script’s emotional valence. As mentioned earlier, each story in DISCERN has
one of five emotion codes associated with it, ranging from very negative to very positive (–,
-, +-, +, ++). These emotion codes are represented by word-sized activation patterns rang-
ing from all zeroes for very negative (–) to all ones for very positive (++). The story parser
learns to reproduce these patterns, which are then associated with each encoded script. The
emotional valence always stays the same for each script of a story, so emotional information
is an opportunity for DISCERN to resolve confusions between alternative ways to continue
a story.
3.1.4 Memory Encoding
After DISCERN has read and decoded an entire story, the story’s constituent scripts are
represented by a sequence of slot-filler representations and their associated emotion codes.
The task of the memory encoder module is to associate each script instance with a memory
cue that allows stories in memory to be addressed and retrieved by content.
The memory encoder is a Recursive Auto-Associative Memory (RAAM; Pollack
1990), a neural network architecture that forms compact distributed representations of re-
cursive data structures such as lists or trees. RAAM networks are feedforward networks
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trained to reproduce their own input, forcing them to form compressed representations of
inputs in their hidden layer, which is smaller than the size of the input. These compressed
representations can then be re-used as part of the input to the RAAM, and compressed
representations of recursive data structures are formed as a result.
For example, consider a sequence of activation patterns [a, b, c], each of size n. Say
we would like to compress the entire list, and represent it as a single pattern of size h. This
can be achieved using a RAAM network with h hidden units and n + h input and output
units. The first input to the network is a concatenation of pattern c and a special end-of-list
pattern (usually n zeroes) denoted as . After the network has propagated the input to the
output layer, the hidden layer contains a compressed representation of the list [c,]. It is
useful to write this compressed list, LISP-like, as (c ). The next input to the network con-
sists of b and the compressed list (c ) created in the previous step. The resulting activation
in the hidden layer is the compressed list (b(c )). The final input, a and the previous result
(b(c )) produce the compressed list (a(b(c ))) in the RAAM’s hidden layer (see Figure
3.3). Note that the same network could be used to compress a longer list, simply by con-
tinuing the process until all elements are included. Stepping backwards through a list and
recursively re-using previous results in this way, RAAM networks can produce compressed
representations of arbitrarily long lists. Also note that the final compressed list is not nec-
essarily the only result of this process: compressed versions of partial lists, like (b(c )),
are produced as by-products along the way.
During the memory encoding process in DISCERN, the list of script representations
produced by the story parser is compressed exactly in the way described above. More
specifically, imagine that the three patterns [a, b, c] in the previous example each represent
one of the three scripts that make up a story. The memory encoder compresses this story by
stepping backwards through the list of scripts. Each compressed partial list (and the final
complete list) produced along the way is then used as a memory cue for the script used to









Figure 3.3: The memory encoder in DISCERN is a Recursive Auto-Associative Memory
(RAAM; Pollack, 1990), a neural network that is trained to replicate its input at its out-
put nodes, forcing it form a compressed representation of the input in its hidden layer.
By reusing these hidden layer representations as part of the next input, RAAM can form
fixed-size representations of recursive data structures like lists and trees. In DISCERN,
compressed lists of scripts are created in this way and used as episodic memory cues.
script b, and (a(b(c ))) is the cue for script a. Figure 3.4 illustrates the memory encoding
process in detail.
Each of the script-cue pairs produced by the memory encoder is called an episodic
memory trace. In the original DISCERN, these traces were classified through a hierarchy
of self-organizing maps, and a trace was created in the lateral connections of maps at the
lowest level. Because episodic memory itself is not the main focus of the current work, its
structure is abstracted in the current implementation: It is simply a store of script-cue pairs.
During story recall, episodic memory is accessed using a memory cue; the memory trace
that contains the most similar cue (in terms of Euclidean distance) is then retrieved.
One important feature of this memory mechanism is that the memory cues asso-
ciated with each script are shaped by more than just the single script with which they are
associated: Each cue encodes the entire remainder of a story at that point. This property




















Figure 3.4: During the memory encoding process, each script of a story is paired with
a memory cue, transforming the output of the story parser (left column) into content-
addressable episodic memory traces (right column). Each script’s memory cue is a com-
pressed version of the remaining story, and represents DISCERNs discourse plan at that
point – e.g. the cue for script 2 is the compressed version of scripts 2 and 3, denoteded
(LISP-like) by (2(3)). The memory encoder builds these cues by stepping backwards
(from bottom to top) through the scripts of a story, at each step creating a memory cue by
combining a script with the memory cue produced previously. In this manner, stories of
variable length can be compressed into a single distributed memory representation.
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of a story in the right order would require maintaining a “discourse plan” at every point
during story recall.
In DISCERN, RAAM representations of lists of scripts are used as cues to address
episodic memory by content. Figure 3.3 shows a RAAM network that is being used to create
a memory cue. Note how the network uses a cue (a compressed partial story) as part of the
input to form the next cue in its hidden layer. In this way, the network steps backwards
through a story, and produces a compressed representation of the rest of the story at each
step, associating each new cue with the script used to create it. Figure 3.4 illustrates the
encoding process.
3.1.5 Story Recall
Story recall is the process of transforming a story stored in episodic memory back into
the original sequence of plain-text words. The story generator module is the heart of this
process: It successively retrieves the memory traces that make up a story from episodic
memory, and reproduces the story as a sequence of sentence representations.
Figure 3.5 shows the structure of the story generator module. It is a simple recurrent
network that takes as its input a complete episodic memory trace (consisting of memory cue,
slot-filler representation, and emotion code), and produces as its output a memory cue and
a case-role representation of a sentence.
When recalling a story, the story generator is first cued with the first memory trace
of that story. The initial output consists of the case-role representation of the story’s first
sentence, and a memory cue to episodic memory. Successive iterations of the story gener-
ator network produce a sentence and a memory cue each time. The memory cue is used to
retrieve a memory trace from episodic memory, which is then used as the next input for the
story generator.
Note that a memory trace encodes an entire script, which consists of multiple sen-
tences. The story generator can produce only one sentence at a time, so the input memory
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Figure 3.5: The story gen-
erator module in DISCERN
is a simple recurrent neu-
ral network (Elman 1990).
During story recall, the list
of episodic memory traces
encoding the current story
are successively recalled from
episodic memory. Each it-
eration of the story genera-
tor produces both a sentence
representation and a memory
cue. The sentence representa-
tion is passed on to the sen-
tence generator; the memory
cue is used to retrieve the next
episodic memory, thereby de-
termining the network’s own
next input. In this manner,
the story generator can step
through an arbitrary number
of memory traces that encode
a story, enabling it to process
























trace needs to stay the same until all sentences of the current script are produced. Dur-
ing recall of a single script, the story generator therefore produces the same memory cue
repeatedly, while the output sentences change every time.
When the last sentence of a script is produced, the output memory cue changes, and
the next memory trace (i.e. the next script) is retrieved from episodic memory. Figure 3.6
illustrates such a switch from one script to the next in detail.
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Three snapshots of the story generator’s input and output are shown during the
switch from the second to the third script of the example story shown in Figure 3.2. The
final memory cue, produced together with the last sentence of a story, is an end-of-story
marker consisting of all zeroes. When this cue is passed on to episodic memory, an end-of-
story memory trace is retrieved, and story recall ends.
Correct switching of memory cues during story recall is a complex task, since each
script has a variable number of sentences, and each story has a variable number of scripts.
Producing the correct sequence of cues therefore requires the story generator to maintain
considerable internal state. The context layer of SRNs like the story generator is the only
place where such networks can maintain such a state. The context layer therefore plays the
role of working memory, and is therefore the target of several simulations of possible illness
mechanisms.
Note also that, as mentioned earlier, the memory cues at each point during story
recall are compressed versions of the entire remainder of the story. The ability to reproduce
sequences of such complex structures for a large number of stories requires generalization.
In other words DISCERN is forced to maintain a detailed discourse plan in the form of
memory cues at all times during story recall.
Emotion codes, unlike memory cues, are encoded by very simple activation pat-
terns, and are easy to reproduce. However, they are not unique to a story, so they cannot
guide story recall by themselves. The emotional valence does stay the same throughout
each story, however, so the emotion codes that form part of each memory trace hold valu-
able information that can be used to resolve ambiguity between alternative continuations
of a story. Previous research has shown that DISCERN indeed makes use of the emotional
information in this way (Fidelman et al. 2005).
Based on evidence of an editor function during human speech production (Fox Tree
2000), DISCERN includes an output sentence filter that estimates the distortion of every












































Figure 3.6: During story recall, the story generator steps through each sentence of the story,
and accesses each memory trace encoding it. Three consecutive snapshots of the story
generator’s input and output are shown durng the switch from the second script ($driving)
to the third ($pulled-over) script of the story shown in Figure 3.2. Time flows from bottom
to top. Bottom: DISCERN reproduces the sentence “Vito is scared” in the second script
of the story. The story generator produces a representation of the sentence, which is then
passed on to the sentence generator (to the right). (continued on the next page)
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(Figure 3.6 continued.) Additionally, it produces a memory cue that is used to retrieve the next
input memory trace from episodic memory (on the left). In this case, the same memory trace as
before is retrieved, since the script is not yet finished. Middle: DISCERN produces the last sentence
of the script, “Vito drives recklessly.” The memory cue changes, and the memory trace for the
third ($pulled-over) script is retrieved. Top: Using the retrieved memory trace, DISCERN now
starts to reproduce the third script. By switching memory cues successively, the story generator
can step through each script in the correct order. In this manner, scripts trigger subsequent scripts
within a single story as is commonly done in symbolic script-processing systems (Schank 1999). In
DISCERN, this model of narrative structure is given a subsmbolic connectionist implementation.
above a threshold. In this way, errors are reduced at the cost of reducing correct recall.
The distortion D(C) of a case-role representation C is estimated as the squared sum of the




|ci − ĉi|2, (3.1)
where ci is the ith component word of the case-role representation C, ĉi is the closest match
of ci in the lexicon, and |·| denotes the Euclidean norm. This estimate relies on the fact that
the lexicon is sparsely populated, so a distorted word representation is less likely to have a
close match in the lexicon. Note that the only way to find the actual distortion of a word,
rather than an estimate, would be to compare it to the correct target word, which is not
known to the story generator during recall. In practice the estimate works well, especially
in eliminating word errors that cross lexical categories. To make adjusting the behavior of
the output filter more intuitive, the threshold is not set directly but is defined through a filter
strength parameter s such that a sentence C is discarded when D(C) > 1/s. In this way, a
higher filter strength means more output will be filtered.
The final step of the recall process is straightforward: Sentences that are not dis-
carded by the output filter are passed on to the sentence generator, which is an SRN that
takes a case-role representation of a sentence as its input and produces a sequence of indi-
vidual word representations as its output. The input case-role representation stays the same
over multiple calls, until the end-of-sentence pattern corresponding to “ . ” is produced. At
this point, the current sentence is finished and processing of the next case-role representa-
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tion can begin. The individual word representations are passed to the lexicon and converted
into plain-text words, which form the final output of the DISCERN system.
3.2 Modeling Schizophrenia in DISCERN
DISCERN is a subsymbolic implementation of a symbolic theory. As such, it links two
important conceptual levels, grounding human memory and language behavior in abstract
neurons and synapses. As a basis for models of psychopathology, this is the core of DIS-
CERN’s strength: Underlying illness mechanisms can be simulated at the low level, and
their manifestations observed in terms of high-level behavior.
The simulated illness mechanisms discussed in this section take full advantage of
this opportunity. Eight illness models (or lesions) were implemented and evaluated in DIS-
CERN. Each lesion simulates a low-level illness mechanism hypothesized to play an im-
portant role in causing symptoms of schizophrenia. Figure 3.7 gives a brief summary of the
lesions, and indicates where in DISCERN they were applied.
The remainder of this section discusses the eight illness models in detail. The evi-
dence supporting each illness model is reviewed briefly, summarizing the earlier discussion
of possible illness mechanisms in Section 2.5. The implementation of each illness model in
DISCERN is described, including the way in which the severity (or lesions strength) is ad-
justed in each case. Models of working memory impairment are introduced first, followed
by semantic memory disturbances. Hyperlearning, a simulation of impaired dopamine
transmission and memory consolidation, is described last.
1. Working memory disconnection (WMD)
As discussed earlier in Section 2.5.1, loss of brain connectivity has been hypothesized
to cause the symptoms of schizophrenia. Connections that have been found to be al-
tered include both local cortical connections and connectivity between brain regions,
and involve networks that are thought to be central to working memory function.
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Figure 3.7: Overview of the
illness models, or lesions, im-
plemented in the DISCERN
model. The labelled cir-
cles indicate to which part
of DISCERN the lesion was
applied. WMD: Working
memory (WM) disconnec-
tion (pruning WM → hid-
den connections, and, in the
extended model, hidden →
output connections as well);
WMN: WM noise (added to
the activation of WM neu-
rons); WMG: WM gain re-
duction (less steep sigmoid in
WM neurons); EA: Excessive
arousal states (varying bias
weights of story generator
WM neurons); SN: Seman-
tic memory distortion (adding
noise to semantic word rep-
resentations); SO Semantic
overactivation (increasing ac-
tivation of semantic word rep-
resentations), SB: Semantic
blurring or overpriming (blur-
ring semantic word represen-

































learning (amplified backpropagation learning, applied to the memory encoder (HLM) or the
story and sentence generators (HLG). In the three-parameter hyperlearning model (Chapter
5), both HLM and HLG were used at the same time. The different illness models will later
be evaluated as simulations of schizophrenic language.
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The primary working memory component that governs language production in DIS-
CERN is part of the story generator network. Recall that the story generator is a
simple recurrent network, i.e. each time the network is activated, it stores its hidden-
layer activation in its context layer. The context layer in turn has a full set of trainable
forward connections to the hidden layer, so the network has access to its own previous
internal state. This hidden-context-hidden layer loop effectively enables the network
to learn, represent, and act on patterns in time, such as scripts, which are patterns of
propositions in time.
The WMD lesion therefore targeted this component of the story generator network.
In order to simulate altered connectivity, DISCERN’s working memory was partially
disabled by pruning the forward connections from the context layer to the hidden
layer of the story generator network. The parameter that determined the severity, or
strength, of the lesion was the pruning threshold: All connections whose absolute
weight fell below the threshold were cut, i.e. set to zero.
Note that, even though working memory circuits are implicated in the literature on
functional disconnection in schizophrenia, disconnection does not necessarily have
to involve only working memory. The same pruning method can be used to partially
disable other comonents of the network. For example, in experiment I (Chapter 5),
both the working memory connections and the hidden to output layer connections in
the story generator were pruned independently.
2. Working memory noise (WMN)
Working memory dysfunction is strongly associated with schizophrenia (Aleman
et al. 1999), and may have other causes than altered brain connectivity. As discussed
in section 2.5.2, abnormal DA activity may cause noisy and otherwise impaired in-
formation processing in WM networks.
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In DISCERN, noisy information processing of this type was modeled using the work-
ing memory of the story generator network. Every time hidden activations were
copied to the context layer, Gaussian noise with zero mean was added to the activa-
tions. The strength of the lesion was controlled by changing the variance of the noise;
higher variance meant higher levels of noise distortion.
3. Working memory gain reduction (WMG)
Changing the gain of the activation function of artificial neurons has been investigated
previously as a simulation of changed dopaminergic neuromodulation in schizophre-
nia (Cohen and Servan-Schreiber 1992; Sections 2.5.2 and 2.6). Since DISCERN’s
working memory, discourse planning, and context processing during story recall all
happen in the story generator, this module was again the target of this lesion. Work-
ing memory gain reduction (WMG) was implemented by changing the slope of the
sigmoid activation function of the hidden-layer neurons in the story generator. By
default, all activation functions in DISCERN are sigmoids with unit slope, and are
not adapted during training. The WMG lesion reduced the slope; the lesion strength
parameter controlled the amount by which it was reduced.
4. Excessive Arousal (EA)
Historically, a popular view has been that symptoms of schizophrenia, and psychosis
in particular, are caused by a state of constant cortical overarousal, or by suscepti-
bility to such a state (Kornetsky and Eliasson 1969; Schlör et al. 1985). A recent
study on the genetics of catecholamine function Arnsten (2007) suggests how such
a susceptibility could occur: Both schizophrenia and bipolar disorder are associated
with genetic changes that “may render patients vulnerable to profound stress-induced
PFC dysfunction including symptoms of thought disorder.” Furthermore, one of the
earliest neural network-based models of schizophrenia was based on the theory of
overarousal (Grossberg and Pepe 1970; see Section 2.6).
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Elevated arousal at a neuronal level was simulated in DISCERN by increasing the
bias of all WM neurons in the story generator by a fixed amount. The strength of this
lesion was adjusted by changing the value added to the bias.
5. Semantic blurring (SB)
The hyper-priming hypothesis (Section 2.5.3) suggests that excessive spreading acti-
vation in semantic maps is a major contributor to the symptoms of thought disorder
in schizophrenia, and has been the subject of previous computational models (Spitzer
1997; Leeson et al. 2005; see Section 2.6 for details).
In DISCERN, hyper-priming, i.e. excessive coactivation of related words in the lex-
icon was simulated by semantic blurring, i.e. instead of a word representation w the
lexicon produced a mixture of w and its neighbors. These “blurred” word representa-
tions were calculated in the following way: for each word w, the lexicon was sorted
by Euclidean distance to w. The blurred version of w is then defined in the following





where wi is the ith closest word to w, and w0 = w. N is the size of the lexicon, and
0 < β < 1 is a “blur factor” – larger β means more blurring. The lesion strength for
the SB lesion is adjusted through β.
6. Semantic memory noise (SN)
Altered verbal fluency and object comparisons suggest that semantic memory itself,
not just access to it, may be disorganized in TD schizoprenic patients (Goldberg et al.
1998; Tallent et al. 2001; Section 2.5.3). In order to simulate distortion or disorga-
nization of semantic memory, Gaussian noise with zero mean was added to the word
representations in DISCERN’s lexicon. Note that this lesion is intended to model
changes to the semantic memory itself, so noise was added only once, not continu-
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ously during lexical access. The severity, or strength, of the semantic distortion was
controlled by adjusting the variance of the noise.
7. Semantic memory overcativation (SO)
Several recent functional imaging studies reported cortical overactivation in regions
involved in semantic memory and language processing during tasks that involved
semantic association and lexical access Kuperberg et al. 2007; Assaf et al. 2006. The
SO lesion in DISCERN consequently simulated overactivation of semantic memory
networks by adding a constant bias to word representations produced by the lexicon.
The strength of the SO lesion was regulated by adjusting this bias.
8. Hyperlearning (HLM, HLG)
Hyperlearning is a version of the DA hypothesis based on Kapur’s (2003) theory that
increased midbrain DA release leads to abnormally enhanced motivational salience,
which in turn causes psychotic symptoms (see Section 2.5.2 for details). Hyperlearn-
ing extends and formalizes this theory by proposing a concrete mechanism by which
this could occur: Aberrant salience of experience leads to overly intense memory
consolidation. This hypothetical “hyperlearning state” was simulated in DISCERN
by performing additional backpropagation learning at elevated learning rates. Hy-
perlearning was always applied for 500 additional epochs (i.e. iterations of the entire
story corpus) after DISCERN was fully trained.
Hyperlearning was applied to either the memory encoder network (HLM) or the gen-
erator modules (story generator and sentence generator; HLG), or both. In the case of
HLM, the down-stream generator modules were also trained (using normal learning
rates) in order to enable them to compensate for changing memory cues.
Not all hypotheses about possible illness mechanisms could be simulated meaning-
fully in DISCERN. For example, loss of attentional control and impaired theory of mind are
currently not accessible to the model (but see Chapter 7). Nevertheless, the illness models
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span a wide range of current theories, and reflect the emphasis that is currently placed on
the role of impaired semantic memory and disturbances involving dopamine and/or working
memory.
3.3 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce the computational modeling tools that will
be used in this dissertation to create and evaluate simulations of schizophrenic language.
DISCERN, a connectionist model of human story understanding and recall, was descibed
in detail. Recent extensions of the model were discussed, including the ability to process
multi-script stories, emotions, and a filter mechanism that reduces errors at the cost of lower
overall language output.
Based on the DISCERN model, eight simulations of candidate illness mechanisms
that could underlie symptoms of schizophrenia were then introduced. Each of these illness
models was motivated by a specific hypothesis about illness mechanisms in schizophrenia.
The implementation in terms of the DISCERN model was described in each case.
DISCERN and the different illness models will ultimately be evaluated as simula-
tions of schizophrenic language. However, in order to do so, a simulation of normal human
language based on DISCERN must be created first as a starting point. The development of
this “healthy” DISCERN model is the topic of the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Developing a Healthy Model
DISCERN is a complex model, where multiple functional layers combine, learn, and per-
form together to create the final language behavior. Much of its power as a model of schizo-
phrenic language derives from the complexity of the underlying healthy language: When
story processing breaks down due to simulated illness mechanisms, it may do so in equally
complex and unexpected ways. In order to create the most informative models of schizo-
phrenic language possible, it was therefore necessary to push the limits of the DISCERN
system and develop concrete, running instances of the model whose language behavior was
as rich and varied as possible. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the steps that were
necessary to achieve this goal.
First, the model was implemented and integrated into the existing parallel comput-
ing infrastructure. Second, a corpus of input stories was created that was large and complex
enough to make it possible to observe and quantify subtle changes in recall and language
performance. Based on the vocabulary used in these stories, a lexicon of word representa-
tions was then developed using the FGREP algorithm described in section 3.1.2. Finally,
training methods and schedules were developed that allowed DISCERN to learn the entire
story corpus almost perfectly. The resulting “healthy” instances of the DISCERN model
form the basis of all computational experiments discussed in this dissertation.
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4.1 Implementation Details
The C implementation of the extended DISCERN model was based on the proc module
that was part of the original DISCERN implementation by Risto Miikkulainen (available at
http://nn.cs.utexas.edu/?discern), and on previous code extensions by Hong Ming Yeh and
Peggy Fidelman (Fidelman et al. 2005). The original code was extensively redesigned and
optimized for modern computer architectures.
Comparisons between alternative lesions, especially for experiment I (Chapter 5),
made it necessary to explore the parameter space of different lesions extensively. In order
to make this possible, tools were developed to integrate the model into the existing parallel
computing infrastructure. All computational experiments were run on the Mastodon clus-
ter (http://www.cs.utexas.edu/facilities/accommodations/condor/mastodon) using the con-
dor job-scheduling system.
The findings reported in the following chapters are based on millions of different
combinations of lesion and filter parameters tested. For each of these combinations, detailed
statistics on the language performance of 30 DISCERN systems were collected. Special-
ized tools were created, mostly using Python (www.python.org van Rossum and de Boer
1991)), to manage the large amount of experimental data created in this way. Data visu-
alization, including all plots in this dissertation, was done using matplotlib (Hunter 2007,;
http://www.matplotlib.sourceforge.net). Additionally, a website that allows users to explore
the data for experiment II (chapter 5) was developed using Python and gnuplot, both as a
demo and to help communication within the project.
4.2 Story Corpus
In the original DISCERN model, all stories consisted of a single script, which limited DIS-
CERN to learning stories describing a single, relatively uncomplicated event, like eating in
a restaurant or getting on a plane. The current extended model is able to store and recall
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Emotion: positive
[$drink I Stacy met Moe’s-Tavern table wine _]
I went to Moe’s-Tavern [I went Moe’s-Tavern _ _]
I sat at a table [I sat table _ _]
I ordered wine [I ordered _ _ wine]
I drank the wine [I drank _ _ wine]
I met Stacy at Moe’s-Tavern [I met Moe’s-Tavern _ Stacy]
[$relation I Stacy liked trusted _ my girlfriend]
Stacy was my girlfriend [Stacy was _ my girlfriend]
I liked Stacy [I liked _ _ Stacy]
I trusted Stacy [I trusted _ _ Stacy]
[$person Stacy 20s ponytail New-York movies books compact]
Stacy was in her 20s [Stacy was 20s her _]
Stacy had a ponytail [Stacy had _ _ ponytail]
Stacy was from New-York [Stacy was New-York _ _]
Stacy drove a compact car [Stacy drove _ compact car]
Stacy liked movies [Stacy liked _ _ movies]
Stacy liked books [Stacy liked _ _ books]
[$talking I Stacy liked liked kiss books long]
I talked to Stacy about books [I talked Stacy about books]
I liked books [I liked _ _ books]
I talked to Stacy a long time [I talked Stacy long time]
I liked talking to Stacy [I liked Stacy _ talking]
I gave a kiss good-bye to Stacy [I gave Stacy kiss good-bye]
Figure 4.1: An uneventful example story from the personal context: “ I ” meet my girl-
friend Stacy for a drink, and we have a conversation about books. Most stories in the
personal context are, like this one, told from the first-person point of view. The “ I ”, or
self, is overrepresented in the story corpus in order to simulate the concept of the person
experiencing and telling the stories.
stories that can in principle be composed of an unlimited number of scripts. In practice,
DISCERN’s capacity to process multi-script stories (and mine to come up with them) is
limited to about seven scripts. Nevertheless, this ability makes a wide range of more com-
plex stories accessible. Scripts can be combined and recombined in new ways, or can be
repeated within a story, expressing different content by using different slot-fillers. Stories
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can also share multiple of scripts, establishing stereotypical, repeating sequences of scripts
that can themselves be viewed as scripts that are implicitly learned by the model. Over-
all, multi-script stories make DISCERN a more useful model by creating a more difficult
task, demanding more complex behavior, and giving DISCERN more opportunities to fail
in interesting ways.
The story corpus designed for this dissertation is an attempt to make use of these
opportunities, and to stretch as far as possible the kind and number of stories that DISCERN
can learn. It was also designed with the goal of this dissertation in mind: The stories need to
make it possible to investigate the kinds of language disturbance observed in patients with
schizophrenia. Specifically, failures of context, of continuity, and of character slotting need
to be observable during story recall. Opportunities for content to intrude from one story
into another had to be created. The remainder of this section describes the corpus in detail,
and addresses how these issues were addressed.
The corpus contains 28 stories. Each one is a sequence of three to seven scripts,
and contains between nine and 35 sentences. All stories taken together contain 550 single
sentences in 120 script instances. The size of the vocabulary is about 160 words, including
20 names or descriptions of story characters (e.g. “Frank” or “lawyer”). The entire story
corpus is reproduced in Appendix 8, including script and sentence representations.
The stories in the corpus are divided into two groups, defining two distinct cate-
gories, or contexts. The first (the “personal context”) consists of stories from the life of a
character called “I” (referred to as the self in the following). The stories in the personal
context mostly described his relationships and experiences, and attempted to create a some-
what coherent slice of his life. Most of these stories are told from the first-person point of
view of the self, who is overrepresented in this way in order to simulate the central role of
the self in autobiographical human memory. An example of such a story is shown in Figure
4.1. The stories in the personal context span the whole range of emotional tone, from very
negative to very positive.
66
The second group (the “gangster context”) contains stories with a very different
theme, and mostly negative emotional tone. They concern a group of Mafia-type gangsters
who mostly engage in stereotypical gangster activities, committing crimes, killing each
other, and occasionally getting caught by the police. The stories in this context are intended
to simulate the impersonal stories to which humans are exposed, e.g. through movies or the
news. In contrast to most personal stories, they are told from the third-person point of view
of varying characters; the self character does not appear. An example of a gangster story
was previously shown in Figure 3.2.
Note that the two story contexts are entirely implicit: DISCERN is given no direct
information that would make it possible to distinguish one context from the other, or even
to decide whether or not stories can usefully be divided up in this way. At the same time,
contextual cues are everywhere in the story content. For example, words that are unique
to one context like gun or wedding make it easy in principle to decide what the current
context is. This contextual information can then help story understanding and recall, e.g.
by resolving ambiguity. The data reported below on the errors that occur in heathy systems
suggest that DISCERN indeed learns to use these contextual cues.
Some of the most important and unambiguous contextual cues are names of story
characters: All ten named characters are context-specific, i.e. each appears in the personal
context or the gangster context, but not both. Five characters (three gangsters and two po-
licemen) are unique to gangster stories, and five (including the self) appear only in personal
stories. Unnamed characters that appear in the stories, like cop or girlfriend, are not
always unique to a context.
In order to encourage DISCERN to use contextual information, and also to make
failures of context easier to observe in the output language, there are several pairs of char-
acters that are similar, but belong to different contexts. For example, the self’s boss Joe
is in many ways similar to the Mafia boss Vito. At any point in a story, the easiest way
to decide between the two would be to consider the current context. On the other hand, if
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Table 4.1: Overview of the 14 scripts used to build the story corpus. The length of each
script is given in sentences.
Script Name Context Content Length
$person Both Description of a story character 6
$job Both Desciption of a character’s job 5
$relation Both Relationship between two persons (e.g. boss, finacee) 3
$flight Both Getting on a plane and flying somewhere 7
$drink Both Having a drink and meeting someone 5
$driving Both Driving somewhere in a car 5
$drunk Both Getting drunk 3
$pulled-over Both Getting pulled over by the police 5
$trial Both Being accused of a crime in court 5
$talking Both A conversation between two characters 5
$plan Both Two characters plan an occasion 4
$occasion Both Generic occasion, including wedding and bombing 5
$being-after Gangster An organization, e.g. the police, is after someone 5
$investigation Gangster The police investigates a crime 4
DISCERN learns to rely on such information, and context processing is later impaired, this
reliance on contextual cues should result in an observable tendency to confuse characters
across contexts.
All stories were assembled from 14 different scripts, briefly summarized in table
4.1. Examples of each script and its slots can be found in Appendix 8. Most scripts describe
stereotypical sequences of events such as meeting someone for a drink or being pulled
over by the police. Additionally, several scripts ($person, $job, and $relation) do not
describe an event, but instead describe a person or a relationship between two persons. The
purpose of these scipts is to create opportunities for DISCERN and the FGREP algorithm
to develop detailed and complex representations of the agents in the story corpus.
Most scripts were designed to be used in both personal and gangster contexts, and
in stories with either positive or negative emotion. For example, there is no specific script
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describing a crime — instead, there is a general $occasion script that can encode various
very different events, depending on the concepts used to fill the slots. In story #26, for
example, the $occasion script is used to describe how Vince, a Mafia hitman, kills Tony,
another gangster:
[$occasion Vince Vince phone-call killed Starbucks Tony murder]
Vince entered Starbucks for murder. [Vince entered ...]
Vince killed Tony. [Vince killed _ ...]
The murder was a success. [murder was _ _ ...]
Vince made a phone-call. [Vince made _ _ ...]
Vince smoked a cigarette. [Vince smoked _ ...]
In story #17, the same script is used to describe a harmless wedding:
[$occasion I Mary speech kissed Four-Seasons Joe wedding]
I entered the Four-Seasons for wedding. [I entered ...]
Mary kissed Joe. [Mary kissed ...]
The wedding was a success. [wedding was ...]
I gave a speech. [I gave _ _ ...]
I drank champagne. [I drank _ _ ...]
In this way, shared scripts between contexts create opportunities for DISCERN to
cross over between contexts, and again encourage the use of context. In the same way,
coincidental shared structure between real-life and imaginary stories in humans may create
opportunities for derailments or for the formation of delusional ideas. In the instances of
the $occasion script above, note also that the script content is mostly, but not entirely,
determined by inserting slot fillers into otherwise fixed sentence structures. For example,
the content of just one slot (speech vs. phone-call) determines the structure of an
entire sentence (I gave a speech. vs. Vince made a phone-call.). DISCERN
can make use of this kind of flexible script definition, as long as most scripts follow a
regular structure.
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4.3 Developing a Lexicon
The story corpus described above containes approximately 160 unique words, including 78
nouns, 44 verbs, 18 adjectives or adverbs, and 10 prepositions. Apart from the prepositions,
other closed-class words are definite and indefinite articles, and the pronouns “his”, “her”,
“my”, “me”, and “that”. Of the nouns, 20 described story characters or groups of people like
“police” or “Mafia”. Ten of the words describing characters were names (“I” is considered
a name here rather than a pronoun); the rest were more abstract descriptions of characters
like “cop” or “fiancee”.
Before DISCERN’s processing modules could be trained to process the story cor-
pus, it was necessary to develop meaningful word representations for these words based on
the way in which they were used in the input stories. This was achieved using the FGREP
algorithm described in Section 3.1.2.
Since both the story corpus and the vocabulary were many times larger than any that
had been used in DISCERN previously, some preliminary experiments were necessary to
determine the behavior of the algorithm. These experiments led to several observations that
proved to be useful in developing a large lexicon with FGREP. First, the success of FGREP
depended to some degree on the size of the word representations, but above a certain size,
larger representations lead to no additional benefit. In this case, representations of size
12 turned out to be close to optimal – the default size that was also used in the original
DISCERN model.
Second, FGREP worked well when word representations were trained while sen-
tences were processed by DISCERN’s sentence parser module. Using any other combina-
tion of modules reduced the quality of the word representations, i.e. the similarity of repre-
sentations did not reflect word similarity as well. One reason for this difference in FGREP
performance between modules could be that the input to the sentence parser network is
a single word representation at a time. The input layers of DISCERN’s other processing
modules all consist of multiple words, which may lead to a noisier, less word-specific error
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signal. It is also possible that the patterns of use and co-ocurrence in sentences are clearer
and more useful than, say, in slot-filler representations.
The quality of word representations also depended significantly on the duration
of training, on the learning rates for connection weights and for word representations, on
network size, and on a range of other parameters. The best word representations seemed
to result when relatively small sentence parser networks were trained for a relatively short
period, and when the learning rate for word representations was significantly higher than
the one used for network connections. Intuitively, the opposite should be true for each of
these parameters: longer training and larger networks should make learning easier; learning
rates should be higher for the network connections in order to avoid moving-target effects
(Miikkulainen 1993). The reason for this behavior remains to be investigated in future
work.
The FGREP algorithm did, however, produce a set of high-quality word representa-
tions. The best results were trained using a sentence parser network with 12 input units, 150
hidden units, and 60 output units. FGREP training lasted for 500 epochs, i.e. the network
was exposed to each sentence in the corpus 500 times. The learning rate was 0.01 for net-
work connections and 0.1 for word representations. The values of the word representations
were clipped to the interval [0, 1].
By the end of training, the word representations reflected the similarities between
the concepts well: words whose representations were close tended to denote similar con-
cepts, and usually belonged to the same lexical category. Table 4.2 illustrates this tendency
by listing the four closest words (by Euclidean distance) for a representative subset of words
in the lexicon. Note, for example, how the names of story characters form a tight and well-
defined cluster. With only a single exception, the words closest to each name are other
names. Note also that the closest name to Joe is Vito, reflecting the similarity of the self’s
boss and the Mafia boss mentioned in the previous section. Other word categories form
similar clusters, although they are generally not as tight as the cluster of story characters.
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Table 4.2: The four words with the most similar FGREP representations (by Euclidean
distance) are shown for a representative subset of the lexicon. Similarity of word represen-
tations corresponds well with similarity of word meaning.
Word Closest Second Third Fourth Distance
I Vince Tony Joe Fred (0.23–0.43)
Stacy Kate Mary Fred Vito (0.08–0.31)
Mary Stacy Kate Vito Bob (0.15–0.28)
Joe Vito Mary Kate Fred (0.21–0.32)
Tony Vince I the Joe (0.22–0.48)
Vince Tony I Fred Joe (0.22–0.41)
Vito Joe Mary Stacy Bob (0.21–0.31)
man Joe Tony I Vito (0.47–0.60)
boss girlfriend fiancee pulled-over mother (0.41–0.83)
co-worker mother friend fiancee brought (0.67–0.90)
girlfriend boss mother pulled-over fiancee (0.41–0.78)
friend mother co-worker girlfriend brought (0.45–0.99)
mother friend girlfriend co-worker accused (0.45–0.80)
doctor gangster beer cigarette late (0.32–0.91)
Mafia police job bag St-vincent’s (0.53–0.83)
police Mafia job bad Moe’s-tavern (0.53–1.02)
New-york Starbucks LA city-hall St-vincent’s (0.50–0.72)
Chicago LA St-vincent’s New-york fine (0.22–0.79)
airport Four-seasons city-hall guns books (0.57–0.66)
Starbucks city-hall New-york Four-seasons St-vincent’s (0.47–0.63)
city-hall Starbucks airport Four-seasons to (0.47–0.65)
wedding murder meeting bombing Vince (0.39–0.60)
bombing murder meeting the wedding (0.39–0.54)
hated feared distrusted trusted $trial (0.72–0.80)
trusted loved feared distrusted kissed (0.11–0.52)
loved trusted distrusted feared kissed (0.11–0.60)
liked drank feared $plan Kate (0.90–1.00)
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Table 4.2 also illustrates another interesting feature of the FGREP representations:
the lists of similar words reflect a mixture of similarity in grammatical role and similarity
in semantic meaning. This effects is most clearly visible in the cluster of character names:
their grammatical roles are virtually identical, but the internal structure of the cluster never-
theless reflects more subtle similarities, e.g. Mary is closest to Stacy, and Tony is closest
to Vince. In the same way, the positive verbs loved and trusted are closer to each other
than to negative verbs like feared. This observation shows one of the main strengths of the
FGREP approach: When learning word representations from actual language, lexical cate-
gories provide the strongest and most immediate organizing principle, but once words are
ordered according to that principle, more subtle differences in the way words are used make
it possible to capture semantic meaning as well. Figure 4.2 shows a principal component
analysis of the 102 words that were used as slot fillers in the story corpus. Words cluster
relatively well according to grammatical role and semantic categories. Again, several levels
of more or less fine-grained neighborhood relationships expressing different levels of simi-
larity are visible. Note, for example, the cluster containing “rusty”, “nice”, and “compact”,
three words exclusively used in the story corpus to describe cars. Also note how the internal
structure of the tight cluster of character names. The two components shown account for
43% of the data variance.
In summary, the FGREP algorithm was able to learn word representations that re-
flect similarity of both lexical category and semantic meaning well. Both of these similari-
ties were learned exclusively from the way words were used in the input stories. Meaningful
word representations such as these are essential because they ensure that small errors in net-
work output translate into equally small errors in word selection, making DISCERN more










































































































Figure 4.2: Principal Component Analysis of word representations learned by the FGREP
algorithm. The set of 102 words that were used as slot fillers in the story corpus are shown.
Clusters form at different levels of detail, according to a mixture of grammatical role and
semantic similarity. Note e.g. the fine-grained structure in the central cluster of character
names. The two principal components shown account for 43% of the data variance. Some
labels (but not markers) were moved slightly to avoid overlap.
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4.4 Network Training
With the corpus and the word representations in place, the next step was to develop effective
methods to train the DISCERN model to understand and reproduce the stories. Network
sizes and parameters were determined empirically. Sentence parsers and generators had
250 hidden neurons, story parsers had 225, and story generators had 150. Memory encoder
networks had 48 hidden neurons.
Modules were trained in a chain, with the output from one module used as the input
for the next. Starting with the sentence parser module, new modules were added to the
chain successively as meaningful input became available during the course of learning.
The learning rate for each module was set to 0.4 times the average output error
of the module (root mean squared error, averaged over all outputs of the network during
the previous training epoch). In this way, the learning rate for each module decreased
automatically as the output error decreased during training, which allowed for fast weight
changes during early training as well as fine-tuning of network response at low learning
rates later on.
It should be noted that the usefulness of this kind of adaptive learning rates in back-
propagation training is controversial (Sarle 1997; Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis 1996). Neverthe-
less, it works well in the case of DISCERN. One particular advantage is that learning rates
adapt independently for each module, which reduces the complexity of training schedules
considerably.
A total of 70,000 backpropagation learning epochs were employed overall for each
DISCERN system, even though only a subset of all modules were trained during most
epochs. The following schedule was used to determine which modules to train at each
point during training:
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1. Until epoch 30,000: Train only the sentence parser module.
2. Epoch 30,000 – 40,000: Train the story parser module. The sentence parser module
is still running to provide input, but is not being trained.
3. Epoch 40,000 – 50,000: Train the memory encoder and story generator modules. The
sentence and story parsers are running to provide input, but are not being trained.
4. Epoch 50,000 – 60,000: Train the memory encoder, story generator, and sentence
generator modules. The sentence and story parsers are running to provide input, but
are not being trained.
5. Epoch 60,000 – 70,000: Train all modules in a chain.
The training schedule was determined empirically, and is based on a considerable
amount of trial and error. Overall, 30 “healthy” DISCERN systems were trained. All of
them learned to reproduce the story corpus almost perfectly. On average, 95.6% (SD 0.8%)
of sentences and 99.3% of words were reproduced correctly.
The majority of errors that occurred were consistent with errors commonly seen in
healthy humans. Seven of the 30 systems jumped once from one to another story that was
closely related. All seven jumps occurred in personal stories and stayed within context.
All systems sometimes confused story characters that were closely related, most frequently
Stacy and Mary. These confusions showed a strong tendency to stay within context: 86%
of the time, a character from the same context was inserted. Lexical errors were rare,
and almost always concerned words that were generally used to denote generic conversa-
tion topics (as in I talked to Mary about *books(movies)). Lexical errors stayed




This chapter described the steps that were completed in order to develop a set of undamaged
DISCERN systems as a basis for further experiments. An extensive corpus of input stories
was developed and discussed in detail. Based on the words occuring in the stories, word
representations were trained to reflect word meanings using the FGREP algorithm. Training
methods were developed and then used to train a set of 30 complete DISCERN systems.
The recall errors of the resulting systems were analyzed and found to be consistent with
normal human performance. The final “healthy” DISCERN systems formed the starting
point for the simulations of schizophrenic language described in the next chapters.
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Chapter 5
Experiment I: Matching Human
Story Recall Data
The foundation of the work reported in this chapter is an experimental study of story re-
call in patients with schizophrenia, designed and conducted by Ralph Hoffman and his
colleagues at Yale (Hoffman et al. 2010) as part of a joint project with this dissertation
research. Participants in the study listened to several short stories, and later attempted to
recall them as precisely as possible. Insertions, omissions, and recall errors that occurred
were recorded and analyzed, creating a detailed characterization of language disturbance in
schizophrenia. The scoring methodology of the human study was designed with compu-
tational modeling (and the DISCERN model) in mind. Thus, these data present a unique
opportunity to tackle one of the main problems that this dissertation is trying to solve, which
is to evaluate and distinguish candidate illness mechanisms in a rigorous and quantitative
way. Because DISCERN’s output is (a simplified version of) human language, equivalent
scoring methods can be easily designed for DISCEN. The different illness mechanisms
can then be characterized in DISCERN, and compared to human data. The quality of the
match can be used to judge which illness mechanism is more likely to cause the observed
impairments in patients.
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The remainder of this chapter first reviews the study of human story recall, includ-
ing the experimental design, methodology, and the resulting data. Building on the human
study, the next section then describes the methods used to match illness mechanisms to
human data, and the computational experiments that were conducted. The results of these
experiments are presented next, and are discussed in detail.
5.1 Human Story Recall in Schizophrenia
The participants in the study were 20 healthy controls and 37 patients with schizophre-
nia. The patients were all relatively stable outpatients under medication, diagnosed psy-
chiatrically with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder. These diagnoses were based on
DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association 2000), established using the Compre-
hensive Assessment of Symptoms and History (CASH; Andreasen 1987). The Yale Uni-
versity School of Medicine Human Investigation Committee approved the human subjects
study. Written, informed consent was obtained from all subjects.
In order to examine language-related manifestations of delusions more closely, the
patient group was further divided into those who definitely demonstrated evidence of fixed
delusions with a plot-like or narrative scheme, and those who showed questionable or no
evidence of such delusions. This distinction was made based on the presence of paranoid,
grandiose, or religious delusions, and excluded scores for non-fixed delusions (thought
broadcasting, thought control, thought insertion, and somatic delusions). Typical exam-
ples of such story-like delusions included God choosing the patient to eliminate racial op-
pression, and the patient being trailed by Homeland Security agents due to allegations of
terrorist activities.
The absence of psychiatric diagnosis in healthy controls was confirmed using the
non-patient version of the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV (First et al. 2002).
Antipsychotic drug levels of patients were quantified as chlorpromazine equivalents (Davis
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Table 5.1: Comparison of patients and healthy controls in the human story recall study,
including all individuals completing the seven-day recall task. Patients and controls are
generally well matched, although patients had slightly lower WAIS vocabulary scores.
Age1 Gender (M/F)
Parental edu- WAIS scaled
cation (grades) vocabulary score
Healthy controls
36.6 (9.0) 11/9 13.7 (4.0) 12.2 (3.0)(N = 20)
Patients with
41.5 (9.6) 16/21 15.1 (7.6) 9.9 (4.6)schizophrenia
(N = 37)
Significance test t(55) = 1.51, χ2 = 0.72 t(55) = 0.77, t(55) = 2.04,
(two-tailed) p = 0.14 p = 0.40 p = 0.44 p = 0.046
1mean (stdev)
1974; Woods 2003; Centorrino F 2002). Verbal abilities of all participants were estimated
using the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III vocabulary test (WAIS Wechsler 1987). A
comparison of patient and control groups in terms of age, gender, parental education and
vocabulary test performance is provided in Table 5.1. Patients and healthy controls were
generally well-matched, although patients had somewhat lower vocabulary scores (p =
0.046).
In the study, participants were asked to recall three short, pre-recorded stories. The
first story was selected from the Chicken Soup for the Soul book series (Cerf 1993), and
was chosen because it tended to elicit a sad emotional reaction in a small pilot study with
healthy controls. The second story was the “Anna Thompson” story borrowed from the
WAIS Logical Memory test, and the third was custom-written to resemble the others. All
three stories are reproduced below.
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“Flower” Story
In one seat of the bus a wispy old man sat holding a bunch of fresh flowers.
Across the aisle was a young girl whose eyes came back again and again to the
man’s flowers. The time came for the man to get off. He thrust the flowers into
the girls lap. “I can see you love flowers,” he explained, “and I think my wife
would like you to have them. Ill tell her I gave them to you.” The girl accepted
the flowers and watched the man get off the bus and walk through the gate of
an old cemetery.
“Anna Thompson” story
Anna Thompson of South Boston, employed as a cook in a school cafeteria,
reported at the police station that she had been held up on State Street the night
before and robbed of fifty-six dollars. She had four small children, the rent was
due, and they had not eaten for two days. The police, touched by the womans
story, took up a collection for her. Anna baked them a cake the following week.
Her oldest son, from then on, wanted to be a policeman. Anna never walked
down State Street again.
“Hitchhiker” story
I hitched into town. A wispy old man driving a pick-up truck with his frail wife
gave me a ride. I sat in the back and watched the tires kick up dust. We stopped
and waited for a traffic light. I turned around and peered into the rear window.
I hadn’t eaten all day and my eyes came back again and again to a bag of Fritos
on the dashboard. The man got out of the truck and walked around to the back.
“My wife noticed that you kept looking at the Fritos,” he explained, “and she
wanted you to have them.”
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Similar to the DISCERN story corpus described previously in Section 4.2, the stories were
selected (or, in the case of the Hitchhiker story, written) to have overlapping sctructure and
content in order to create the possibility of cross-over or transfer of content between stories.
The Flower story and the Hitchhiker story, for example, have similar narrative structure;
they also both involve travel and share a story character (the “wispy old man”). All three
stories share the theme of a gift being given to a story character.
All participants listened to all three stories in random order. Stories were presented
binaurally on headphones. All participants were asked to recall the stories three times:
once immediately, once 45 minutes after exposure, and once after seven days. If a sub-
ject was unable to recall any element of a particular story spontaneously, he or she was
prompted by a the title of the story. Seven-day recall was unannounced in order to pre-
vent rehearsal of stories in the intervening period. The recalled stories of all participants
were tape-recorded, transcribed, and then analyzed: errors and insertions were categorized
and counted, and overall recall success was scored. A number of outcome variables were
calculated based on these results. Among them were ungrammatical constructions, fail-
ures of pronoun reference, within-story accretions (misplaced content within a story), and
between-story migrations (content from one story intruding into another). The following
four variables, however, turned out to be the most reliable and descriptive, with parallel er-
rors of the same type generated by DISCERN under illness conditions, and were therefore
used as a basis of comparison with the computational model:
1. Recall success
In order to measure human recall, the three target stories were broken down into sets
of kernel propositions. Consider the first sentence of the Flower story: “In one seat
of the bus a wispy old man sat holding a bunch of fresh flowers.” This sentence was
translated into three kernels: (i) a man rode on a bus, (ii) the man was old/aged and
frail/weak, (iii) the man was holding/possessed flowers. The Flower story contained
12 kernel propositions, the Anna Thompson story contained 14, and the Gift story
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contained 10. Successful paraphrases for each kernel was scored if the gist was cap-
tured in the rater’s judgment. The final recall score was the total number of kernels
paraphrased successfully (scored as 1) or partially (scored as 0.5), divided by the
number of kernels in all three target stories (36). The recall success variable thus
represented the fraction of content correctly reproduced.
2. Derailments
A derailment was scored when a clause (independent or dependent) was produced
whose meaning was extraneous to or inconsistent with the target story. An example
from the Hitchhiker story, recalled by a patient with schizophrenia: “He got in the
truck and then they stopped for gas.” Stopping for gas was not part or the Hitchhiker
story, and the clause was therefore scored as a derailment. The outcome variable for
derailments was expressed as a penetrance score, meaning the number of derailments
divided by the number of correctly recalled propositions. In this way, the variable
measures the difficulty in following a consistent story line, expressed as a score that
is independent of the number and length of the recalled stories.
3. Agency shifts
These errors comprised a special category of word substitution error that specifically
involved story characters. The following example was produced by a patient in the
study:
“She gave the old man the flowers as a gift.”
In the original story, the old man gave the girl flowers. This segment therefore con-
tained two agency shifts, or agent-slotting errors: one for “She” and one for “the old
man.” Pronouns referring to people were scored as agency shifts if the implied noun
reference was incorrect. In patients, this variable turned out to be linked to fixed
delusions. Again, the outcome was expressed as a penetrance score.
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4. Lexical misfires
These errors were scored if a word (or word phrase) was replaced by another that
filled a similar sentence role, but where meaning was significantly changed from the
target text. Examples from human performance include:
“Her son was ecstatic” (the son felt good but not ecstatic).
“The old man got out of the *car (truck).”
Agency shifts as defined above were excluded from this category. The outcome
variable was lexical misfire penetrance, i.e. number of occurrences divided by recall
score.
For each subject, scoring was done by a rater who was not involved in data col-
lection, and who was blind to group, presence or absence of fixed delusions, and subject
identification. The interrater reliability obtained for all relevant outcome variables was ac-
ceptable (>0.6, see Table 5.1). Pooling data across both groups of human subjects, there
was no significant correlation between any of the performance variables, and age, education
level, or WAIS-scaled vocabulary, assuming an uncorrected cut-off of α = 0.05. Within
just the patient group, number of hospitalizations and antipsychotic dose (scored as chlor-
promazine equivalents) were also not significantly correlated with any of the performance
variables using the same cut-off.
The primary findings of the human study were as follows (Hoffman et al. 2010).
First, patients with schizophrenia were significantly less successful (p = 0.00001) at re-
Table 5.2: Interrater reliability of all
outcome variables is in the accept-
able range (> 0.6). Numbers are av-
eraged across immediate, 45-minute,
and seven-day story recall data for ten
subjects.
Variable Mean alpha (range)
Propositions recalled 0.98 (0.98 - 0.99)
Agency shifts 0.75 (0.66 - 0.89)
Lexical misfires 0.63 (0.38 - 0.94)
Derailments 0.87 (0. 78 - 0.93)
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Table 5.3: Comparative data for healthy controls and patients with schizophrenia-spectrum
disorder. Patients showed significant impairment in recall performance, and produced sig-
nificantly more derailments and agent-slotting errors. Lexical errors did not differentiate
the two groups.
Recall Derailment Agent-slotting Lexical misfire
success1 penetrance1 penetrance1 penetrance1
Healthy controls 0.67 (0.12) 0.022 (0.072) 0.012 (0.016) 0.026 (0.032)
Patients with
0.41 (0.23) 0.153 (0.178) 0.043 (0.061) 0.033 (.043)schizophrenia
Significance test4
t(55) = 4.9, t(52.1) = 3.9, t(44.8) = 3.0, t(49.3) = 0.7,
p = 0.00001 p = 0.00032,3 p = 0.0043 p = 0.493
1 mean (stdev); 2 after sqrt transformation to normalize data;
3 equal variance not assumed; 4 two-tailed, uncorrected.
producing story content than healthy controls. On average, the recall score was 41% after
seven days, or 61% of the average recall score of healthy controls.
Second, derailment behavior was relatively frequent in the patient group, like in the
following example produced by a patient in the study: “He got flowers. He looks over at the
girl who has blue eyes.” Penetrance of such insertions differentiated patients from controls
robustly (p = 0.0003, after square root transform to normalize data).
Third, patients were more likely than healthy controls to produce agency shifts (p =
0.004). More interestingly, the group of patients with fixed, story-like delusions made
significantly more agent-slotting errors than both healthy controls and patients without these
delusions (p = 0.015, corrected post-hoc comparison, α = 0.05), suggesting that agency
shifts may provide a promising model for delusion formation.
One surprising negative finding was that neither lexical misfires nor ungrammatical
language differentiated patients and controls. The frequency of lexical misfires was equally
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low in both patients and healthy controls (p = 0.49), and ungrammatical constructions were
virtually absent in all study participants.
The human subject data collected in this study present a unique opportunity to eval-
uate and distinguish the candidate illness models introduced in Section 3.2. The reminder
of this chapter describes the methods and the results of a computational study that was
designed to do so in a rigorous and quantitative way.
5.2 Methods
In order to evaluate DISCERN and the alternative illness models, a principled way to com-
pare the language produced by DISCERN to that of humans was needed.
While quantitative measures of verbal memory performance have been developed
for word list stimuli (Tremont et al. 2000), to our knowledge similar measures do not exist
for recall of narratives. Moreover, in the context of altered story recall in schizophrenia, a
meaningful comparison should not just measure performance, but instead attempt to capture
and compare important aspects of the specific alterations that were found to be relevant.
Based on the findings of the human study summarized in the previous section, such
a measure was developed for this experiment. It specifically focuses on the four outcome
variables introduced in the previous section: recall success, derailment penetrance, agency
shift penetrance, and lexical misfire penetrance.
The primary reason for choosing this set of variables as a basis for comparing hu-
man language to DISCERN was that they all indicated some interesting or distictive lan-
guage behavior in the human study. For example, recall that patients were more impaired
than controls in recall success, derailment penetrance, and agent-slotting error penetrance.
The lexical misfire penetrance did not differentiate patients from healthy controls, but was
used anyway because (1) this was a surprising finding, and (2) different lesions in DIS-
CERN tended to produce different rates of word selection errors (see e.g. Figure 6.3 in the
next chapter).
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A fifth variable, measuring ungrammatical constructions, was initially used, but was
discarded from the analysis because both human study subjects and DISCERN produced
virtually no ungrammatical language. The variable was therefore not useful in comparing
alternative simulations to the human data.
Other variables were discarded because no equivalent scoring method was available
for DISCERN. For example, pronoun reference failures could not be used because DIS-
CERN used only very few pronouns (at least in the current story corpus). Between-story
migrations (content from one story intruding into another) could also not be used, because
all stories in DISCERN’s memory were known, so most errors fell into this category. In hu-
mans, on the other hand, intrusions could presumably come from an extremely large number
of narrative memories in addition to the target stories used in the experiment. In contrast,
the four variables used for comparison could be scored in DISCERN in a straightforward
way that was very close or identical to the scoring for human data:
1. Recall success
Sentences in DISCERN were short and contained no dependent clauses, so each sen-
tence was counted as one kernel proposition. Recall success was calculated as the
total number of sentences accurately reproduced, divided by the total number of sen-
tences in the corpus of target stories. Stories in DISCERN were much more numerous
and often more extended, yielding a total number of 549 kernels.
2. Derailments
In DISCERN, derailments were scored when recall switched from one story to an-
other during recall. The number of derailed sentences was counted and divided by
the number of correctly recalled sentences. The resulting penetrance score measured
DISCERN’s difficulty in maintaining a consistent story line.
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3. Agency shifts
Identical to the study of human story recall, agency shifts were scored when DIS-
CERN substituted on story character for another. An example from a DISCERN
simulation:
I talked to *Stacy(Kate) about *Kate(Stacy).
where Kate is the mother of the first-person character and Stacy is his girlfriend.
Like in the example of human agent-slotting errors shown earlier, two story characters
are switched, and two agency shifts are scored. The human story recall data suggests
that such agent-slotting errors can indicate narrative-type fixed delusions.
4. Lexical misfires
Like in the human subject study, these errors were scored when DISCERN substi-
tuted one word for another word that belonged to the same lexical category, unless
the substitution was already scored as an agency shift. Examples from DISCERN’s
output include
Vince drove *recklessly(carefully).
Vito was from *LA(Chicago).
Kate liked *guns(books).
The following word substitutions, on the other hand, were not scored as lexical mis-
fires because they crossed lexical categories:
Vince killed *the(Tony).
I was *wedding(late).
Such ungrammatical constructions were rare in this experiment: Most word substitu-
tions in DISCERN involved semantically related words.
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Based on these four variables, a measure was developed for how well an illness
model matched the human data. It calculated the goodness of fit (GOF) for a specific le-
sioned DISCERN system using a mean square deviation metric (Schobel et al. 2009):










where GOFC|P (D,m, f) is the goodness-of-fit of a given DISCERN exemplar D
with illness model (lesion) L applied at lesion stregth s, and output filter threshold f . GOF
is calculated relative to either the group of human healthy controls C or human patients
with schizophrenia P . V̄ C|Pi is the mean value of the story-recall variable i (either recall
success, derailments, agency shifts, or lexical misfires) calculated for the subject group C
or P . Vi(D,L, s, f) is the score for that same variable for the DISCERN exemplar D with
lesion L at stregth s and filter parameter f . SE(V C|Pi ) is the standard error of the mean for
variable i. Note that a lower GOF score implies a better fit.
The goodness-of-fit measure was then used to compare alternative illness models
to human data. The 30 “healthy” DISCERN models developed in Chapter 4 formed the
starting point for this experiment. The initial unlesioned models recalled the entire story
corpus reliably, with average sentence-level recall at 95.6% (SD 0.8%).
Each of the eight illness models introduced in Section 3.2 was then tested to deter-
mine which one could create the best fit to human data. This comparison was done by the
following method, once for the patient group P and once for the healthy control group C.
First, for each illness model L and each of the 30 initial DISCERN systems D,
the best-fit combination of lesion strength s and output filter setting f was determined.
GOFC|P (D,L, s, f) was calculated for each combination (s, f) on a 100 × 1000 grid of
lesion strengths and filter settings.
The 100 lesion strengths were spaced equally between zero and a strength where
recall performance was close to 30%. Filter settings were varied between zero and a setting
89
that filtered over 90% of the output of unlesioned systems. Preliminary experiments were
undertaken to ensure that increasing the resolution of the parameter search further would
not alter the outcome significantly.
The result of this parameter search was the best GOF for system D and lesion L,
indicating how well lesion L was able to match the human subject group using DISCERN
system D. The best-fit GOF data for all 30 systems and all eight lesions were then analyzed
to determine which illness model fit the human data best. For the comparison, mixed models
were used with best-fit GOF as the response variable, DISCERN systems as the clustering
factor, and type of lesion (eight levels) and group (healthy control versus patient) as within-
subject factors.
The two illness models that matched patient data best, i.e. working memory dis-
connection and hyperlearning, were then studied in more detail. The parameter space of
both models was expanded by applying the same lesion in a second location. This expan-
sion meant that these models now had three parameters: the lesion strengths s1 and s2 for
lesions in two separate locations and, as before, the filter setting f .
Hyperlearning was expanded by applying it to the generator modules of DISCERN
in addition to the memory encoder module. Network training was adjusted such that s1 was
the learning rate for the memory encoder network, and s2 was now the learning rate for
story and sentence generator modules.
Working memory disconnection was expanded by pruning the story generator’s out-
put connections in addition to the connections between context and hidden layer. The le-
sion parameters s1 and s2 were used as pruning thresholds for, respectively, the context-to-
hidden layer connections and the hidden-to-output layer connections.
The two expanded illness models were then compared to each other in fundamen-
tally the same way as the two-parameter models. The available computing resources made it
possible to expand the parameter space to three dimensions, but the resolution for the lesion
strength variables had to be reduced to 40, so that the parameter space was a 40×40×1000
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grid. The statistical approach was the same as previously, using mixed models with the
second lesion parameter as an additional fixed effect.
In order to model fixed delusions, the systematicity of DISCERN’s agent-slotting
errors needed to be investigated, i.e. whether or not the same confusion of a personal-story
and a gangster-story character tended to recur in the output stories. This systematicity
was measured by generating cross-context errors randomly (using the same base rate for
each agent as in the story corpus), and counting how many of the errors were repeats of
earlier ones (in the same or opposite direction). The same total number of errors as in the
30 DISCERN exemplars together was generated 10,000 times, and the rate of systematic
errors compared to that of DISCERN simulations.
5.3 Results
In the first set of experiments, the eight two-parameter models were compared first to the
healthy control group and then to the patient group. A mixed model revealed a significant
subject-group × lesion interaction (F (7, 203) = 36.7, p < 0.0001).
No illness model had a significant advantage matching the story-recall performance
of controls (F (7, 203) = 1.91, p = 0.07). Figure 5.1A compares the best-fit GOF values
obtained by matching each lesion to the healthy control group. In contrast, the eight illness
models differed significantly in how well they matched the patients’ story-recall perfor-
mance (F (7, 203) = 50.5, p < 0.0001). Working memory disconnection and hyperlearn-
ing were robustly superior to the other six models in terms of GOF to patient performance
((p < 0.0005 on paired t-tests) but were not significantly different from each other (Figure
5.1B, Table 5.4).
That the different illness models differ in matching patients but not healthy controls
suggests that some models are indeed better able to capture specific aspects of the patho-














































































































































































Figure 5.1: Goodness of fit of the 30 DISCERN exemplars to human story-recall data. The
plots show each of the eight illness models mapped using a mean square deviation metric to
the language profile of controls (A) and patients (B,C). GOF was log converted to normal-
ize distributions; smaller values represent a better fit. All mechanisms were equivalent in
matching the controls. However, hyperlearning and WM disconnection fit the patients better
than the other mechanisms (Table 5.4). (C) Adding a third parameter to disconnection and
hyperlearning models improved GOF to the patient language profile, with hyperlearning
fitting significantly better than WM disconnection.
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Table 5.4: Pairwise comparisons of optimized GOF for two-parameter hyperlearning and
two-parameter disconnection relative to the other six two-parameter models. Comparisons
are based on mixed model analysis1,2.
Hyperlearning WM Disconnection
t-test p-value t-test p-value
WM noise 3.9 < 0.0001 3.6 < 0.0004
WM gain reduction 7.8 < 0.0001 7.2 < 0.0001
Lowered WM bias 14.7 < 0.0001 13.3 < 0.0001
Semantic noise 9.9 < 0.0001 9.2 < 0.0001
Semantic overactivation 8.2 < 0.0001 7.7 < 0.0001
Semantic blurring 9.5 < 0.0001 8.8 < 0.0001
1df = 203, all pairwise comparisons favored 2D hyperlearning and disconnection over other
models; numbers in parentheses correspond to mechanism code illustrated in Figure 3.7;
2comparison of 2D hyperlearning vs 2D WM disconnection in terms of optimized GOF
with patient data was nonsignificant (t=0.09).
In the second experiment, these two illness models were further studied by adding a
second lesion parameter to each, resulting in a three-parameter model. The third parameter
improved the overall GOF to patient data significantly (F (1, 29) = 37.3, p < 0.0001). A
significant lesion × parameter interaction was detected (F (1, 29) = 10.3, p = 0.003), with
three-parameter hyperlearning producing a significantly better fit to the patient profile than
the three-parameter disconnection model (t(29) = 4.2, p = 0.0002).
In order to evaluate how well the best-fit illness model was able to reproduce the
actual language behavior of patients, the content of the language produced by the three-
parameter hyperlearning model was analyzed in detail. First, with regard to derailments,
midstream jumps from one story to another occurred in a highly systematic fashion in both
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the model and the patients (who were in relatively stable condition during the study). Most
striking was that emotional valence was retained from the pre- to the post-derailment story
in 90.1% of the 30 simulations. Moreover, personal stories tended to derail to other personal
stories, and gangster stories tended to derail to other gangster stories. Overall, only 15.1%
of derailments violated context. A typical example of an autobiographical derailment was
initiated when DISCERN recalled story about the self meeting his mother, Kate, for a drink,
and recounting some of her attributes:
Kate had a ponytail.
Kate drove a nice car.
Kate liked books.
DISCERN then switched into another personal story with similar content and struc-
ture, in which the self meets his girlfriend Stacy for a drink:
I talked to *Kate(Stacy) about *guns(books).
I like *baseball(books).
I liked talking with Stacy.
Note that the derailment includes an agent slotting error that is consistent with the
original story. In patients with schizophrenia, derailments are often accompanied by such
errors. The two lexical misfires both substitute closely related words – guns, book, and
baseball all appear in the corpus mainly as topics of conversation, only distinguishable
by the people who talk about them. This, also, is consistent with the kind of errors seen in
patients. Interestingly, the original story continues with
I talked to Kate about Stacy
I liked Stacy
[...]
It seems that the imminent appearence of Stacy in the target story may have caused
the confusion between the two stories, suggesting that, at least in this case, the discourse was
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derailed by a confusion between two alternative discourse plans with similar content, rather
than more low-level fluctuations in network error. Also of note is that both the “meeting
Kate for a drink” and the “meeting Stacy for a drink” stories (#18 and #16 in the story
corpus) were assigned the same emotional valence, “+,”, so DISCERN could not rely on
this information to guide story recall.
Second, in regard to delusions, recall that the human data demonstrated that patients
with fixed, story-like delusions are more likely than others to produce agent-slotting errors.
This suggests a possible theory of delusion formation: delusional ideas and stories could
emerge when agents (specifically the self) cross over into impersonal stories, creating spu-
rious and possibly frightening narratives that are then remembered as lived experience. In
order for this agent-slotting model of delusions to work, agency shifts need to cross contexts
in a systematic fashion.
The hyperlearning systems produced cross-context agent-slotting errors in a highly
systematic fashion: the same two characters, one from an autobiographical story and the
other from a crime story, were interchanged on average 2.5 occasions (range 0-10) per
exemplar. For example, the following output was generated by one hyperlearning exemplar
when recalling Story #2:
*Vito(Joe) was in his 30s.
Joe was a doctor.
Joe worked in New York.
Joe was my boss.
In the story corpus, Vito is the boss of the Mafia gang in the gangster context,
while Joe is the boss of the self in autobiographical stories. Later, for Story #10, the same
DISCERN system produced
Vito was a famous gangster.




The same confusion occurred again while recalling Story #27:
Vince went to Starbucks.
Vince sat at a table.
Vince liked Vito.
Vince feared *Joe(Vito).
Vince accepted the order.
Vince drove to City Hall.
Vince was scared.
Vince drove carefully.
Vince entered City Hall for murder.
In the original version of this story, Vince, a Mafia hitman, received an order from
Vito to kill Tony, another gangster. Again, the Joe reference is substituted for Vito. In
human terms, it seems plausible that a tendency to systematically confuse Joe and Vito
could lead to a delusional belief that one’s boss is really a Mafia boss. The frequency with
which the same pair of agents was confused across contexts by best-fit three-parameter
hyperlearning models was robustly greater than expected by chance (p < 0.00001 in the
randomization test). This finding demonstrates that these models confuse story characters in
a systematic fashion, suggesting that the hyperlearning model may indeed capture a central
aspect of the emergence of delusinoal narratives in humans.
5.4 Conclusion
Eight alternative illness models based on DISCERN were compared to human language and
memory performance based on a combination of four measures: recall success, derailment
errors, agent-slotting errors, and lexical misfire errors. A mean square deviation metric
was used to estimate how well the different illness models were able to match both healthy
humans and patients with schizophrenia.
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The main result of this experiment is that whereas all eight illness mechanisms
were equivalent in matching the story-recall profile of healthy controls, hyperlearning was
significantly better than the others in matching the story-recall profile of patients. Taken
together, these findings suggest that the hyperlearning model captures specific aspects of
altered brain processes underlying schizophrenia, rather than nonspecific sources of error-
proneness demonstrated by human subjects overall.
The language resulting from hyperlearning resembles that produced by patients also
qualitatively. Derailments are highly non-random and appear to be caused by distortions of
discourse planning rather than lower-level network damage, similar to derailment behavior
seen in patients. Delusions are modeled by systematic agent-slotting errors that cross over
between contexts, which accounts for human data and suggests that delusions could form
when characters (specifically the self) cross over into impersonal stories, creating spurious
narratives that are then remembered as lived experience.
In summary, these findings demonstrate that using the DISCERN model, it is possi-
ble to evaluate and compare alternative illness models to human performance in a rigorous
and quantitative way. Hyperlearning emerged as the best illness model, and was able to
capture the language impairment observed in patients both quantitatively and qualitatively.
However, recall that the patients who participated in the study were in relatively
stable condition, so the best-fit simulations produced more or less intact stories rather than
the more severely impaired language often seen in acute psychosis. An attempt to simulate
these more severe language abnormalities was the logical next step.
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Chapter 6
Experiment II: Psychotic Language
Psychosis is the hallmark of schizophrenia (Kapur 2003), and the positive symptoms of
schizophrenia are of special interest to this work. First, they are among the most distinctive,
and therefore among the easiest to identify in the language of patients (or DISCERN).
They are central to the definition and diagnosis of schizophrenia, and they tend to dominate
in the early stages of the disorder, where models of intervention could be most useful.
Consequently, this chapter aims to recreate the language disturbance characteristic of acute
psychosis, and evaluates the ability of the illness models to do so.
6.1 Characterizing Schizophrenic Language
There is not much quantitative data available about the precise language disturbance profile
of actively psychotic patients with schizophrenia. However, diagnostic criteria (American
Psychiatric Association 2000; Andreasen 1984, 1987) and the literature that exists (e.g. An-
dreasen 1979; Hoffman et al. 1986; Appelbaum et al. 1999; Covington et al. 2005; Kuper-
berg 2010) provide a relatively clear qualitative picture of the kind of language disturbance
that would produce a compelling model of psychosis in schizophrenia.
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Since delusions and disorganized speech are the major psychotic symptoms of
schizophrenia that are expressed directly via language, the experiments in this chapter will
focus on these two symptoms. Disorganized language is often characterized by derail-
ments, where patients tend to jump from one story to the next, creating a confusing, frag-
mented narrative composed of vaguely related “discourse shards” (Hoffman et al. 1986).
Andreasen (1979) also reported several other signs of language disorganization that are at
least “moderately common” in schizophrenia, including poverty of speech, tangentiality,
and perseveration.
Delusions in schizophrenia tend to stay fixed over time, and often have paranoid
or grandiose content (Harrow et al. 2004). A majority of these delusions insert the patient
or persons known to the patient into a rigid, implausible or bizarre narrative schema (Ap-
pelbaum et al. 1999; Vinogradov et al. 1992). The human subject study described earlier
confirmed that such agency shifts can be a sign of story-like delusions in patients, and the
computational study in the previous chapter suggested that agency shifts may be a mecha-
nism by which delusional narratives emerge.
At the sentence or word level, schizophrenic language tends to be mostly intact:
Word pronounciation, morphology, and syntax are all normal or nearly so (Covington et al.
2005; Hoffman and Sledge 1988), even though some syntactic impairments have been re-
ported (Hoffman and Sledge 1988).
Another reported characteristic of schizophrenia is insensitivity to context. In terms
of language abnormality, this means that words may often appear incongruous or inappro-
priate given the surrounding language. Such “context impairments” have also been pro-
posed as the underlying reason for language disorganization in general (Cohen and Servan-
Schreiber 1992; Kuperberg 2010). One way to distinguish alternative hypotheses, then,
would be to look for errors that could have been easily avoided by using contextual cues,
but not otherwise. The two separate contexts (personal and gangster stories) in the story
corpus (Section 4.2) were designed to provide opportunities to observe such errors. For
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example the self’s boss Joe and the gangster boss Vito are similar in many ways, but are
easily distinguished by the story context in which they appear.
Taken together, these features of schizophrenic language suggest that the process-
ing of overall discourse structure is more impaired than sentence-level language process-
ing: Derailments and delusions can be seen as failures of global story structure and content,
while locally, structure and meaning remain relatively intact. A successful model should be
able to capture these characteristics, i.e. errors should be failures of context and discourse
rather than break-down of syntax and lexical access. The experiment described in this chap-
ter evaluates and compares the ability of different illness models to recreate these features
of schizophrenic language.
6.2 Methods
The experiments in this chapter were conducted using ten heathy DISCERN systems that
were all trained in the same way but using different random initial connection weights. As
before, the story corpus, lexicon, and training schedule developed in Chapter 4 were used.
The average sentence-level recall rate of the intial undamaged systems was 96%.
The ten DISCERN systems were subjected to varying degrees of lesion damage
using the same eight simulated illness mechanisms investigated in the previous experiment.
Additionally, hyperlearning was applied to DISCERN’s generator modules, for a total of
nine lesions. The strength of each lesion was increased gradually, starting at zero and
adding small increments until the resulting recall performance was approximately 30%.
Since the present experiment focuses on psychotic language behavior rather than negative
symptoms, DISCERN’s output filter was not used. Table 6.1 provides an updated summary
of all lesions. For brevity, abbreviations from this table are used to refer to each lesion in
this chapter (e.g. “HLM” for “hyperlearning applied to the memory encoder module”).
Errors were counted and classified automatically, using the same error categories as
in the previous experiment, i.e. ungrammatical sentences, derailed language, lexical errors,
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Table 6.1: Candidate illness models used in experiment II.
Abbreviation Simulated illness mechanism Lesion parameter
SB Semantic Blurring Radius
WMD Working Memory Disconnection Pruning threshold
SN Semantic Noise Noise variance
WMG Working Memory Gain Reduction Gain change
EA Excessive Arousal States Added bias
SO Semantic Overactivation Added bias
WMN Working Memory Noise Noise variance
HLM Hyperlearning (Memory Encoder) Learning rate
HLG Hyperlearning (Generator Modules) Learning rate
and agency shifts. In addition to the basic categories of errors, a more detailed analysis of
the patterns and structure of agency shifts produced by different lesions was conducted for
this experiment. First, agency shifts were further divided into those that crossed contexts
(i.e. a gangster being inserted into a personal story or vice versa) and those that did not.
Second, a separate subcategory of agency shifts was created for self insertions. If a story
character was replaced by the self character, this was counted as a regular agency shift, but
also separately as a self insertion.
Third, agency shifts were divided into unique vs. repeated agency shifts. To be
counted as a repeat, the same substitution (i.e. the same combination of intruding and re-
placed character) had to have occurred previously within the same story. How many of the
observed agency shifts were repeated was used as a measure for the stability of patterns of
agency shifts.
Fourth, a weighted entropy metric was developed, intended as an alternative mea-
sure of the consistency and predictability of agency shifts. Intuitively, the entropy measure
computes how hard it is on average to predict agents in the output text, given previous






P (i, j)log2(P (i, j)),
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where A is the set of all agents in the story corpus, ni is the number of occurrences of agent
i in the story corpus, and P (i, j) is the relative frequency with which agent j (as opposed
to other characters) is substituted for agent i. The resulting measure of entropy is expressed
in bits. For example, if no agency shifts occur, the weighted entropy would be zero, and
if exactly half of the instances of every agent were replaced by one particular agent, the
weighted entropy would be 1 bit.
6.3 Overview of Results
All illness models reduced the recall performance and led to significant distortion of DIS-
CERN’s output language. This section analyzes the differences in the types and patterns of
recall errors across the alternative lesions. The goal is to determine which lesions are able
to produce language distortions that are both plausible models of psychotic symptoms and
consistent with the language observed in patients with schizophrenia.
Figure 6.1 gives an overview of the type of language distortion that was observed
following the different lesions. For each lesion, recall errors over a range of increasing
damage are broken down into the four error categories. Error percentages are averaged over
the ten individual DISCERN systems.
A few interesting differences are immediately obvious from these plots. First, the
two kinds of hyperlearning lesions seem to produce patterns of recall errors that are strik-
ingly different from each other. When hyperlearning is applied to the generator modules
(HLG), agency shifts dominate other errors; when it is applied to the memory encoder
module (HLM), most recall errors are derailments. No other lesions produces output that is
dominated by one kind of error in this way.
Second, both forms of hyperlearning produce virtually no ungrammatical language.
In contrast, all other lesion produce a substantial percentage of ungrammatical propositions.
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Figure 6.1: Overview of the type of the language
distortion observed following the different illness
models. For each lesion, recall errors were classified
over a range of increasing damage. Averages over
ten individual DISCERN systems are shown. The error
patterns produced by the hyperlearning lesions (HLM and HLG) are qualitatively
different from each other and from the other lesions: HLM produces mostly de-
railed language, and HLG produces mostly agency shifts. In contrast, error patterns
produced by the other lesions are relatively uniform, are not dominated by one kind
of error, and contain many grammatical errors.
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Finally, the patterns of all lesions that do not involve hyperlearning (called “non-
HL lesions”) are relatively uniform, although some produce more ungrammatical language
or derailments than others. Differences may still emerge from a more detailed analysis, but
it appears that the most promising qualitative differences exist between HLG, HLM, and
the non-HL lesions.
Note that DISCERN’s recall performance degrades differently and generally non-
linearly dependng on the lesion. It would therefore be difficult to find “eqivalent” lesion
stregths at which to compare the alternative lesions fairly. In order to avoid this problem,
reduced recall performance is used as a measure of impairment, and comparisons are gener-
ally made at equal levels of recall. Where it is necessary to pick a single level of impairment,
comparisons are made at 40% recall, which is typical for patients with schizophrenia (see
the human study described in Chapter 5). When measures of impairment other than recall
are used, they are motivated separately in each case.
The remainder of this chapter takes a closer look at the differences apparent in Fig-
ure 6.1, and examines the impact of different error patterns on the actual language produced
by DISCERN. The main goal is to determine if any lesions are able to produce language
abnormalities suggestive of (and consistent with) the psychotic symptoms of schizophrenia.
All data used in this experiment, including the output stories generated by all illness
models, can be found at http://nn.cs.utexas.edu/?schizo.
6.4 Grammatical and Lexical Errors
Patients with schizophrenia generally produce language with relatively intact syntax and
morphology, although exceptions have been reported. High levels of grammatical errors
would therefore be problematic in the output language generated after a lesion. Figure
6.2 shows the differences in ungrammatical language that were already visible in Figure
6.1 more clearly. On the left, the effects of four representative example lesions on the





























Figure 6.2: Left: The percentage of ungram-
matical language produced by four represen-
tative lesions is shown as lesion damage in-
creases and recall performance drops in re-
sponse. Clockwise, starting on the top left,
these lesions are HLM, HLG, WMN, and SO
(see Table 6.1 on page 101 for abbreviations).
Solid lines are averages over ten DISCERN















































































































































Right: The percentage of ungrammatical language for all lesions. For a fair compari-
son, the intensity of each lesion was adjusted so that recall performance was as close
as possible to 40% in each case. All lesions except HLM and HLG produce high levels
of ungrammatical language, which is not usually seen in schizophrenia.
the top left, these lesions are HLM, HLG, working memory noise (WMN), and semantic
overactivation (SO). For the larger plot on the right, the intensity of each lesion was adjusted
for each DISCERN system such that recall performance was as close as possible to 40%.
The levels of ungrammatical language observed in non-HL lesions are inconsistent
with the language observed in patients with schizophrenia, suggesting that these lesions are
























Figure 6.3: Left: The frequency of lexical er-
rors produced by different lesions as the im-
pairment increases. Solid lines are averages
of ten DISCERN systems; dots are individual
systems. Right: The number of agency shifts
for all lesions. For a fair comparison, lesion
strength was adjusted so that the recall perfor-
mance of each lesion was close to 40%. Con-
sistent with human data, hyperlearning lesions,





















































































































































ungrammatical language can be effectively eliminated at the cost of reduced language out-
put. This result is nevertheless problematic, because patients with schizophrenia do not
universally talk less. Non-HL lesions would therefore have trouble accounting for these
patients.
Similarly, Figure 6.3 illustrates that both hyperlearning lesions produce fewer lexi-
cal errors, i.e. recall errors where one word is substituted for another. This category excludes
errors that exchange story characters (agency shifts), which will be discussed in more detail
below.
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The following snippet of DISCERN’s output language illustrates the impact that
grammatical and lexical errors can have on stories recalled by DISCERN. It was produced
by a DISCERN system after WM disconnection (threshold 0.2). The overall sentence-level
recall of the system was 51%. Word substitutions are marked with an asterisk (*), and are
followed by the correct word in parentheses.
The Police investigated the bombing at City-Hall.
The Police looked for evidence.
The Police found that Tony bombed City-Hall.
The Police was after *to(Tony).
The Police was after Tony.
The Police thought that *the(Tony) bombed *airport(City-Hall).
The Police wanted to arrest *the(Tony).
The Police found that *to(Tony) *LA(was) *St-Mary’s(in).
The Police planned to arrest *I(Tony) in New-York.
[...]
In this example, distorted sentence constructions like “The Police found that to
LA St-Mary’s” make the text appear non-sensical (St. Mary’s is the hospital where the self
works). In contrast, the following was produced by the same DISCERN system reproducing
the same story after hyperlearning was applied to the generator modules (strength=0.3).
Even though the overall recall is about the same (5̃0%), the resulting language is much
more coherent and grammatical:
The Police investigated the bombing at City-Hall.
The Police looked for evidence.
The Police found that Tony bombed City-Hall.
The Police was after *I(Tony).
The Police was after *I(Tony).
The Police thought that *I(Tony) bombed City-Hall.
The Police wanted to arrest *Joe(Tony).
The Police found that *I(Tony) was in New-York.
The Police planned to arrest Tony in New-York.
[...]
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These short examples also illustrate a more general difference between hyperlearn-
ing and all other lesions: in the first example, syntax and meaning break down in a local
way, leaving the overall story random and meaningless. In the second example, the content
is changed in a way that changes the overall meaning of the story, but leaves it locally co-
herent. Errors of this kind, suggesting global errors of context and organization rather than
local, sentence-level breakdown are pervasive in schizophrenia. In the following two ex-
amples, these differences stand out even more clearly. Again, they are taken from the same
DISCERN system recalling the same story (story #12, script 1). The first was produced
following WMD (strength=0.27):
I went to Moe’s-Tavern.
I sat at the counter.
I ordered *coffee(beer).
I drank the *bombed(beer).
I met *airport(Joe) at Moe’s-Tavern.
The second example was produced using HLG (strength=0.36):
*Tony(I) went to Moe’s-Tavern.
*Tony(I) sat at the counter.
*Tony(I) ordered beer.
*Tony(I) drank the beer.
*Tony(I) met Joe at Moe’s-Tavern.
Again, WMD produces ungrammatical and apparently meningless language, while the lan-
guage generated by HLG remains locally consistent and coherent, while the overall meaning
is distorted.
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6.5 Agency Shifts and Delusional Language
A plausible model of delusional language needs to demonstrate how delusional ideas and
narratives could emerge from normal experience and shared cultural stories. As mentioned
earlier, one possible mechanism that has been proposed for delusion formation is that pa-
tients with schizophrenia insert themselves or persons in their life into complex imaginary
narratives, creating spurious memories that can acquire the same force as lived and remem-
bered reality. The concept of delusion formation based on such agency-shifts is supported
by fact that patients with fixed, story-like delusions are more likely to confuse agents when
recalling stories (Section 5.1).
Of all lesions investigated, only hyperlearning produced a compelling model of
delusional language. Applied to the generator networks, hyperlearning robustly produced
stable patterns of agency shifts where characters migrated between stories in a highly con-
sistent way. Like in the examples shown in the previous section, grammar and local struc-
ture stayed largely intact, while emerging patterns of agency shifts produced meaningful
(but distorted) new narratives. For example, in the following output text the gangster boss
Vito is replaced by the self’s own boss Joe:
*Joe(Vito) drove recklessly .
*Joe(Vito) was pulled-over by a cop.
The cop asked *Fred(Vito) for his license.
*Joe(Vito) gave his license to the cop.
The cop checked the license.
The cop arrest(ed) *Joe(Vito) for bombing.
*Joe(Vito) was accused of *murder(bombing).
*Joe(Vito) was brought before the court.
*Joe(Vito) had a good lawyer.

































Figure 6.4: Left: The number of unique vs.
repeated (within the same story) agency shifts
following four representative lesions. Solid
lines are averages of ten DISCERN systems
as the lesion damage increases. Agency shifts
following hyperlearning of generator networks
(HLG) tend to be repeated much more fre-
quently than those caused by semantic noise































































































































































(WMD). Hyperlearning applied to the memory encoder (HLM) produces few agency
shifts. Right: Average number of repeats per unique agency shift for all nine lesions.
Again, character substitutions following HLG are repeated much more frequently,
causing stable patterns of agency shifts suggestive of delusional content.
In this way, characters from the self’s personal context often intrude into gangster stories.
Combined with the substitution of “murder” for “bombing” this pattern of errors creates
a new story whose content has little to do with any input story DISCERN has ever seen.
It is easy to imagine how such stories, if they are remembered as real, could lead to the





























Figure 6.5: Left: The entropy, or randomness,
of agency shifts produced by different lesions
as the impairment increases. Solid lines are av-
erages of ten DISCERN systems; green dots are
individual systems. Agency shifts due to HLG
have lower entropy than SN or WMD because
they follow a more consistent pattern. Right:
Entropy of agency shifts for all lesions; for a











































































































































that each lesion produced close to 200 agency shifts. Again, HLG producesagency
shifts with lower entropy, suggesting more consistent and predictable error patterns.
HLM was omitted from this plot because it never produces 200 agency shifts, even
with very high lesion damage.
Consistent, “delusion-like” patterns of agency shifts such as these are pervasive in
the output of HLG, and very rare or absent in other lesions. Figure 6.4 shows that agency
shifts following HLG are more consistent than those generated by other lesions: they are
repeated several times on average within the same story. Agency shifts following other
lesions, including semantic noise (SN) and working memory disconnection (WMD), tend
to be repeated much less frequently. Interestingly, HLM produces very few agency shifts,
but also does not produce many repetitions.
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This finding is confirmed when the entropy of agency shifts is used as an alterna-
tive measure of consistency. Figure 6.5 shows that HLG produces agency shifts that have
lower entropy than those produced by other lesions, suggesting that they follow a more pre-
dictable pattern. To make a fair comparison possible in this case, the lesion strength was set
separately for each system and each lesion so that close to 200 agency shifts were produced.

























Figure 6.6: Comparing the frequency of self-
insertions into gangster stories caused by the
different lesions. Left: The number of self in-
sertions caused by four representative lesions
is shown as the lesion damage increases. Solid
lines are averages over ten DISCERN systems.
Right: Number of self insertions for all lesions
when recall is adjusted to 40% by varying the













































































































































a pronounced tendency to insert the self into gangster stories. Note that in some sys-
tems HLG does not cause any self-insertions, while in others, most (up to 80%) of all
agency shifts in gangster stories are self insertions.
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more agency shifts than other lesions at equal recall, and the entropy depends in large part
on the number of agency shifts.
Patients with story-like delusions often insert themselves into the delusional narra-
tive. For example, a delusional patient is more likely to believe that he himself, rather than
someone else, is being followed by the CIA. The agency shifts produced by HLG show
the same pattern. Often, when the self takes over for a gangster character the shift remains
stable throughout the remainder of the story:
The Police investigated the murder at City-Hall.
The Police looked for evidence.
The Police found that Vince killed Bob.
The Police was after Vince.
The Police was after Vince.
The Police thought that Vince *met(killed) Bob.
The Police wanted to arrest Vince.
The Police found that Vince was in New-York.
The Police planned to arrest Vince in New-York.
Vince wanted to go to *Chicago(LA).
*I(Vince) entered his car.
*I(Vince) drove to the airport.
*I(Vince) was *on-time(scared).
*I(Vince) drove recklessly.
*I(Vince) was pulled-over by a cop.
The cop asked *me(Vince) for his license.
*I(Vince) gave his license to the cop.
The cop checked the license.
The cop arrested *me(Vince) for *wedding(murder).
*I(Vince) was accused of murder.
*I(Vince) was brought before the court.
*I(Vince) had a good lawyer.
The court convicted *me(Vince) of *wedding(murder).
*I(Vince) went to jail.
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In this version of story #28, the self replaces the gangster Vince. Interestingly, the
word “murder” is replaced with “wedding”, a word that is otherwise exclusively used in
personal stories. This lexical error is repeated across two separate scripts. Note also that
the self is inserted not only through the word “I”, but also through “me” where appropriate.
That pronouns like “me”, “my”, and “his” are mostly (not always) correctly adapted is
further evidence that HLG distorts and impairs story processing in DISCERN at the level
of actual content rather than that of superficial language production.
Another interesting aspect of the patterns of self insertions produced by HLG is that
they tend to recur multiple times within the output of the same DISCERN system. Many
systems never insert the self character at all; however, those who do tend to do so repeatedly
over multiple stories. Figure 6.6 illustrates this tendency: not only are self insertions much
more frequent for HLG on average than for any other lesion – the distribution within the
HLG lesion is very broad, i.e. some systems produce very few self insertions, while in
some systems, up to 80% of agency shifts in gangster stories insert the self. The DISCERN
system that produced the example above was solidly in the latter category: It also produced
the following version of story #21, where the self takes over for the gangster Tony:
[...]
*I(Tony) was a *doctor(gangster) .
Tony worked for the Mafia.
*I(Tony) worked in New-York.
*I(Tony) hated *my(his) job.
*I(Tony) was a bad gangster.
*I(Tony) wanted to go to City-Hall.
*I(Tony) entered his car.
*I(Tony) drove to City-Hall.
*I(Tony) was *on-time(scared).
*I(Tony) drove *recklessly(carefully).
*I(Tony) entered City-Hall for *wedding(bombing).
Tony bombed City-Hall.
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The *meeting(bombing) was a success.
*Vince(Tony) made a phone-call.
*I(Tony) smoked a cigarette.
*I(Tony) went to Moe’s-Tavern.
*I(Tony) sat at the counter.
*I(Tony) ordered beer.
*I(Tony) drank the beer.
*I(Tony) met no-one at Moe’s-Tavern.
*I(Tony) ordered more beer.
*I(Tony) got very drunk.
*I(Tony) had a bad time.
In addition to the self insertions, the confusion between different types of events
recurs, this time including wedding, bombing, and meeting. This type of error is espe-
cially interesting because wedding, bombing, and murder (not meeting) are highly context-
specific. The fact that DISCERN confuses these concepts in a consistent manner suggests
that it specifically misreads cues concerning story context. In story #27 (recalled by the
same system) the self takes over for Vince once again, and the same confusion between
wedding, meeting, and murder re-emerges:
[...]
*I(Vince) wanted to go to City-Hall.
*I(Vince) entered his car.
Vince drove to City-Hall.
*I(Vince) was *on-time(scared).
*I(Vince) drove *recklessly(carefully).
*I(Vince) entered City-Hall for murder.
*I(Vince) killed Bob.
The *meeting(murder) was a success.
Vince made a phone-call.
*I(Vince) smoked a cigarette.
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*I(Vince) wanted to go to City-Hall.
*I(Vince) entered his car.
*I(Vince) drove to *to(City-Hall) *Four-Seasons(_).
*I(Vince) was scared.
*I(Vince) drove carefully.
*I(Vince) entered City-Hall for murder.
*I(Vince) killed Bob.
The *wedding(murder) was a success.
*I(Vince) made a phone-call.
*I(Vince) smoked a cigarette.
The three examples of self-insertions above were all taken from the output of the
same DISCERN system (#4) after the same lesion at the same strength was applied to it
(HLG at 0.35). The examples were selected in this way to demostrate that delusion-like
error patterns are often shared across stories within the same system. However, error pat-
terns like these are not specific to any DISCERN system or lesion strength. The following




*I(Tony) entered City-Hall for bombing.
*I(Tony) bombed City-Hall.
The *wedding(bombing) was a success.
*I(Tony) made a phone-call.
*I(Tony) smoked a cigarette.
[...]
Repeated patterns such as these are frequent, and occur in every single DISCERN sys-



























Agency Shifts Within Context
Figure 6.7: Agency shifts within the gangster
context are compared with agency shifts that
intrude from personal stories. Solid lines are
averages as the lesion strengths increase; green
circles are individual lesioned DISCERN sys-
tems. Four representative lesions are shown:
hyperlearning of the memory encoder (HLM),
hyperlearning of the generator modules (HLG),




























































































































































noise (SN). HLG inserts personal characters into gangster stories more frequently than
other lesions, suggesting that it impairs processing of context more.
and do not always produce new narratives that appear as meaningful. Agency shifts can
also involve character from the same story context, which is not common in schizophre-
nia patients. One possible reason for this mismatch is that personal and gangster contexts
in DISCERN are separated only implicitly by the presence of the self and other context-
specific characters and content. In humans, real lived memories are qualitatively different
from stories that are only experienced second-hand. Nevertheless, the data suggest that
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DISCERN picks up on contextual cues, and that HLG impairs processing of context more
(and other aspects of story processing less) than other lesions. Figure 6.7, for example,
shows that HLG, more than other lesions, tends to insert personal characters into gangster
stories, suggesting the insensitivity to context that is typical of schizophrenia.
6.6 Disorganized Speech
The HLG lesion (hyperlearning applied to the generator modules) was the focus of the
findings presented so far. While it produces an interesting and plausible mechanism by
which delusional stories and ideas may emerge, it does not produce many derailments, i.e.
it does not tend to switch from one story to another in the middle of recall. This finding in
itself is interesting, because derailments, just like delusions, are not shared by all patients
with schizophrenia. However, a model of psychotic language in schizophrenia would not
be complete if it did not account for mechanisms underlying derailed discourse.
Figure 6.8 illustrates the frequency of derailments for different lesions. The panel
on the right shows the percentage of derailed language produced by all lesions at 40%
recall. The two hyperlearning lesions differ dramatically in the amount of derailed language
they produce: HLG causes very few derailments, while the language produced by HLM is
derailed over 50% of the time on average, by far the most of all lesions. Several non-HL
lesions, including SN and WMG, produce little derailed language, while others, including
WMD and WMN, derail more frequently.
In the absence of patient data, the frequency of derailments alone cannot be used
to decide that one lesion is a better model of language disorganization than another. A
plausible model would be expected to produce a reasonable amount of derailed language,
but more importantly, the language should not contain too many other errors that disrupt
syntax and local story structure. Figure 6.9 shows that derailment-type errors dominate
other errors for HLM but not for other lesions. The following example illustrates the way in
which such word-level errors can make a story appear random and non-sensical rather than
disorganized. It was produced by the WMN lesion (system #3, strength=0.2):
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*Joe(I) went *St-Mary’s(to).
I sat at a table.
I *drove(ordered) coffee.
*Tony(I) drank the coffee.
*Tony(I) met *Kate(Mary) at Starbucks.
[jumping to Story #12]
Joe was the fiancee of *Joe(Mary).
I hated *Bob(Joe).
I *feared(distrusted) *man(Joe).
I talked to Mary about wedding.
I *liked(hated) *the(wedding) *City-Hall(_).
*Kate(I) talked to *to(Mary) *the(a) *Four-Seasons(short).
I liked talking to *Joe(Mary).
I gave a *hand-shake(kiss) good-bye to *Vince(Mary).
DISCERN does derail to another story, but language like “I drove coffee” and “Kate talked
to the Four Seasons” are too intrusive to create a credible simulation of derailed discourse.
The output language of HLM, on the other hand, contains fewer grammatical and lexical
errors, and when they do appear, they are much less disruptive:
[...]
I went to Four-Seasons.
I sat at a table.
I ordered wine.
I drank the wine.
I met *Stacy(Kate) at Four-Seasons.
[jumping to story #16]
Stacy was in her 20s.
Stacy had a ponytail.
Stacy was from New-York.




[jumping back to story #18]
I talked to Kate about *Kate(Stacy).
I liked *Mary(Stacy).
I talked to Kate a long time.
I liked talking to Kate.






















Figure 6.8: The frequency of derailments for
different lesions. Left: The number of derailed
sentences produced by four representative le-
sions are shown as the recall performance drops
due to lesion damage. Right: The percentage of
derailments produced by all lesions at 40% re-
call. The two hyperlearning lesions differ dra-
matically in the amount of derailments they


















































































































































HLM causes more derailments than any other lesion. Several non-HL lesions, includ-
ing SN and WMG, produce little derailed language, while others, including WMD and
WMN, derail more frequently.
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This version of story #18 (system #2; HLM at strength = 1.5) is interesting for
several other reasons as well. First, the jump to story 18 (which is about Stacy) is “fore-
shadowed” by the insertion of Stacy for Kate, which suggests that the jump is not merely
an error in producing the correct memory cue, but that content from another story intrudes
and interferes with DISCERN’s discourse plan. Second, when DISCERN then jumps back
to story #18, some confusion remains about who is talking to whom. Throughout the story,


































Figure 6.9: Left: Derailment penetrance vs.
word error penetrance. Word-level errors are
much more frequent than derailments for all
illness models except HLM. Right: The num-
ber of derailed sentences divided by the num-
ber of word-level errors for all illness mod-
els. Recall was adjusted to 40%. Several le-
sions produce derailed language (Figure 6.8),
but only HLM produces language where derail-






























































































































































even stronger in the similar example below, which was produced by a different DISCERN
system (#4; HLM at 1.3) while recalling story #11:
[...]
Mary was my friend.
I loved Mary.
I trusted Mary.
[jumping to story #16]
I talked to *Mary(Stacy) about *guns(books).
I liked *baseball(books).
I talked to *Kate(Stacy) a long time.
I liked talking to *Mary(Stacy).
[jumping to story #18]
I talked to Kate about *Mary(Stacy).
I liked *Kate(Stacy).
I talked to Kate a long time.
I liked talking to *Mary(Kate).
I gave a kiss good-bye to *Mary(Kate).
Stories #11, #16, and #18 mix and interfere with each other, creating the impres-
sion of a fragmented narrative typical of language disorganization in schizophrenia. The
same DISCERN system also produced interesting examples of the foreshadowing effect
mentioned above. First, consider the following version of story # 19:
[...]
I wanted to go to the meeting.
I entered my car.
I drove to the Four-Seasons.
I was late.
I drove *carefully(recklessly). [!]
[jumping to story #24]
Fred entered City-Hall for meeting.
Bob praised Fred.
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The meeting was a success.
Fred gave a speech.
Fred drank champagne.
Fred ordered more champagne.
Fred got a-little drunk.
Fred had a good time.
Before derailing to story #24, “carefully” intrudes from that story to replace “reck-
lessly”. Stories #24 and #19 are similar, but when Fred drives to his meeting, he is on time
and drives carefully, whereas I am late for my meeting, and drive recklessly. Later, when
recalling story #24, the same system produced the following:
[...]
Fred wanted to go to City-Hall.
Fred entered his car.
Fred drove to City-Hall.
Fred was on-time.
Fred drove *recklessly(carefully). [!]
Fred entered City-Hall for meeting.
[jumping to story #19]
I entered the Four-Seasons for meeting.
Joe praised me.
The meeting was a success.
I gave a speech.
I drank champagne.
[jumping back to story #24]
Fred ordered more champagne.
Fred got a-little drunk.
Fred had a good time.
This time, “recklessly” intrudes from story #19, foreshadowing an equivalent de-
railment in the other direction! Also note that the intrusion of “recklessly” is separated
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from the actual derailment by a sentence, so both were produced by separate cycles of the
story generator.
Not all instances of derailed language produced by HLM were equally consistent
with disorganized language in schizophrenia. In particular, at high lesion stregths, DIS-
CERN tended to oscillate between two stories, as in the following example:
The Police investigated the bombing at City-Hall.
The Police looked for evidence.
The Police found that Tony bombed City-Hall.
The Police was after Tony.
[jumping to story #28]
The Police was after Vince.
The Police thought that Vince killed Bob.
The Police wanted to arrest(ed) Vince.
The Police found that Vince was in New-York.
The Police planned to arrest(ed) Vince in New-York.
[jumping to story #14]
I wanted to go to home.
I entered my car.
I drove to home.
I was drunk.
I drove recklessly.
[jumping to story #28]
Vince was pulled-over by a cop.
The cop asked Vince for his license.
[jumping to story #14]
I was pulled-over by a cop.
[jumping to story #28]
Vince was pulled-over by a cop.
The cop asked Vince for his license.
[jumping to story #14]
I was pulled-over by a cop.
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[jumping to story #28]
Vince was pulled-over by a cop.
The cop asked Vince for his license.
[jumping to story #14]
I was pulled-over by a cop.
[...]
In this example, stories #28 and #14 intrude into the paraphrase of story #23. All
three stories have similar content: A different character is pulled over by the police each
time, and ends up getting arrested for a different reason. After the first jump to story #28,
DISCERN begins to jump back and forth between #28 and #14 until recall is cut off for
that story. Like before, the reason seems to be a conflict between two stories, resulting
in a fragmented story. However, oscillations between stories are not common in schizo-
phrenia, and were relatively frequent following HLM at high strength. Alternatively, the
oscillations could be interpreted as perseveration, which is a fairly common sign of schizo-
phrenic thought disorder (Andreasen 1979), and Maher et al. (1987) report that counted
repetitions of words and phrases significantly correlate with rated levels of derailments in
schizophrenia.
6.7 Conclusion
The experiments reported in this chapter attempted to reproduce the more intense symptoms
that occur during active psychotic episodes in schizophrenia, focusing again on derailments
and delusions. The main results were as follows. First, only the hyperlearning models were
able to produce compelling simulations of psychosis in schizophrenia. When hyperlearn-
ing was applied to the generator modules of DISCERN, stable patterns of agency shifts
ermerged that suggest a mechanism by which delusional narratives could be formed. This
finding was unique to the HLG lesion – no other lesion produced similar patterns of agency
shifts, and no other lesion showed the same tendency to insert the self across story contexts.
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Applied to the memory encoder, hyperlearning led to frequent derailments but not
to delusion-like language. Jumps to another story were often preceded by word insertions
from that story, suggesting that they were caused by disturbances on a deeper level than that
of faulty memory cues. Derailments often seemed to be caused by competition between
stories, resulting in signs of fragmented discourse similar to that in schizophrenia.
One of the most intriguing findings of this experiment is that each version of hyper-
learning produced a model for one psychotic symptom but not the other, depending on the
part of the model to which it was applied. Since delusions and derailments are two hall-
mark symptoms of (respectively) paranoid-type and disorganized-type schizophrenia, this
suggests that hyperlearing could model the emergence of clinical subtypes of schizophrenia




Discussion and Future Work
The experiments reported above demonstrate that the DISCERN model can indeed be used
to simulate and compare alternative illness mechanisms that could underlie schizophrenia.
Candidate illness models can be characterized by the ways in which they distort storytelling
in the model, and their viability and plausibility as models of schizophrenia can be judged
by comparing the errors they cause to those made by schizophrenic patients. Creating a
computational and experimental framework where hypotheses can be modeled and com-
pared in this way was one of the main goals of this dissertation.
Beyond the proof of concept, a more ambitious goal was to create an illness model
that actually captures important aspects of impaired story processing in schizophrenia, and
that represents a plausible hypothesis about its causes. The hyperlearning mechanism lo-
cated in different DISCERN modules produces such a hypothesis.
7.1 Summary of Results
The first set of experiments (Chapter 5) showed that hyperlearning can match the story-
recall profile of human patients with schizophrenia (but not healthy controls) significantly
better than other models. The resulting language of the best-fit hyperlearning models is also
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qualitatively similar to that produced by patients, including both derailments and delusion-
like fixations. These findings suggest that hyperlearning captures specific aspects of patho-
physiology underlying schizophrenia, rather than nonspecific sources of error-proneness
demonstrated by human subjects overall.
In the second experimental study (Chapter 6), where the ability of the illness models
to recreate more intense psychotic symptoms was tested, only the hyperlearning models
were able to produce compelling simulations of psychotic language. Hyperlearning applied
to DISCERN’s generator modules caused stable patterns of agency shifts to ermerge in
the output stories. Agents tended to cross over from autobiographical stories into gangster
stories more than would be expected by chance, and more than was the case for other
illness models. Hyperlearning also inserted the self into gangster stories very frequently,
sometimes replacing every instance of a gangster in an entire story.
This tendency to confuse the self systematically with agents in gangster stories is
one of the most interesting findings, because it creates a compelling model of a hallmark
type of delusion in schizophrenia, i.e. the self-referential type. In these delusions, agents
personally known to the patient (often the self) are confused with those in culturally en-
dorsed narratives. Examples include a patient claiming that she is the Virgin Mary, and
another that his upstairs neighbor is a CIA agent spying on him because he (the patient)
has classified government information. The hyperlearning model suggests a mechanism by
which such delusions could be formed: When the self crosses over into impersonal stories,
spurious new narratives are created. It is easy to imagine that such stories, if they are re-
membered as real, could lead to complex and frightening delusional ideas. This model of
fixed delusions was supported by data showing that patients with fixed narrative delusions
made more agent-slotting errors than healthy controls and patients without these delusions.
The model is unique to hyperlearning – no other illness model produced similar patterns of
agency shifts, or had the same tendency to insert the self across story contexts.
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When hyperlearning was applied to the memory encoder network, it caused frequent
derailments but no delusion-like language. Jumps to another story were often preceded by
word insertions from that story, suggesting that they were caused by disturbances of content
rather than non-specific network error. Derailments often seemed to be caused by compe-
tition between stories, resulting in signs of fragmented discourse typical of schizophrenia.
Furthermore, though several other illness models also caused derailments, only hyperlearn-
ing produced derailment behavior that was not accompanied by frequent lexical errors and
break-down of syntax, which is not usually the case with real schizophrenic language.
One of the most intriguing findings of this research is that hyperlearning produced
a model of delusions when applied to the generator modules, and of derailed speech when
applied to the memory encoder. Since delusions and derailments are hallmark symptoms
of (respectively) paranoid-type and disorganized-type schizophrenia, this suggests that hy-
perlearing could model how clinical subtypes of schizophrenia could share an underlying
brain mechanism, but could emerge independently from each other. This explanation could
also account for shared genetic vulnerabilities between subtypes, and for the fact that these
subtypes are not necessarily stable over time. An encouraging preliminary results is that
hyperlearning, applied to generators and memory encoder networks at the same time, can
produce both delusional and derailed language in the same DISCERN system.
7.2 The Hyperlearning Hypothesis
The initial success of the hyperlearning model in simulating speakers with schizophrenia
at different stages of the disorder suggests a promising direction for future research: Since
hyperlearning was able to model both the behavior of patients in acute psychotic states
(Chapter 6) and that of stable, medicated outpatients (Chapter 5), it seems likely that the
transition from the former state to the latter could be modeled as well. If successful, the
result would be the first simulation of antipsychotic drug action, potentially contributing to
a better understanding of their effects, and possibly to the development of more effective
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treatments in the future. Modeling antipsychotic drug action as a learning process also
explains why dopamine blockade does not relieve symptoms immediately.
The hyperlearning illness mechanism in the model arises from exaggerated back-
propagation error signaling. Normal backpropagation in DISCERN and other connectionist
models assumes a gradual consolidation process: Memories are replayed many times, and
connection weights are adjusted in small, incremental steps (McClelland et al. 1995). In-
terestingly, normal memory consolidation in humans appears to involve repeated replay of
memories as well (Euston et al. 2007), resulting in a gradual and incremental process that
occurs over weeks or months (McGaugh 2000). Consequently, exaggerated backpropaga-
tion can plausibly simulate aberrant human memory consolidation due to overexuberant
neuroplastic responses to prediction error (Kraus et al. 2009).
The hyperlearning hypothesis was inspired by Kapur’s (2003) theory concerning
motivational salience and psychosis, but it also converges with several recent behavioral
and neurobiological studies. For instance, shared emotional valence in DISCERN plays
an important role in triggering derailments, i.e. jumps from one story to another are very
likely to involve two stories with the same or similar emotional valence. Similarly, emo-
tionality has been found to prompt derailments in patients with schizophrenia (Docherty
et al. 1998). Second, the narrative templates in DISCERN can be seen as components of
social intelligence that predict goals and intentions of others (Bower and Morrow 1990);
thus corrupted narrative memories modeled in DISCERN could account for impaired the-
ory of mind in schizophrenia. Indeed delusions have been shown to be associated with an
impaired capacity to understand the mental states of others (Bentall et al. 2009).
On the neurobiological side, in a recent imaging study healthy subjects were given
a psychotomimetic drug (ketamine), and were then asked to perform an associative learning
task. Greater cortical response to prediction error was associated with delusion formation
when ketamine was administered (Corlett 2006). Furthermore, higher basal hippocam-
pal/parahippocampal activity has been linked with schizophrenia, speech disorganization,
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and delusion formation (Moritz et al. 2003; Heckers et al. 1998; McGuire 1998; Schobel
et al. 2009). These structures are central to memory consolidation (McGaugh 2000), and
their increased activation may therefore indicate a hyperlearning mechanism. Memory con-
solidation can also be enhanced by elevated dopamine neurotransmission (Schott et al.
2006; Wittmann et al. 2005). Since schizophrenic psychosis has been linked to a hyper-
dopaminergic state (van Os and Kapur 2009), enhanced memory consolidation may well be
the link between dopamine and psychosis.
The postulated hyperlearning mechanism should be studied experimentally in order
to determine if it actually happens in psychotic patients. Specifically, the neural correlates
of the predicted accelerated memory consolidation should be investigated. For instance,
hyperlearning in humans could be observed via functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI; Takashima et al. 2009). This could be especially interesting during sleep, and in
combination with behavioral measures of how fast and how well new memories are consol-
idated.
Another prediction of the hyperlearning model is that even brief periods of aberrant
memory consolidation, perhaps lasting only days or weeks, could produce enduring psy-
chosis. In DISCERN, a relatively small number of hyperlearning epochs (500) produced
enduring memory reorganization. Preliminary results suggest that once this has happens,
the “psychotic” network state is relatively stable, and can be reversed only with difficulty.
This result could explain why delusions in patients often stay fixed over many years, and
also why patients generally do not unlearn delusions but rather learn to limit their impact
(Kapur 2003). This finding also suggests that hyperlearning in humans might be detectable
as specific types of narrative learning impairments before the full syndrome of schizophre-
nia emerges (see for instance Brewer 2005), and novel interventions could be developed to
mitigate its effects.
In addition to the predictions on the level of neurobiology, hyperlearning, as an ex-
plicit computational process, predicts specific changes of information processing in schizo-
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phrenia. The effects of hyperlearning in DISCERN should therefore be analyzed in detail,
especially the way in which it affects the dynamics of story learning, and the way in which
internal network representations and the flow of information in the model change. Under-
standing hyperlearning on this level promises further ways to test and validate the model,
as well as a chance to gain new insights into the abnormal information processing that
underlies psychosis in humans.
The hyperlearning mechanism is not only a plausible and predictive illness model,
it also serves to demonstrate the strengths of the general modeling approach. First, hyper-
learning was not part of the initial set of planned illness models. Instead, it emerged from
preliminary experiments meant to explore the effects of compensatory network learning
while other lesions were applied. In this way, computational models can suggest novel,
alternative hypotheses through unexpected behavior. Second, several predictions of the
model were similarly unexpected, and demonstrate how emergent behavior can suggest
new explanations and tie together explanations of seemingly disparate symptoms. These
predictions include delusion formation through agency shifts and the existence of a shared
illness mechanism for different clinical subtypes. Third, hyperlearning demonstrates the
conceptual reach of neural network modeling: The simulation is based on a relatively ab-
stract theory, but offers a concrete, running interpretation of that theory, and is able to tie
together research findings on different levels of analysis.
7.3 Extending the DISCERN Model Further
If hyperlearning occurs in humans, then the model is clearly a simplified version of the real
process, just like DISCERN is a simplified version of human story processing. However,
another advantage of computational models is that refinement and extensions are a natural
part of their development. DISCERN was already extended significantly for this research,
and can be extended further in future work. For example, one limitation of the current
model is the absence of an explicit executive control mechanism, which could be added as
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a separate high-level control module (Miikkulainen 1993, 1996). Such a mechanism would
make it possible to simulate executive dysfunction, which has been linked to both speech
disorganization and delusions (Bentall et al. 2009; Kerns and Berenbaum 2003). The exec-
utive control model could include a model of attention and dopamine function, as suggested
by (Braver et al. 1999). Motivational salience could be modeled within this framework as
well, as a combination of emotional valence and unpredictability. DISCERN would then
remember and generate only the salient parts of a story, which could make simulations of
additional symptoms possible. For example a sign of thought disorder called pressure of
speech, where patients talk rapidly and incessantly, could be simulated. Executive control
could also provide an alternative model for alogia, simulating reduced output as a result of
inattention and blunted emotions, and a refined version of hyperlearning, e.g. one where
hyperlearning follows from network damage that increases prediction error.
Other possible extensions would put additional symptoms and illness mechanisms
within reach. One straightforward example is the inclusion of pronouns and pronoun reso-
lution. It is possible that this addition would only involve changes to the input stories, since
DISCERN already uses possessive pronouns correctly, and there is no obvious reason why
this ability would not scale up. Pronouns would make DISCERN’s language significantly
more realistic, and would also create an opportunity to model pronoun reference errors,
a common kind of error in schizophrenia. Hallucinations are another important symptom
that has so far not been modeled in DISCERN. Hallucinations cannot be observed directly
through DISCERN’s output language like derailments and delusional language. However,
spurious speech perceptions in the parser modules could arise in response to network dam-
age, which could be seen as a model of hallucinated speech. A previous similar approach
using a speech perception SRN (Hoffman and McGlashan 1997, 2006) observed such spon-
taneous perceptions in the absence of external input.
As DISCERN and the illness models are refined further over time, a more complete
picture of the mechanisms that are involved in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia may
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emerge. New experimental findings can be integrated into the model, possibly helping us
integrate them into the overall understanding of schizophrenia. In the short term, the most
important goal is to investigate experimentally whether the hypelearning mechanism hap-
pens in real psychotic patients. If validated, the hyperlearning hypothesis could contribute
to a better understanding of schizophrenia, and provide a platform for characterizing and




Hallmark symptoms of schizophrenia are expressed as language behavior, specifically as
defects of storytelling. These symptoms are diagnosed through clinical interviews, where
narrative language is used as a window to the schizophrenic mind. This dissertation was
motivated by the idea that computational models of schizophrenia should be able to do the
same. Consequently, the research reported here was an attempt to understand the nature
and pathophysiology of schizophrenia as disturbances in a computational model of story
processing.
The main contribution of this dissertation is the first simulation of a speaker with
schizophrenia. DISCERN, a neural network-based model of human story understanding
and recall, was used to simulate how hypothetical neurobiological illness mechanisms could
lead to abnormal storytelling observed in schizophrenia. The use of narrative language was
the main feature that set this work apart from previous computational models of schizo-
phrenia: In DISCERN, symptoms like delusions and derailments were observed directly at
the level of narrative language — the same level at which real patients are diagnosed.
Based on the research literature, a range of candidate illness mechanisms were sim-
ulated in the model, and the resulting abnormal storytelling was evaluated and compared
to that of patients with schizophrenia in two sets of computational experiments. First, data
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from a human subject study of story recall in schizophrenia was used to determine wich
illness model was able to fit the story-recall profile of patients best. Second, the ability of
the models to recreate the language of patients in acute psychotic phases of schizophrenia
was evaluated, focusing on derailment behavior and signs of delusions.
Of all illness models, hyperlearning, a model of overly intense memory consolida-
tion, produced the best fit to patient data, as well as compelling models of delusions and
derailments. The hyperlearning/DISCERN model of language disturbance in schizophrenia
is the second main contribution of this work. It represents a viable computational hypothe-
sis about the way in which dopamine imbalance could lead to psychosis, and it ties together,
and converges with, a range of previous research findings on dopamine imbalance, memory
consolidation, and psychosis in schizophrenia.
Predictions of the hyperlearning model include the formation of fixed delusions
through systematic confusion of agents and the existence of a shared underlying illness
mechanism for different clinical subtypes of schizophrenia. Additionally, the hyperlearning
hypothesis could be tested by studying the neural correlates of intensified memory consol-
idation in psychotic patients. If validated, the hyperlearning hypothesis could contribute to
a better understanding of schizophrenia, and provide a platform for simulating the effects
of medication and other future treatments.
“I have transformed the problem from an intractably difficult and possibly quite
insoluble conundrum into a mere linguistic puzzle. Albeit,” he muttered, after
a long moment of silent pondering, “an intractably difficult and possibly insol-
uble one.”





Emotion: neutral Context: Personal
[$person I 30s beard LA baseball beer rusty]
I was in my 30s. [I was 30s my _]
I had a beard. [I had _ _ beard]
I was from LA. [I was LA _ _]
I drove a rusty car. [I drove _ rusty car]
I liked baseball. [I liked _ _ baseball]
I liked beer. [I liked _ _ beer]
[$job I St-Vincent’s worked liked New-York good doctor]
I was a doctor. [I was _ _ doctor]
I worked for St-Vincent’s. [I worked St-Vincent’s _ _]
I worked in New-York. [I worked New-York _ _]
I liked my job. [I liked _ my job]
I was a good doctor. [I was _ good doctor]
story-end
Story #2
Emotion: very negative Context: Personal
[$person Joe 30s beard Chicago baseball wine nice]
Joe was in his 30s. [Joe 2was 30s his _]
Joe had a beard. [Joe had _ _ beard]
Joe was from Chicago. [Joe was Chicago _ _]
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Joe drove a nice car. [Joe drove _ nice car]
Joe liked baseball. [Joe liked _ _ baseball]
Joe liked wine. [Joe liked _ _ wine]
[$job Joe St-Vincent’s head liked New-York famous doctor]
Joe was a doctor. [Joe was _ _ doctor]
Joe was the head of St-Vincent’s. [Joe was St-Vincent’s _ head]
Joe worked in New-York. [Joe worked New-York _ _]
Joe liked his job. [Joe liked _ his job]
Joe was a famous doctor. [Joe was _ famous doctor]
[$relation I Joe hated distrusted _ my boss]
Joe was my boss. [Joe was _ my boss]
I hated Joe. [I hated _ _ Joe]
I distrusted Joe. [I distrusted _ _ Joe]
story-end
Story #3
Emotion: very positive Context: Personal
[$person Mary 30s ponytail LA movies books compact]
Mary was in her 30s. [Mary was 30s her _]
Mary had a ponytail. [Mary had _ _ ponytail]
Mary was from LA. [Mary was LA _ _]
Mary drove a compact car. [Mary drove _ compact car]
Mary liked movies. [Mary liked _ _ movies]
Mary liked books. [Mary liked _ _ books]
[$relation I Mary loved trusted _ my friend]
Mary was my friend. [Mary was _ my friend]
I loved Mary. [I loved _ _ Mary]
I trusted Mary. [I trusted _ _ Mary]
story-end
Story #4
Emotion: very positive Context: Personal
[$relation I Stacy liked trusted _ my girlfriend]
Stacy was my girlfriend. [Stacy was _ my girlfriend]
I liked Stacy. [I liked _ _ Stacy]
I trusted Stacy. [I trusted _ _ Stacy]
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[$person Stacy 20s ponytail New-York baseball New-York compact]
Stacy was in her 20s. [Stacy was 20s her _]
Stacy had a ponytail. [Stacy had _ _ ponytail]
Stacy was from New-York. [Stacy was New-York _ _]
Stacy drove a compact car. [Stacy drove _ compact car]
Stacy liked baseball. [Stacy liked _ _ baseball]
Stacy liked New-York. [Stacy liked _ _ New-York]
story-end
Story #5
Emotion: positive Context: Personal
[$person Kate 50s ponytail LA books wine nice]
Kate was in her 50s. [Kate was 50s her _]
Kate had a ponytail. [Kate had _ _ ponytail]
Kate was from LA. [Kate was LA _ _]
Kate drove a nice car. [Kate drove _ nice car]
Kate liked books. [Kate liked _ _ books]
Kate liked wine. [Kate liked _ _ wine]
[$relation I Kate loved trusted _ my mother]
Kate was my mother. [Kate was _ my mother]
I loved Kate. [I loved _ _ Kate]
I trusted Kate. [I trusted _ _ Kate]
story-end
Story #6
Emotion: neutral Context: Gangster
[$person Fred 30s mustache New-York baseball guns rusty]
Fred was in his 30s. [Fred was 30s his _]
Fred had a mustache. [Fred had _ _ mustache]
Fred was from New-York. [Fred was New-York _ _]
Fred drove a rusty car. [Fred drove _ rusty car]
Fred liked baseball. [Fred liked _ _ baseball]
Fred liked guns. [Fred liked _ _ guns]
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[$job Fred Police worked liked New-York good cop]
Fred was a cop. [Fred was _ _ cop]
Fred worked for the Police. [Fred worked Police _ _]
Fred worked in New-York. [Fred worked New-York _ _]
Fred liked his job. [Fred liked _ his job]
Fred was a good cop. [Fred was _ good cop]
story-end
Story #7
Emotion: neutral Context: Gangster
[$person Bob 50s mustache Chicago guns baseball nice]
Bob was in his 50s. [Bob was 50s his _]
Bob had a mustache. [Bob had _ _ mustache]
Bob was from Chicago. [Bob was Chicago _ _]
Bob drove a nice car. [Bob drove _ nice car]
Bob liked guns. [Bob liked _ _ guns]
Bob liked baseball. [Bob liked _ _ baseball]
[$job Bob Police head liked City-Hall good cop]
Bob was a cop. [Bob was _ _ cop]
Bob was the head of the Police. [Bob was Police _ head]
Bob worked at City-Hall. [Bob worked City-Hall _ _]
Bob liked his job. [Bob liked _ his job]
Bob was a good cop. [Bob was _ good cop]
[$relation Fred Bob liked trusted _ Fred boss]
Bob was the boss of Fred. [Bob was Fred _ boss]
Fred liked Bob. [Fred liked _ _ Bob]
Fred trusted Bob. [Fred trusted _ _ Bob]
story-end
Story #8
Emotion: neutral Context: Gangster
[$person Tony 20s mustache Chicago baseball guns rusty]
Tony was in his 20s. [Tony was 20s his _]
Tony had a mustache. [Tony had _ _ mustache]
Tony was from Chicago. [Tony was Chicago _ _]
Tony drove a rusty car. [Tony drove _ rusty car]
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Tony liked baseball. [Tony liked _ _ baseball]
Tony liked guns. [Tony liked _ _ guns]
[$job Tony Mafia worked hated Chicago bad gangster]
Tony was a gangster. [Tony was _ _ gangster]
Tony worked for the Mafia. [Tony worked Mafia _ _]
Tony worked in Chicago. [Tony worked Chicago _ _]
Tony hated his job. [Tony hated _ his job]
Tony was a bad gangster. [Tony was _ bad gangster]
[$relation Vince Tony hated distrusted _ Vince co-worker]
Tony was a co-worker of Vince. [Tony was Vince _ co-worker]
Vince hated Tony. [Vince hated _ _ Tony]
Vince distrusted Tony. [Vince distrusted _ _ Tony]
story-end
Story #9
Emotion: neutral Context: Gangster
[$person Vince 30s beard LA guns movies nice]
Vince was in his 30s. [Vince was 30s his _]
Vince had a beard. [Vince had _ _ beard]
Vince was from LA. [Vince was LA _ _]
Vince drove a nice car. [Vince drove _ nice car]
Vince liked guns. [Vince liked _ _ guns]
Vince liked movies. [Vince liked _ _ movies]
[$job Vince Mafia worked liked LA good gangster]
Vince was a gangster. [Vince was _ _ gangster]
Vince worked for the Mafia. [Vince worked Mafia _ _]
Vince worked in LA. [Vince worked LA _ _]
Vince liked his job. [Vince liked _ his job]
Vince was a good gangster. [Vince was _ good gangster]
[$relation Tony Vince hated feared _ Tony co-worker]
Vince was a co-worker of Tony. [Vince was Tony _ co-worker]
Tony hated Vince. [Tony hated _ _ Vince]




Emotion: neutral Context: Gangster
[$person Vito 50s beard New-York guns baseball nice]
Vito was in his 50s. [Vito was 50s his _]
Vito had a beard. [Vito had _ _ beard]
Vito was from New-York. [Vito was New-York _ _]
Vito drove a nice car. [Vito drove _ nice car]
Vito liked guns. [Vito liked _ _ guns]
Vito liked baseball. [Vito liked _ _ baseball]
[$job Vito Mafia head liked New-York famous gangster]
Vito was a gangster. [Vito was _ _ gangster]
Vito was the head of the Mafia. [Vito was Mafia _ head]
Vito worked in New-York. [Vito worked New-York _ _]
Vito liked his job. [Vito liked _ his job]
Vito was a famous gangster. [Vito was _ famous gangster]
[$relation Vince Vito liked feared _ Vince boss]
Vito was the boss of Vince. [Vito was Vince _ boss]
Vince liked Vito. [Vince liked _ _ Vito]
Vince feared Vito. [Vince feared _ _ Vito]
[$relation Tony Vito hated feared _ Tony boss]
Vito was the boss of Tony. [Vito was Tony _ boss]
Tony hated Vito. [Tony hated _ _ Vito]
Tony feared Vito. [Tony feared _ _ Vito]
story-end
Story #11
Emotion: very positive Context: Personal
[$drink I Mary met Moe’s-Tavern table wine _]
I went to Moe’s-Tavern. [I went Moe’s-Tavern _ _]
I sat at a table. [I sat table _ _]
I ordered wine. [I ordered _ _ wine]
I drank the wine. [I drank _ _ wine]
I met Mary at Moe’s-Tavern. [I met Moe’s-Tavern _ Mary]
[$person Mary 20s ponytail LA movies books compact]
Mary was in her 20s. [Mary was 20s her _]
Mary had a ponytail. [Mary had _ _ ponytail]
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Mary was from LA. [Mary was LA _ _]
Mary drove a compact car. [Mary drove _ compact car]
Mary liked movies. [Mary liked _ _ movies]
Mary liked books. [Mary liked _ _ books]
[$relation I Mary loved trusted _ my friend]
Mary was my friend. [Mary was _ my friend]
I loved Mary. [I loved _ _ Mary]
I trusted Mary. [I trusted _ _ Mary]
[$talking I Mary liked liked kiss movies long]
I talked to Mary about movies. [I talked Mary about movies]
I liked movies. [I liked _ _ movies]
I talked to Mary a long time. [I talked Mary long time]
I liked talking to Mary. [I liked Mary _ talking]
I gave a kiss good-bye to Mary. [I gave Mary kiss good-bye]
story-end
Story #12
Emotion: negative Context: Personal
[$drink I Joe met Moe’s-Tavern counter beer _]
I went to Moe’s-Tavern. [I went Moe’s-Tavern _ _]
I sat at the counter. [I sat counter _ _]
I ordered beer. [I ordered _ _ beer]
I drank the beer. [I drank _ _ beer]
I met Joe at Moe’s-Tavern. [I met Moe’s-Tavern _ Joe]
[$relation I Joe hated distrusted _ my boss]
Joe was my boss. [Joe was _ my boss]
I hated Joe. [I hated _ _ Joe]
I distrusted Joe. [I distrusted _ _ Joe]
[$person Joe 30s beard Chicago baseball wine nice]
Joe was in his 30s. [Joe was 30s his _]
Joe had a beard. [Joe had _ _ beard]
Joe was from Chicago. [Joe was Chicago _ _]
Joe drove a nice car. [Joe drove _ nice car]
Joe liked baseball. [Joe liked _ _ baseball]
Joe liked wine. [Joe liked _ _ wine]
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[$relation Mary Joe hated distrusted _ I fiancee]
Joe was the fiancee of Mary. [Joe was Mary _ fiancee]
I hated Joe. [I hated _ _ Joe]
I distrusted Joe. [I distrusted _ _ Joe]
[$talking I Joe loved hated hand-shake Mary short]
I talked to Joe about Mary. [I talked Joe about Mary]
I loved Mary. [I loved _ _ Mary]
I talked to Joe a short time. [I talked Joe short time]
I hated talking to Joe. [I hated Joe _ talking]
I gave a hand-shake good-bye to Joe.
[I gave Joe hand-shake good-bye]
story-end
Story #13
Emotion: negative Context: Personal
[$drink I Mary met Starbucks table coffee _]
I went to Starbucks. [I went Starbucks _ _]
I sat at a table. [I sat table _ _]
I ordered coffee. [I ordered _ _ coffee]
I drank the coffee. [I drank _ _ coffee]
I met Mary at Starbucks. [I met Starbucks _ Mary]
[$relation Joe Mary loved trusted _ I fiancee]
Mary was the fiancee of Joe. [Mary was Joe _ fiancee]
I loved Mary. [I loved _ _ Mary]
I trusted Mary. [I trusted _ _ Mary]
[$talking I Mary hated liked kiss wedding short]
I talked to Mary about wedding. [I talked Mary about wedding]
I hated wedding. [I hated _ _ wedding]
I talked to Mary a short time. [I talked Mary short time]
I liked talking to Mary. [I liked Mary _ talking]




Emotion: very negative Context: Personal
[$drink I man met Moe’s-Tavern counter beer _]
I went to Moe’s-Tavern. [I went Moe’s-Tavern _ _]
I sat at the counter. [I sat counter _ _]
I ordered beer. [I ordered _ _ beer]
I drank the beer. [I drank _ _ beer]
I met man at Moe’s-Tavern. [I met Moe’s-Tavern _ man]
[$talking I man loved hated hand-shake Mary long]
I talked to man about Mary. [I talked man about Mary]
I loved Mary. [I loved _ _ Mary]
I talked to man a long time. [I talked man long time]
I hated talking to man. [I hated man _ talking]
I gave a hand-shake good-bye to man.
[I gave man hand-shake good-bye]
[$drunk I _ _ _ beer bad very]
I ordered more beer. [I ordered _ more beer]
I got very drunk. [I got _ very drunk]
I had a bad time. [I had _ bad time]
[$driving I _ drunk home home recklessly _]
I wanted to go to home. [I wanted home go _]
I entered my car. [I entered _ my car]
I drove to home. [I drove home _ _]
I was drunk. [I was _ _ drunk]
I drove recklessly. [I drove _ _ recklessly]
[$pulled-over I cop arrest(ed) _ DUI _ _]
I was pulled-over by a cop. [I was cop _ pulled-over]
The cop asked me for my license. [cop asked license my I]
I gave my license to The cop. [I gave cop my license]
The cop checked the license. [cop checked _ _ license]
The cop arrest(ed) me for DUI. [cop arrest(ed) DUI _ I]
[$trial I _ got convicted fine DUI bad]
I was accused of DUI. [I was DUI _ accused]
I was brought before the court. [I was court _ brought]
I had a bad lawyer. [I had _ bad lawyer]
The court convicted me of DUI. [court convicted DUI _ I]




Emotion: negative Context: Personal
[$drink Joe Mary met Four-Seasons table champagne _]
Joe went to Four-Seasons. [Joe went Four-Seasons _ _]
Joe sat at a table. [Joe sat table _ _]
Joe ordered champagne. [Joe ordered _ _ champagne]
Joe drank the champagne. [Joe drank _ _ champagne]
Joe met Mary at Four-Seasons. [Joe met Four-Seasons _ Mary]
[$relation Joe Mary loved trusted _ Joe girlfriend]
Mary was the girlfriend of Joe. [Mary was Joe _ girlfriend]
Joe loved Mary. [Joe loved _ _ Mary]
Joe trusted Mary. [Joe trusted _ _ Mary]
[$talking Joe Mary liked liked kiss wedding long]
Joe talked to Mary about wedding. [Joe talked Mary about wedding]
Joe liked the wedding. [Joe liked _ _ wedding]
Joe talked to Mary a long time. [Joe talked Mary long time]
Joe liked talking to Mary. [Joe liked Mary _ talking]
Joe gave a kiss good-bye to Mary. [Joe gave Mary kiss good-bye]
[$plan Mary people invite LA wedding I invitation]
Mary planned a wedding in LA. [Mary planned LA _ wedding]
Mary wanted to invite a-lot-of people.[Mary wanted _ invite people]
Mary sent invitation to me. [Mary sent I _ invitation]
I accepted the invitation. [I accepted _ _ invitation]
[$drunk Joe _ _ _ champagne good a-little]
Joe ordered more champagne. [Joe ordered _ more champagne]
Joe got a-little drunk. [Joe got _ a-little drunk]
Joe had a good time. [Joe had _ good time]
story-end
Story #16
Emotion: positive Context: Personal
[$drink I Stacy met Moe’s-Tavern table wine _]
I went to Moe’s-Tavern. [I went Moe’s-Tavern _ _]
I sat at a table. [I sat table _ _]
I ordered wine. [I ordered _ _ wine]
I drank the wine. [I drank _ _ wine]
I met Stacy at Moe’s-Tavern. [I met Moe’s-Tavern _ Stacy]
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[$relation I Stacy liked trusted _ my girlfriend]
Stacy was my girlfriend. [Stacy was _ my girlfriend]
I liked Stacy. [I liked _ _ Stacy]
I trusted Stacy. [I trusted _ _ Stacy]
[$person Stacy 20s ponytail New-York movies books compact]
Stacy was in her 20s. [Stacy was 20s her _]
Stacy had a ponytail. [Stacy had _ _ ponytail]
Stacy was from New-York. [Stacy was New-York _ _]
Stacy drove a compact car. [Stacy drove _ compact car]
Stacy liked movies. [Stacy liked _ _ movies]
Stacy liked books. [Stacy liked _ _ books]
[$talking I Stacy liked liked kiss books long]
I talked to Stacy about books. [I talked Stacy about books]
I liked books. [I liked _ _ books]
I talked to Stacy a long time. [I talked Stacy long time]
I liked talking to Stacy. [I liked Stacy _ talking]
I gave a kiss good-bye to Stacy. [I gave Stacy kiss good-bye]
story-end
Story #17
Emotion: very negative Context: Personal
[$driving I _ late Four-Seasons wedding carefully _]
I wanted to go to wedding. [I wanted wedding go _]
I entered my car. [I entered _ my car]
I drove to the Four-Seasons. [I drove Four-Seasons _ _]
I was late. [I was _ _ late]
I drove carefully. [I drove _ _ carefully]
[$occasion I Mary speech kissed Four-Seasons Joe wedding]
I entered the Four-Seasons for wedding.
[I entered wedding _ Four-Seasons]
Mary kissed Joe. [Mary kissed _ _ Joe]
The wedding was a success. [wedding was _ _ success]
I gave a speech. [I gave _ _ speech]
I drank champagne. [I drank _ _ champagne]
[$talking I Mary hated hated kiss wedding short]
I talked to Mary about wedding. [I talked Mary about wedding]
I hated wedding. [I hated _ _ wedding]
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I talked to Mary a short time. [I talked Mary short time]
I hated talking to Mary. [I hated Mary _ talking]
I gave a kiss good-bye to Mary. [I gave Mary kiss good-bye]
[$drunk I _ _ _ champagne bad very]
I ordered more champagne. [I ordered _ more champagne]
I got very drunk. [I got _ very drunk]
I had a bad time. [I had _ bad time]
story-end
Story #18
Emotion: positive Context: Personal
[$plan I Kate met LA meeting Kate invitation]
I planned a meeting in LA. [I planned LA _ meeting]
I wanted to met Kate. [I wanted _ met Kate]
I sent invitation to Kate. [I sent Kate _ invitation]
Kate accepted the invitation. [Kate accepted _ _ invitation]
[$relation I Kate loved trusted _ my mother]
Kate was my mother. [Kate was _ my mother]
I loved Kate. [I loved _ _ Kate]
I trusted Kate. [I trusted _ _ Kate]
[$flight I no-one _ New-York LA long late]
I entered the New-York airport. [I entered _ New-York airport]
I walked to the counter. [I walked counter _ _]
I checked my bag. [I checked _ my bag]
I walked to my gate. [I walked gate my _]
I entered the plane to LA. [I entered LA _ plane]
The plane was late. [plane was _ _ late]
I met no-one in the plane. [I met plane _ no-one]
[$drink I Kate met Four-Seasons table wine _]
I went to Four-Seasons. [I went Four-Seasons _ _]
I sat at a table. [I sat table _ _]
I ordered wine. [I ordered _ _ wine]
I drank the wine. [I drank _ _ wine]
I met Kate at Four-Seasons. [I met Four-Seasons _ Kate]
[$person Kate 50s ponytail LA books wine nice]
Kate was in her 50s. [Kate was 50s her _]
Kate had a ponytail. [Kate had _ _ ponytail]
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Kate was from LA. [Kate was LA _ _]
Kate drove a nice car. [Kate drove _ nice car]
Kate liked books. [Kate liked _ _ books]
Kate liked wine. [Kate liked _ _ wine]
[$talking I Kate liked liked kiss Stacy long]
I talked to Kate about Stacy. [I talked Kate about Stacy]
I liked Stacy. [I liked _ _ Stacy]
I talked to Kate a long time. [I talked Kate long time]
I liked talking to Kate. [I liked Kate _ talking]
I gave a kiss good-bye to Kate. [I gave Kate kiss good-bye]
story-end
Story #19
Emotion: positive Context: Personal
[$job Joe St-Vincent’s head liked New-York famous doctor]
Joe was a doctor. [Joe was _ _ doctor]
Joe was the head of St-Vincent’s. [Joe was St-Vincent’s _ head]
Joe worked in New-York. [Joe worked New-York _ _]
Joe liked his job. [Joe liked _ his job]
Joe was a famous doctor. [Joe was _ famous doctor]
[$relation I Joe hated distrusted _ my boss]
Joe was my boss. [Joe was _ my boss]
I hated Joe. [I hated _ _ Joe]
I distrusted Joe. [I distrusted _ _ Joe]
[$plan Joe people praise(d) New-York Meeting I invitation]
Joe planned a Meeting in New-York. [Joe planned New-York _ Meeting]
Joe wanted to praise(d) a-lot-of people.
[Joe wanted _ praise(d) people]
Joe sent invitation to me. [Joe sent I _ invitation]
I accepted the invitation. [I accepted _ _ invitation]
[$driving I _ late Four-Seasons meeting recklessly _]
I wanted to go to the meeting. [I wanted meeting go _]
I entered my car. [I entered _ my car]
I drove to the Four-Seasons. [I drove Four-Seasons _ _]
I was late. [I was _ _ late]
I drove recklessly. [I drove _ _ recklessly]
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[$occasion I Joe speech praise(d) Four-Seasons me meeting]
I entered the Four-Seasons for meeting.
[I entered meeting _ Four-Seasons]
Joe praise(d) me. [Joe praise(d) _ _ me]
The meeting was a success. [meeting was _ _ success]
I gave a speech. [I gave _ _ speech]
I drank champagne. [I drank _ _ champagne]
[$drunk I _ _ _ champagne good a-little]
I ordered more champagne. [I ordered _ more champagne]
I got a-little drunk. [I got _ a-little drunk]
I had a good time. [I had _ good time]
story-end
Story #20
Emotion: very negative Context: Gangster
[$job Vito Mafia head liked New-York famous gangster]
Vito was a gangster. [Vito was _ _ gangster]
Vito was the head of the Mafia. [Vito was Mafia _ head]
Vito worked in New-York. [Vito worked New-York _ _]
Vito liked his job. [Vito liked _ his job]
Vito was a famous gangster. [Vito was _ famous gangster]
[$plan Vito Tony met New-York meeting Tony invitation]
Vito planned a meeting in New-York. [Vito planned New-York _ mtg.]
Vito wanted to met Tony. [Vito wanted _ met Tony]
Vito sent invitation to Tony. [Vito sent Tony _ invitation]
Tony accepted the invitation. [Tony accepted _ _ invitation]
[$relation Tony Vito hated feared _ Tony boss]
Vito was the boss of Tony. [Vito was Tony _ boss]
Tony hated Vito. [Tony hated _ _ Vito]
Tony feared Vito. [Tony feared _ _ Vito]
[$flight Tony no-one _ Chicago New-York long late]
Tony entered the Chicago airport. [Tony entered _ Chicago airport]
Tony walked to the counter. [Tony walked counter _ _]
Tony checked his bag. [Tony checked _ his bag]
Tony walked to his gate. [Tony walked gate his _]
Tony entered the plane to New-York. [Tony entered New-York _ plane]
The plane was late. [plane was _ _ late]
Tony met no-one in the plane. [Tony met plane _ no-one]
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[$drink Tony Vito met Four-Seasons table wine _]
Tony went to Four-Seasons. [Tony went Four-Seasons _ _]
Tony sat at a table. [Tony sat table _ _]
Tony ordered wine. [Tony ordered _ _ wine]
Tony drank the wine. [Tony drank _ _ wine]
Tony met Vito at Four-Seasons. [Tony met Four-Seasons _ Vito]
[$plan Vito City-Hall bomb(ed) New-York bombing Tony order]
Vito planned a bombing in New-York.
[Vito planned New-York _ bombing]
Vito wanted to bomb(ed) City-Hall.
[Vito wanted _ bomb(ed) City-Hall]
Vito gave order to Tony. [Vito gave Tony _ order]
Tony accepted the order. [Tony accepted _ _ order]
story-end
Story #21
Emotion: very negative Context: Gangster
[$job Tony Mafia worked hated New-York bad gangster]
Tony was a gangster. [Tony was _ _ gangster]
Tony worked for the Mafia. [Tony worked Mafia _ _]
Tony worked in New-York. [Tony worked New-York _ _]
Tony hated his job. [Tony hated _ his job]
Tony was a bad gangster. [Tony was _ bad gangster]
[$driving Tony _ scared City-Hall City-Hall carefully _]
Tony wanted to go to City-Hall. [Tony wanted City-Hall go _]
Tony entered his car. [Tony entered _ his car]
Tony drove to City-Hall. [Tony drove City-Hall _ _]
Tony was scared. [Tony was _ _ scared]
Tony drove carefully. [Tony drove _ _ carefully]
[$occasion Tony Tony phone-call bomb(ed) City-Hall City-Hall bombing]
Tony entered City-Hall for bombing.
[Tony entered bombing _ City-Hall]
Tony bomb(ed) City-Hall. [Tony bomb(ed) _ _ City-Hall]
The bombing was a success. [bombing was _ _ success]
Tony made a phone-call. [Tony made _ _ phone-call]
Tony smoked a cigarette. [Tony smoked _ _ cigarette]
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[$drink Tony no-one met Moe’s-Tavern counter beer _]
Tony went to Moe’s-Tavern. [Tony went Moe’s-Tavern _ _]
Tony sat at the counter. [Tony sat counter _ _]
Tony ordered beer. [Tony ordered _ _ beer]
Tony drank the beer. [Tony drank _ _ beer]
Tony met no-one at Moe’s-Tavern. [Tony met Moe’s-Tavern _ no-one]
[$drunk Tony _ _ _ beer bad very]
Tony ordered more beer. [Tony ordered _ more beer]
Tony got very drunk. [Tony got _ very drunk]
Tony had a bad time. [Tony had _ bad time]
story-end
Story #22
Emotion: neutral Context: Gangster
[$drink Vince Vito met Moe’s-Tavern counter beer _]
Vince went to Moe’s-Tavern. [Vince went Moe’s-Tavern _ _]
Vince sat at the counter. [Vince sat counter _ _]
Vince ordered beer. [Vince ordered _ _ beer]
Vince drank the beer. [Vince drank _ _ beer]
Vince met Vito at Moe’s-Tavern. [Vince met Moe’s-Tavern _ Vito]
[$relation Vince Vito liked feared _ Vince boss]
Vito was the boss of Vince. [Vito was Vince _ boss]
Vince liked Vito. [Vince liked _ _ Vito]
Vince feared Vito. [Vince feared _ _ Vito]
[$person Vito 30s beard Chicago guns movies nice]
Vito was in his 30s. [Vito was 30s his _]
Vito had a beard. [Vito had _ _ beard]
Vito was from Chicago. [Vito was Chicago _ _]
Vito drove a nice car. [Vito drove _ nice car]
Vito liked guns. [Vito liked _ _ guns]
Vito liked movies. [Vito liked _ _ movies]
[$talking Vince Vito liked liked kiss guns long]
Vince talked to Vito about guns. [Vince talked Vito about guns]
Vince liked guns. [Vince liked _ _ guns]
Vince talked to Vito a long time. [Vince talked Vito long time]
Vince liked talking to Vito. [Vince liked Vito _ talking]
Vince gave a kiss good-bye to Vito. [Vince gave Vito kiss good-bye]
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[$drunk Vince _ _ _ beer good a-little]
Vince ordered more beer. [Vince ordered _ more beer]
Vince got a-little drunk. [Vince got _ a-little drunk]
Vince had a good time. [Vince had _ good time]
story-end
Story #23
Emotion: negative Context: Gangster
[$investigation Tony Police bomb(ed) City-Hall City-Hall bombing _]
The Police investigated the bombing at City-Hall.
[Police investigated City-Hall _ bombing]
The Police looked for evidence. [Police looked evidence _ _]
The Police found that Tony bomb(ed) City-Hall.
[Police found City-Hall bomb(ed) Tony]
The Police was after Tony. [Police was _ after Tony]
[$being-after Police Tony bomb(ed) arrest(ed) New-York City-Hall _]
The Police was after Tony. [Police was _ after Tony]
The Police thought that Tony bomb(ed) City-Hall.
[Police thought City-Hall bomb(ed) Tony]
The Police wanted to arrest(ed) Tony.
[Police wanted _ arrest(ed) Tony]
The Police found that Tony was in New-York.
[Police found New-York was Tony]
The Police planned to arrest(ed) Tony in New-York.
[Police planned New-York arrest(ed) Tony]
[$driving Tony _ scared Chicago Chicago recklessly _]
Tony wanted to go to Chicago. [Tony wanted Chicago go _]
Tony entered his car. [Tony entered _ his car]
Tony drove to Chicago. [Tony drove Chicago _ _]
Tony was scared. [Tony was _ _ scared]
Tony drove recklessly. [Tony drove _ _ recklessly]
[$job Fred Police worked liked New-York good cop]
Fred was a cop. [Fred was _ _ cop]
Fred worked for the Police. [Fred worked Police _ _]
Fred worked in New-York. [Fred worked New-York _ _]
Fred liked his job. [Fred liked _ his job]
Fred was a good cop. [Fred was _ good cop]
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[$pulled-over Tony Fred arrest(ed) _ bombing _ _]
Tony was pulled-over by Fred. [Tony was Fred _ pulled-over]
Fred asked Tony for his license. [Fred asked license his Tony]
Tony gave his license to Fred. [Tony gave Fred his license]
Fred checked the license. [Fred checked _ _ license]
Fred arrest(ed) Tony for bombing. [Fred arrest(ed) bombing _ Tony]
[$talking Tony Fred hated liked hand-shake Vito long]
Tony talked to Fred about Vito. [Tony talked Fred about Vito]
Tony hated Vito. [Tony hated _ _ Vito]
Tony talked to Fred a long time. [Tony talked Fred long time]
Tony liked talking to Fred. [Tony liked Fred _ talking]
Tony gave a hand-shake good-bye to Fred.
[Tony gave Fred hand-shake good-bye]
[$being-after Police Vito bomb(ed) arrest(ed) New-York City-Hall _]
The Police was after Vito. [Police was _ after Vito]
The Police thought that Vito bomb(ed) City-Hall.
[Police thought City-Hall bomb(ed) Vito]
The Police wanted to arrest(ed) Vito.
[Police wanted _ arrest(ed) Vito]
The Police found that Vito was in New-York.
[Police found New-York was Vito]
The Police planned to arrest(ed) Vito in New-York.
[Police planned New-York arrest(ed) Vito]
story-end
Story #24
Emotion: neutral Context: Gangster
[$relation Fred Bob liked trusted _ Fred boss]
Bob was the boss of Fred. [Bob was Fred _ boss]
Fred liked Bob. [Fred liked _ _ Bob]
Fred trusted Bob. [Fred trusted _ _ Bob]
[$plan Bob Fred praise(d) City-Hall Meeting Fred invitation]
Bob planned a Meeting at City-Hall.
[Bob planned City-Hall _ meeting]
Bob wanted to praise(d) Fred. [Bob wanted _ praise(d) Fred]
Bob sent invitation to Fred. [Bob sent Fred _ invitation]
Fred accepted the invitation. [Fred accepted _ _ invitation]
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[$driving Fred _ on-time City-Hall City-Hall carefully _]
Fred wanted to go to City-Hall. [Fred wanted City-Hall go _]
Fred entered his car. [Fred entered _ his car]
Fred drove to City-Hall. [Fred drove City-Hall _ _]
Fred was on-time. [Fred was _ _ on-time]
Fred drove carefully. [Fred drove _ _ carefully]
[$occasion Fred Bob speech praise(d) City-Hall Fred meeting]
Fred entered City-Hall for meeting.[Fred entered meeting _ City-H.]
Bob praise(d) Fred. [Bob praise(d) _ _ Fred]
The meeting was a success. [meeting was _ _ success]
Fred gave a speech. [Fred gave _ _ speech]
Fred drank champagne. [Fred drank _ _ champagne]
[$drunk Fred _ _ _ champagne good a-little]
Fred ordered more champagne. [Fred ordered _ more champagne]
Fred got a-little drunk. [Fred got _ a-little drunk]
Fred had a good time. [Fred had _ good time]
story-end
Story #25
Emotion: very negative Context: Gangster
[$job Vito Mafia head liked New-York famous gangster]
Vito was a gangster. [Vito was _ _ gangster]
Vito was the head of the Mafia. [Vito was Mafia _ head]
Vito worked in New-York. [Vito worked New-York _ _]
Vito liked his job. [Vito liked _ his job]
Vito was a famous gangster. [Vito was _ famous gangster]
[$driving Vito _ scared airport LA recklessly _]
Vito wanted to go to LA. [Vito wanted LA go _]
Vito entered his car. [Vito entered _ his car]
Vito drove to the airport. [Vito drove airport _ _]
Vito was scared. [Vito was _ _ scared]
Vito drove recklessly. [Vito drove _ _ recklessly]
[$pulled-over Vito cop arrest(ed) _ bombing _ _]
Vito was pulled-over by a cop. [Vito was cop _ pulled-over]
The cop asked Vito for his license. [cop asked license his Vito]
Vito gave his license to The cop. [Vito gave cop his license]
The cop checked the license. [cop checked _ _ license]
The cop arrest(ed) Vito for bombing.[cop arrest(ed) bombing _ Vito]
155
[$trial Vito _ walked cleared free bombing good]
Vito was accused of bombing. [Vito was bombing _ accused]
Vito was brought before the court. [Vito was court _ brought]
Vito had a good lawyer. [Vito had _ good lawyer]
The court cleared Vito of bombing. [court cleared bombing _ Vito]
Vito walked free. [Vito walked _ free _]
story-end
Story #26
Emotion: very negative Context: Gangster
[$being-after Mafia Tony talked kill(ed) New-York Police _]
The Mafia was after Tony. [Mafia was _ after Tony]
The Mafia thought that Tony talked to Police.
[Mafia thought Police talked Tony]
The Mafia wanted to kill(ed) Tony. [Mafia wanted _ kill(ed) Tony]
The Mafia found that Tony was in New-York.
[Mafia found New-York was Tony]
The Mafia planned to kill(ed) Tony in New-York.
[Mafia planned New-York kill(ed) Tony]
[$driving Vince _ on-time airport New-York carefully _]
Vince wanted to go to New-York. [Vince wanted New-York go _]
Vince entered his car. [Vince entered _ his car]
Vince drove to the airport. [Vince drove airport _ _]
Vince was on-time. [Vince was _ _ on-time]
Vince drove carefully. [Vince drove _ _ carefully]
[$flight Vince no-one _ LA New-York short late]
Vince entered the LA airport. [Vince entered _ LA airport]
Vince walked to the counter. [Vince walked counter _ _]
Vince checked his bag. [Vince checked _ his bag]
Vince walked to his gate. [Vince walked gate his _]
Vince entered the plane to New-York.
[Vince entered New-York _ plane]
The plane was late. [plane was _ _ late]
Vince met no-one in the plane. [Vince met plane _ no-one]
[$plan Vito Tony kill(ed) New-York murder Vince order]
Vito planned a murder in New-York. [Vito planned New-York _ murder]
Vito wanted to kill(ed) Tony. [Vito wanted _ kill(ed) Tony]
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Vito gave order to Vince. [Vito gave Vince _ order]
Vince accepted the order. [Vince accepted _ _ order]
[$driving Vince _ on-time Tony Tony carefully _]
Vince wanted to go to Tony. [Vince wanted Tony go _]
Vince entered his car. [Vince entered _ his car]
Vince drove to Tony. [Vince drove Tony _ _]
Vince was on-time. [Vince was _ _ on-time]
Vince drove carefully. [Vince drove _ _ carefully]
[$occasion Vince Vince phone-call kill(ed) Starbucks Tony murder]
Vince entered Starbucks for murder.
[Vince entered murder _ Starbucks]
Vince kill(ed) Tony. [Vince kill(ed) _ _ Tony]
The murder was a success. [murder was _ _ success]
Vince made a phone-call. [Vince made _ _ phone-call]
Vince smoked a cigarette. [Vince smoked _ _ cigarette]
[$investigation nothing Police _ Starbucks _ murder _]
The Police investigated the murder at Starbucks.
[Police investigated Starbucks _ murder]
The Police looked for evidence. [Police looked evidence _ _]
The Police found nothing. [Police found _ _ nothing]
The Police was after no-one. [Police was _ after no-one]
story-end
Story #27
Emotion: very negative Context: Gangster
[$drink Vince Vito met Starbucks table coffee _]
Vince went to Starbucks. [Vince went Starbucks _ _]
Vince sat at a table. [Vince sat table _ _]
Vince ordered coffee. [Vince ordered _ _ coffee]
Vince drank the coffee. [Vince drank _ _ coffee]
Vince met Vito at Starbucks. [Vince met Starbucks _ Vito]
[$relation Vince Vito liked feared _ Vince Boss]
Vito was the Boss of Vince. [Vito was Vince _ Boss]
Vince liked Vito. [Vince liked _ _ Vito]
Vince feared Vito. [Vince feared _ _ Vito]
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[$plan Vito Bob kill(ed) New-York murder Vince order]
Vito planned a murder in New-York. [Vito planned New-York _ murder]
Vito wanted to kill(ed) Bob. [Vito wanted _ kill(ed) Bob]
Vito gave order to Vince. [Vito gave Vince _ order]
Vince accepted the order. [Vince accepted _ _ order]
[$talking Vito Vince liked liked hand-shake murder short]
Vito talked to Vince about murder. [Vito talked Vince about murder]
Vito liked murder. [Vito liked _ _ murder]
Vito talked to Vince a short time. [Vito talked Vince short time]
Vito liked talking to Vince. [Vito liked Vince _ talking]
Vito gave a hand-shake good-bye to Vince.
[Vito gave Vince hand-shake good-bye]
[$driving Vince _ scared City-Hall City-Hall carefully _]
Vince wanted to go to City-Hall. [Vince wanted City-Hall go _]
Vince entered his car. [Vince entered _ his car]
Vince drove to City-Hall. [Vince drove City-Hall _ _]
Vince was scared. [Vince was _ _ scared]
Vince drove carefully. [Vince drove _ _ carefully]
[$occasion Vince Vince phone-call kill(ed) City-Hall Bob murder]
Vince entered City-Hall for murder.
[Vince entered murder _ City-Hall]
Vince kill(ed) Bob. [Vince kill(ed) _ _ Bob]
The murder was a success. [murder was _ _ success]
Vince made a phone-call. [Vince made _ _ phone-call]
Vince smoked a cigarette. [Vince smoked _ _ cigarette]
story-end
Story #28
Emotion: negative Context: Gangster
[$investigation Vince Police kill(ed) City-Hall Bob murder _]
The Police investigated the murder at City-Hall.
[Police investigated City-Hall _ murder]
The Police looked for evidence. [Police looked evidence _ _]
The Police found that Vince kill(ed) Bob.
[Police found Bob kill(ed) Vince]
The Police was after Vince. [Police was _ after Vince]
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[$being-after Police Vince kill(ed) arrest(ed) New-York Bob _]
The Police was after Vince. [Police was _ after Vince]
The Police thought that Vince kill(ed) Bob.
[Police thought Bob kill(ed) Vince]
The Police wanted to arrest(ed) Vince.
[Police wanted _ arrest(ed) Vince]
The Police found that Vince was in New-York.
[Police found New-York was Vince]
The Police planned to arrest(ed) Vince in New-York.
[Police planned New-York arrest(ed) Vince]
[$driving Vince _ scared airport LA recklessly _]
Vince wanted to go to LA. [Vince wanted LA go _]
Vince entered his car. [Vince entered _ his car]
Vince drove to the airport. [Vince drove airport _ _]
Vince was scared. [Vince was _ _ scared]
Vince drove recklessly. [Vince drove _ _ recklessly]
[$pulled-over Vince cop arrest(ed) _ murder _ _]
Vince was pulled-over by a cop. [Vince was cop _ pulled-over]
The cop asked Vince for his license. [cop asked license his Vince]
Vince gave his license to the cop. [Vince gave cop his license]
The cop checked the license. [cop checked _ _ license]
The cop arrest(ed) Vince for murder.[cop arrest(ed) murder _ Vince]
[$trial Vince _ went convicted jail murder good]
Vince was accused of murder. [Vince was murder _ accused]
Vince was brought before the court. [Vince was court _ brought]
Vince had a good lawyer. [Vince had _ good lawyer]
The court convicted Vince of murder.
[court convicted murder _ Vince]
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